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ABSTRACT 
  
The effectiveness of development assistance is one of the most contested debates 
in international development studies. While some of its most ardent supporters consider 
aid as the key to solving the plight of the developing world (e.g. Sachs 2006), its 
opponents consider it as part of the problem rather than the solution (e.g. Moyo 2009).  
By investigating the case of Afghanistan as one of the world’s largest aid recipients from 
2002 to 2014, I show that one reason for arriving at such diametrically opposed 
conclusions lies in the narrow definition of aid effectiveness as income growth rates. 
However, when this definition is broadened to incorporate various development 
outcomes, one arrives at a more nuanced understanding of the aid effectiveness question, 
and the conditions under which aid may be made more effective.  
I situate my thesis within the contingency school that establishes the effectiveness 
of aid conditional upon certain factors. Specifically, in this theory-confirming case study 
(Lijphart 1971), I test the hypothesis that the pre-aid level of local human capacity is a 
key determinant of aid effectiveness, defined here as the attainment of development 
outcomes in areas such as health, education, and infrastructure. This is in contrast to 
prevailing arguments on the supply-side factors such as volume of development 
assistance (Sachs 2006) or demand-side factors such as good policy environment 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000).  
 iii 
In order to develop and test this hypothesis, I exploit the within country, cross-
sector variations in the attainment of development outcomes between 2002 and 2014, as 
defined by the country’s poverty reduction strategy paper, called Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS). I find that achievements in some sectors – particularly 
health, education, and rural development – are far greater than those in other sectors, such 
as social protection and mining, even though all sectors operate under essentially the 
same conditions. Using the method of process tracing (informed by significant desk 
review and fieldwork), I show that the variations in aid effectiveness across sectors are 
best explained by variations in local human capacity.  
Focusing on health as the most successful sector as defined by ANDS, I trace this 
sector’s success to local capacities developed through the decades of the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s. During these decades, today’s policy makers and health practitioners received 
their medical training and professional experience while delivering basic health care 
services inside Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in Pakistan through working for 
different non-government organizations (NGOs). These experiences enabled them to play 
leadership roles in the country’s development process in the early 2000s. The relatively 
higher levels of local capacity in medicine are not surprising in the context of 
Afghanistan, where certain professions such as doctors and engineers, are highly sought-
after because of their social prestige value. Furthermore, skill development in these fields 
is reinforced through a higher education system that admits only the best minds in these 
fields.  
Two policy implications of the local human capacity hypothesis are especially 
pertinent. First, an intelligent allocation of development assistance should be informed by 
 iv 
an extensive assessment of existing local capacities in the recipient countries. Second, 
while channeling development assistance in capacity-rich sectors could yield significant 
results, capacity-poor sectors are better served by carefully crafted investments in 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
Flow of resources from one country or region to another has always been an 
important part of the international system. However, foreign aid as we know it – or 
official development assistance (ODA) – dates back to the establishment of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions after the Second World War. ODA flows on average make about only 
0.3% of donor countries’ gross national income (GNI), which is far below the United 
Nations’ 0.7% target. Regardless they play a critical role in some of the world’s poorest 
countries that rely heavily on aid to finance development and provide basic public 
services such as health and education. Since 1960, more than US$4 trillion in 
development assistance have been delivered. The annual volume of ODA disbursed in 
real terms has quadrupled from about US$37 billion in 1960 to nearly US$135 billion in 
2014 (OECD-DAC 2014). 
Afghanistan is a critical case study primarily because of the sheer volume of aid it 
has received in the last decade. In fact, based on the total amount of ODA received from 
1960 to 2013, Afghanistan is the fifth largest recipient of development assistance, after 
India, Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan respectively. However, in the post-2001 era, Afghanistan 
is now the second largest recipient of aid after Iraq. Together, Iraq and Afghanistan 
account for nearly 10% of all aid disbursed to developing countries between 2003 and 
2013. Afghanistan alone has received more ODA during this period than the entire region 
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of Sub-Saharan Africa. At its peak in the late 2000s, Afghanistan has received nearly 
US$7 billion in annual ODA, making up to 50% of its GDP and up to US$250 aid in per 
capita terms. These reasons make Afghanistan a critical case study as “an extreme outlier 
in its dependence on aid” (World Bank 2012b, 9). 
The growing volume of aid has been accompanied by a growing body of literature 
debating its effectiveness. In order to present a concise summary of this large and hard-
to-amalgamate body of literature, I divide it into two broad clusters based on their 
presumed indicator of aid effectiveness. The first cluster, dominated mostly by 
economists with reductionist tendencies in their approach, equates aid effectiveness with 
the attainment of increased rates of growth in gross domestic production (GDP) in 
recipient countries. This characterization is in light of the claim that those with 
reductionist, essentialist, or determinist tendencies reduce causal relationships to a few 
determinant or essential variables, such as ODA and GDP growth rate in this example.  
The second cluster adopts a broader definition of aid effectiveness, including the 
Human Development Index (HDI), poverty reduction, or attainment of other sector-
specific development outcomes, such as life expectancy, mortality ratios, and school 
enrollment rates. This cluster may be called anti-reductionist for its refusal to reduce 
causal relationships – believed to be over determined by a myriad of factors – to a select 
few variables. Out of practical necessity, even anti-reductionist researchers may have to 
limit their attention to a manageable list of variables as long as they are “aware of and 
explicit about” the partial and incomplete nature of their analysis and results thereof 
(Wolff and Resnick 1987, 20). 
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The majority of the literature in the first cluster that equate aid effectiveness with 
the attainment of increased GDP growth rates may be divided into three broad categories 
on the basis of their hypothesized causal mechanism between ODA and GDP growth 
(Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009; Radelet 2006; Hansen and Tarp 2000). Those in the 
first category are influenced by the theories of factor accumulation and look for a 
relationship between ODA and growth via increased savings and investment in recipient 
countries. Those in the second category strive to establish the aid-growth relationship 
without any intermediary variables. Those in the third category, which I call the 
contingency school, estimate the relationship between aid and growth, conditional upon 
certain factors, such as the degree of civil liberties (Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett 
1995), or good policy environment in recipient countries (Burnside and Dollar 2000). 
The defining features of the reductionist cluster include parsimony, clarity, 
precision, a call to action, and universalism, thus making the categorization of the 
aforementioned literature easier. The anti-reductionist cluster, on the other hand, does not 
come with these features. In fact, it acknowledges and allows for some opaqueness and 
obscurity in dealing with complexity. Instead, it allows its adherents the flexibility to 
analyze complex issues while acknowledging the associated limitations. For example, a 
noted anti-reductionist thinker and Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen (1992, 48) argues 
against over-precision in the domain of wellbeing as he considers it a “broad and partly 
opaque” concept. 
I believe that while each of these clusters offers unique insights and advantages 
into social inquiry, any one approach on its own is incomplete. The combined application 
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of both approaches should, therefore, yield more interesting discussion and more fruitful 
results. As a result, this study unfolds over two distinct stages; one in line with the 
reductionist approach that statistically investigates the relationship between aid and GDP 
growth, and the other in line with the anti-reductionist approach that qualitatively 
investigates the relationship between aid and various development outcome indicators, 
such as mortality rates.  
In the first stage, I undertake the conventional approach of assessing aid 
effectiveness in Afghanistan by attempting to show, quantitatively, whether increased 
volumes of aid have contributed to economic growth in the country. However, in the 
context of Afghanistan, where reliable data is extremely elusive, this type of quantitative 
analysis is extremely challenging at best. The available data, despite its fragmented and 
sometimes irreconcilable nature, is extracted from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) (World Bank 2014), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) and the Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) database 
on aid statistics (OECD-DAC 2014), complemented with data from the United Nations’ 
National Accounts Main Aggregate Database (United Nations 2015), and the Afghan 
government’s Ministry of Finance.  
Data imperfections preclude the possibility of carrying out advanced statistical 
analysis. Therefore, I limit my analysis to identifying the degree of correlation between 
aid and GDP with some analysis using two-stage and three-stage least squares methods. 
The simple test reveals almost perfect correlation between levels of ODA and GDP, with 
the highest coefficient of 0.9473 between levels of GDP and nominal aid. This is not 
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surprising in Afghanistan where aid makes a significant portion of the economy and the 
non-stationary nature of both ODA and GDP levels over time. 
Beyond the test of correlation, I use the available data to run simple time-series, 
ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) regressions, to analyze the direction and statistical significance of the 
relationship between the outcome and explanatory variables. In particular, I test five 
models, utilizing three measures of economic wellbeing (namely GDP growth rates, 
levels of GDP in current dollars and GDP per capita), and three measures of aid (namely, 
net ODA as a percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP, net ODA in current dollars and net ODA 
per capita). I use different measures of aid and outcome variables to make up for the 
losses due to incomplete data in any one measure. 
The OLS results indicate an overall positive relationship between aid and income. 
More specifically, I find that on average, a one percent increase in net ODA as a 
percentage of GDP is associated with a 0.035 percentage points increase in GDP growth 
rates. This finding, however, is not statistically significant. Replacing GDP growth rates 
with levels of GDP indicate that each dollar of foreign aid infused in the country is 
associated with a $2.28 increase in levels of GDP for the period 1960-2014, and $2.54 for 
the period 2001-2014. Lastly, I find that each dollar of foreign aid per capita is associated 
with a $1.81 increase in GDP per capita for the period 1960-2014. However, from 2001 
to 2014, each dollar of aid per capita is associated with increase of $2.36 in per capita 
GDP. These results are statistically significant.  
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One of the key shortcomings of the above OLS estimate is the endogeneity of the 
aid variables and potential reverse causality. One way to mitigate this concern is to use 
instrument variables that are uncorrelated to the error term but are correlated with the 
outcome variable only through its effect on the instrumented independent variable. The 
secret key to this model, however, is finding the right instrument variable. Fortunately, in 
time series analysis, lagged variables are usually a good candidate for instrument 
variables (Wooldridge 2009). Therefore, using the first lagged variable of the 
independent variable, I run two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions and estimate the 
coefficients discussed above. However, the results vary only slightly, and they fail the 
Hausman test to determine the superiority of 2SLS to OLS in this scenario. This is partly 
due to the limited number of data points given that the WDI database does not have any 
data for Afghanistan’s GDP growth rate prior to 2002.  
For this reason, I combine GDP growth rates from the UN National Accounts 
Main Aggregate Database (United Nations 2015), which includes data for Afghanistan’s 
GDP growth rate from 1972 through 2014. Using this expanded dataset, I apply three-
stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate the relationship between ODA and GDP growth 
rates. The resulting magnitude of the growth coefficient is higher than OLS estimates 
(0.035) and lower than 2SLS estimate (0.069). Specifically, the 3SLS estimate shows that 
a one percent increase in net ODA as a percentage of GDP is associated with a 0.054 
percentage point increase in GDP growth rates. This relationship, however, is not 
statistically significant at 5% levels.  
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In summary, the macro level evidence yields ambiguous results about the 
relationship between foreign aid and economic development for at least three reasons. 
First, missing data for many indicators and over the course of many years significantly 
limit the scope and strength of statistical analysis. A larger dataset would have allowed 
for the possibility of running more robust tests. Second, one has to acknowledge the 
methodological limitations so as not to erroneously equate correlation with causation. 
These simple regressions only indicate correlations and the conditions for establishing 
causality have not been strictly satisfied. Last, all the three models (OLS, 2SLS and 
3SLS) found positive, but statistically insignificant relationships between aid and growth, 
thus leaving the question on aid effectiveness, as narrowly defined by associated increase 
in GDP growth rates, unresolved. 
The ambiguity of these macro results, coupled with the other significant 
challenges that Afghanistan continues to face, paints a grim picture of the effectiveness of 
foreign aid in the country. For example, Afghanistan ranks amongst the bottom 20 
countries according to its Human Development Index (HDI) score (UNDP 2014). More 
than a third of the population continues to live below the official poverty line, three-
quarters are illiterate, and more than a quarter are unemployed (World Bank 2014). Most 
importantly, much of the country’s progress is heavily dependent on international 
assistance and the gains are vulnerable to threats from insecurity, corruption, and the 
illicit drug economy. It is therefore not surprising that even the Afghan government itself 
evaluates the effectiveness of development assistance as “unsatisfactory” (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 2014, 8). 
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The discussion above may leave one thinking that the billions of dollars spent 
through development assistance, not to mention the one trillion dollars spent on the 
military front (Bilmes 2013) in Afghanistan since 2002, were simply wasted or did not 
have significant positive impact. However, a deeper look reveals that Afghanistan has 
made significant strides on several fronts despite these continuing challenges. The scale 
and magnitude of these achievements come to the fore when one compares Afghanistan 
during the Taliban regime to Afghanistan in 2016. For example, some of the most 
important achievements of the last decade – although not all may be directly attributed to 
development assistance – include the introduction of new currency in 2002, public sector 
reform, democratic institution building, including the transfer of power through relatively 
peaceful and democratic elections in 2014, improved women’s participation in public 
life, and an extraordinary growth of the media.  
On the economic front, the country has achieved an average GDP growth rate of 
8.1% from 2003 to 2014, with relatively controlled levels of inflation, albeit with large 
fluctuations in both (World Bank 2014). The level of GDP has gone up from US$2.4 
billion in 2002 (or US$3.7 billion in 1979, the highest in pre-2002 era) to more than 
US$20 billion in 2013 and per capita income, in purchasing power parity, has more than 
doubled from about US$700 in 2002 to nearly US$1,600 in 2013 (World Bank 2014).  
Gains in the areas of education outcomes are remarkable. For instance, the 
number of schools has more than doubled its 2001 levels, from 6,000 to more than 14,000 
in 2014. Primary and secondary school enrollment has grown more than eight times its 
2001 levels, from 1.1 million students to more than 8 million students in 2014, almost 
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40% of whom are girls. The country’s higher education has also experienced significant 
growth, with the number of private institutions of higher education mushrooming from 
practically zero before 2002 to more than 150 in 2014 (World Bank 2014).  
Health indicators illustrate even more progress made since the overthrow of the 
Taliban in 2002. As the number of health facilities has more than quadrupled from 496 in 
2002 to more than 2,300 in 2014, health outcomes have dramatically improved. For 
example, maternal mortality rates have dropped by almost 80% from 1,600 per 100,000 
live births in 2002 to 327 in 2014. Infant mortality rates were more than halved from 165 
per 1,000 live births in 2002 to 68 in 2014. Mortality rates among children under 5 years 
of age declined from 257 per 1,000 live births in 2002 to 94 in 2014 (World Bank 2014).  
How do we reconcile these signs of progress with the ambiguous results of aid-
growth regressions? This is the case of the well-documented micro-macro paradox, in 
which Mosley (1986) found evidence of failure at the macro-level through cross country 
regression analyses between aid and growth.  These failures coexist with evidence of 
success at the micro-level through ex-post project level studies that showed greater than 
ten percent rates of return.  In the case of Afghanistan, this paradox may be interpreted in 
at least one of three ways. First, while Afghanistan has indeed achieved significant gains 
over the last decade, the gains are not large enough to account for the billions of dollars 
in development assistance spent in the country. Second, GDP growth rate is not the right 
indicator to measure the gains achieved, thus pointing to the inadequacy of the 
reductionist approach in answering the aid effectiveness question in Afghanistan. A third 
way to interpret this paradox is to accept both explanations above, yet view the micro-
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level gains as an opportunity to identify differences in the performance of different 
sectors, thus uncovering the conditions under which aid may be more effective.  
In fact, a closer look at the performance of aid across sectors in Afghanistan 
reveals dramatic variations in success. These variations are hard to explain given that all 
the sectors operate under essentially the same set of conditions that could impact their 
degree of effectiveness, such as (in)security, corruption, donor and government 
commitment, and fund availability. For example, although the country has made 
significant strides since 2001, particularly in basic health, education, and rural 
development sectors, it has fared less well in other areas such as social protection, 
mining, and urban development.
1
 The sectors are selected from the ANDS, a document 
produced by the Government of Afghanistan that serves as the country’s first and only 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008c). 
This brings us to stage two of this study, which is complementary to the findings 
at the macro-level discussed in stage one. These variations in aid effectiveness across 
sectors can be exploited to explore answers to the main research question: why was aid 
most effective in the health sector in Afghanistan according to the latest evaluation of 
ANDS in 2014 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 2014, 18). The 
answer to this question requires deeper analysis. The short answer posited by this study is 
one of the main reasons that best explains the relative effectiveness of development 
                                                 
1
 It may be argued that part of the differences in the performance of these sectors may be attributable to the 
differences intrinsic in the sectors. For example, it may be that achieving “success” in the mining sector is 
more difficult than that in the health sector. Although there is some merit to this critique, it has to be noted 
that such factors were taken into account while setting targets for each sector in the development of the 
ANDS document. This and other related critiques will be addressed more fully as “alternative hypotheses” 
in explaining the health sector’s relative success in later chapters.  
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assistance in the health sector is the abundance of local human capacity in delivering 
basic health care services that have been developed over 1970s through 1990s. These 
findings, which form the thrust of my argument, may be generalized as follows: aid is 
likely to be more effective conditional upon the presence of local human capacity to help 
transform the development assistance inputs into meaningful outcomes for the recipient 
countries. In the specific context of Afghanistan, the argument runs as follows: the pre-
aid level of local human capacity is a key explanatory factor for the relative effectiveness 
of aid in the health sector.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that by calling the health sector the most 
successful, it is not to say that all health challenges in Afghanistan have been resolved. 
Instead, it is a relative description of the health sector compared to other sectors within 
Afghanistan. In fact, as it will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, significant 
challenges remain within the health sector. While the strides made at reducing maternal, 
infant, and child mortality ratios are indeed laudable, they continue to be among some of 
the highest ratios globally. 
In order to identify the conditions under which aid is more effective, as in the 
health sector, I apply Mill’s (1925) method of Concomitant Variation, which combines 
his method of agreement and difference. Mill’s method of agreement or “most different 
design” involves a study with one common independent variable explaining common 
dependent variables. In the case of this study, this will involve the presence of a common 
factor that explains success in the health and education sectors. Mill’s method of 
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difference or most similar design, on the other hand, involves a study with one differing 
independent variable explaining the differences in dependent variables.  
In my study, this will require identifying one key explanatory variable that is 
present in successful sectors but absent in less successful sectors. The combination of the 
two, i.e. method of agreement and difference, is called Concomitant Variation and it 
involves the presence of a given set of explanatory variables in the successful cases (i.e. 
the health or education sector) and the absence of these same variables in the less 
successful cases (i.e. mining or urban development sector). This explains success in the 
former and lack of it in the latter cases. Conversely, it is well documented, including by 
Mill himself, that complete adherence to Mill’s methods is not feasible in most studies in 
the social sciences. One solution is to combine Mill’s method with the method of process 
tracing, defined as “a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the 
outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical 
context” (George and Bennett 2005, 176).  
I draw from both primary and secondary sources to feed into the process tracing 
method. In particular, this study relies on significant desk review of Afghan government 
and donor agency documents, including national budget documents from 2002 to 2014, 
national development strategy documents, national policy and strategy documents 
relating to the health sector – including the process of developing Afghanistan’s Basic 
Package of Health Services (BPHS) and Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) – 
program evaluation reports, and other related documents. In addition, primary sources of 
information include key informant interviews and focus group discussions with relevant 
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experts, such as the current health minister and others who played leadership roles in the 
early development process in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.  
According to Mahoney (2010), the method of process tracing follows more 
closely the anti-reductionist approach, is fundamentally different from quantitative 
method because of the former’s focus on causal-process observation (CPO), rather than 
data-set observations (DSO), which are more common in statistical analysis. While DSO 
refers to a general observation as understood in qualitative approaches, CPO refers to a 
“smoking gun” type of evidence that only comes to light with an in-depth knowledge of a 
particular case. This makes the method of process tracing a method of choice not only for 
hypothesis generating, but also for theory testing. In particular, Mahoney discusses three 
types of CPOs, which I attempt to apply in this study.  
The first type of CPO is called Independent Variable CPO because of its focus on 
identifying the mere existence of a causally critical independent variable in the cases 
under investigation. In this study, I show that some of the most successful sectors, such as 
health, education, and rural development enjoy more abundant levels of local human 
capacity. Conversely some of the least successful sectors, such as mining and private 
sector development, suffer from lower levels of local human capacity.  
Following Bayesian logic, the second type of CPO is called Mechanism CPO due 
to its focus on an “intervening event” that is critical in the causal chain that is posited a 
priori by the theory. In this study, I show that it is not just the mere existence of local 
human capacity that explains variations in aid effectiveness across sectors, but more 
importantly it’s the way in which local human capacity gets organized, takes leadership 
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roles, and displays their ability to achieve results, which includes a focus on the sequence 
of events. 
The third type of CPO is called Auxiliary Outcome CPO, given its focus on 
auxiliary “traces” or “markers” left behind by the causal explanatory variable. In my 
study, I show that one observable implication of the local capacity hypothesis is the 
reproduction of knowledge by Afghans. Afghan health experts have indeed displayed 
their abilities in reproducing knowledge by authoring peer-reviewed journal articles on 
rebuilding health systems, facilitated numerous conferences at the local and international 
levels, advised other developing and post-conflict country governments, and have 
actively promoted Afghanistan’s BPHS and contracting-out mechanism as a proven and 
successful model of health care service delivery in post-conflict environments. The 
combination of all the above three types of CPOs should provide credence in support of 
the local capacity hypothesis holding the key to explaining the health sector’s success.  
According to Peter Hall (2006), the method of process tracing involves four steps. 
In the first step of “Theory Formation,” this study, situated within the contingency school 
of aid effectiveness literature, argues that aid is more likely to be effective conditional 
upon the presence of local human capacity in the respective sectors. The causal 
mechanism may be summarized as follows: local experts – with a deeper appreciation of 
local complexities and a greater sense of motivation – play leadership roles in the 
reconstruction of their societies and exercise leadership in the transformation of aid 
dollars into meaningful outcomes, thus contributing to more effective aid.  
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In the second step of “Deriving Predictions,” this study exploits cross-sectoral 
variations in aid effectiveness and predicts that aid will be more effective in sectors with 
relatively greater levels of local human capacity. In the third step of “Making 
Observations,” this study makes relevant observations on expected events, their 
sequence, and evidence on the causal chain. In particular, I expect a gradual, but early 
transfer of authority and responsibility to local experts as they earn the trust and 
confidence of their international counterparts in managing resources effectively and 
delivering results. The local experts should simultaneously display their skills, abilities, 
motivations, and ambitions to exercise true leadership and local ownership. In the final 
step of “Drawing Conclusions,” I present significant evidence to support the argument 
that local human capacity is indeed a central variable that determines the effectiveness of 
development assistance, as exemplified in the success of the health sector in Afghanistan.  
In explaining the success of the health sector in particular, I consider four 
alternative explanations as rival hypotheses and reject them in favor of the local capacity 
hypothesis to increase confidence in the local capacity hypothesis (Bennett and Elman 
2006). The first rival hypothesis, Financial Support Hypothesis (FSH), may attribute the 
success of the health sector to the massive financial support by the donor community. 
While the significance of donor support in reconstructing the health system in 
Afghanistan cannot be denied, I show that more aid alone does not make success, because 
some sectors with higher budgets are among lower performers and vice versa. The second 
rival hypothesis, Easy Indicator Hypothesis (EIH), may attribute the success of the health 
sector to how success was first defined by selecting easier to achieve targets and 
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indicators for the health sector. This argument, however, fails to explain the health 
sector’s success relative to other sectors because a) targets and indicators were set under 
the same rules and conditions for all sectors, and b) the indicators selected for the health 
sector, were mostly set at the level of outcome and impact- such as mortality rates- are 
not easy to achieve. In fact, some less successful sectors have selected much easier to 
achieve targets and objectives at the output level in their monitoring matrices.  
The third rival hypothesis, Low Baseline Hypothesis (LBH), may argue that the 
indicators in the health sector were at such low levels in the post-war period in 2002 that 
any minor push would result in significant gains, thus casting doubt on both the baseline 
data and the resulting magnitude of success. In fact, a seminar featuring Dr. Kenneth Hill 
of Harvard School of Public Health questioned if the gains in Afghan health were “too 
good to be true” (Center for Global Development 2012). This hypothesis, however, is not 
supported by data because we do not observe a significant dip in key health statistics at 
the time of the baseline survey. In addition, we observe consistent trends in key 
determinants of mortality, including lower fertility rates, improved immunization 
coverage, and increased rates of skilled birth attendance.  
Finally, the fourth rival hypothesis, Foreign Capacity Hypothesis (FCH), may 
attribute the health sector’s success to foreign technical assistance, or international 
Externally Funded Staff (EFS). I find, however, that the concentration of international 
EFS is not correlated with the degree of success across sectors. In fact, some of the most 
successful sectors, including the health sector, have some of the lowest rates of 
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international EFS, thus rejecting the foreign capacity hypothesis, in favor of local 
capacity hypothesis.  
An in-depth process tracing of the health sector reveals that the driving force 
behind the success of the present-day health sector in Afghanistan lies in the decades of 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. During these decades, today’s policy makers and health 
practitioners received their medical training and professional experiences while 
delivering basic health care services inside Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan through different NGOs. These capacities manifest themselves during the 
discussions and policy decisions of the early 2000s. In particular, the decision to adopt a 
contracting-out strategy, in which the task of health care service delivery was outsourced 
to NGOs and the Ministry of Public Health’s (MoPH) role was limited to stewardship 
only.  
Afghan experts also played key leadership roles in the development of national 
policies and strategies and in particular, the development of the BPHS and later the EPHS 
to the hospital sector. The BPHS was developed with twin purposes in mind: “(1) to 
provide a standardized package of basic services which forms the core of service delivery 
in all primary health care facilities and (2) to promote a redistribution of health services 
by providing equitable access, especially in underserved areas” and it served those 
purposes well (Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health 
2003).  Together, BPHS and EPHS defined the health system in its entirety from the 
health posts at the village level to specialized hospitals in key urban areas.  
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The argument about local human capacity explaining the top three most 
successful sectors – health, education, and rural development – is not surprising in the 
context of Afghanistan where the top three most sought-after occupations happen to be 
medical doctors, engineers, and educators. Consistent with the cultural preference for 
these fields, the Afghan higher education system further reinforces this phenomenon by 
admitting only the top scorers in the annual university entrance examinations, to these 
fields, especially in the study of medicine and engineering. 
The policy implications of this finding are numerous. First, this study is an 
acknowledgment to the simultaneous existence of both success and failure within the 
debates over aid effectiveness in the context of Afghanistan. Second, this finding on the 
importance of local capacity in determining aid effectiveness moves the debates away 
from supply-side explanations to the status of local human capacity in recipient countries. 
Third, it informs policy by advising the international community and local governments 
to conduct a thorough analysis of existing capacities, including but not limited to human 
capacity, before deciding on aid allocation across sectors. In the relatively capacity-rich 
sectors, foreign aid dollars could produce faster and more tangible results. Conversely, in 
relatively capacity-poor sectors, foreign aid resources are better spent on developing local 
capacity rather than expecting aid dollars to buy outcomes without the needed local 
human capacity to transform those resources into valuable results. This is in line with the 
decades-old call for investing in human development through the annual Human 
Development Report, first published in 1990 (UNDP 1990), whose foundations were 
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built by the pioneering works of many, including two Nobel Laureates (Schultz 1981; 
Sen 1999; K. Haq and Kirdar 1986; M. ul Haq 1995).  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the historical 
context of Afghanistan, because the study of aid effectiveness in a place like Afghanistan 
cannot ignore the country’s troubled history and regional politics. This chapter will pay 
close attention to two key determinants of security and political stability, namely internal 
cleavages along ethnic and ideological beliefs and external dynamics, especially 
relationships with Pakistan This relationship is believed to hold the key to security in the 
region through their influence in bringing insurgents to the negotiating table.  
Chapter III presents an extensive review of literature on foreign aid effectiveness 
and debates to date on what foreign aid is, how it compares to other sources of 
development finance, why donor countries give aid, especially in light of scant evidence 
to support the claim that aid leads to economic growth, and finally how this study fits 
within the broader debates on aid effectiveness.  
Chapter IV is an attempt to provide a macro-level quantitative analysis of the 
relationship between various measures of aid and economic development, in particular 
GDP growth. The results, however, are inconclusive owing to small number of data 
points. This chapter, therefore, produces a first attempt at running OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS 
regressions between ODA and growth rates. The lack of conclusive results helps segue to 
Chapters V through VII, which seek to answer the main research question, i.e. why was 
aid in Afghanistan most effective in the health sector.  
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Chapter V provides an overview of the key priority sectors as identified through 
the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, called the ANDS. After presenting a 
ranking of the sectors according to the percentage of the targets they had achieved in 
2014, this chapter delves deeper into the main objectives, targets, and indicators of the 
health sector, as the most successful sector in Afghanistan.  
Following from the previous chapter, Chapter VI asks the following question: 
what explains the health sector’s remarkable success, especially when all the sectors 
operate under essentially the same conditions and environment. Using Mill’s method of 
concomitant variation combined with process tracing, this chapter maps out the process 
of rebuilding the health sector in the early 2000s after the health system was almost 
completely broken during the three preceding decades of war and conflict. After a careful 
consideration of four alternative hypotheses, this chapter concludes that the presence of 
pre-aid levels of local human capacity best explains the success of the health sector and 
by extension the variations in the degree of effective utilization of aid by all sectors in 
Afghanistan.  
Chapter VI concludes the study by providing further evidence to test the local 





CHAPTER TWO: THE COUNTRY CONTEXT  
 
The study of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan cannot ignore the country’s troubled 
history and regional politics. The state’s ability to deliver public services such as health 
care and education is directly related to the state maintaining authority, legitimacy, and 
capacity (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). Given Afghanistan’s historical 
context, security and development are intertwined, one affecting the other in a dynamic 
interaction. In particular, security becomes an essential precondition for development, 
and development, in turn, can have a multiplier effect on the positive spillovers of 
improved security. In fact, the 2011 World Development Report (World Bank 2011) 
focuses on the nexus between conflict, security, and development, and illustrates that 
based on international experiences, the absence of security – especially the protracted 
type like the one that has defined Afghanistan’s recent history – particularly hampers 
prospects of development. 
This chapter will set the stage by describing the country’s context, focusing on 
what lies at the roots of the security challenges in Afghanistan, especially pertaining to 
their impact on aid effectiveness. In order to achieve this end, I will divide the relevant 
context into two time periods, pre- and post-2001 eras. This delineation is helpful 
because the year 2001 was a turning point for Afghanistan’s development. Although 
Afghanistan has almost always relied on external sources of revenues to finance its 
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development, including significant development assistance from the Soviet Russia during 
the Cold War, it was not until post-2001 that Afghanistan took the center stage as one of 
the largest recipients of development assistance in the world.  
In each time period, I focus on two overarching issues. In the pre-2001 era, the 
first issue worth highlighting is the internal social cleavages, particularly along ethnic and 
ideological lines. The second major issue is Afghanistan’s external relationships, 
predominantly with Pakistan. Both these issues have significant bearing on the study of 
development in Afghanistan today with strong path-dependent effects. For example, 
ethnic divisions were at the roots of the 2014 election irregularities, which led to the 
creation of a National Unity Government headed by representatives of the two dominant 
ethnic groups, Pashtuns and Tajiks. Similarly, the elusive search for an end to the 
country’s insecurity, which has overshadowed development efforts since 2002, cannot be 
fully understood without addressing the roots of the conflict at the local and regional 
levels.  
In the post-2001 era, I will focus on the nature of external development 
assistance, making Afghanistan one of the world’s largest recipients of aid. The second 
relevant issue is the way in which local capacities in certain fields, particularly basic 
health, education and engineering, manifested themselves in the process of post-2001 
reconstruction of the country. As it will be made clear throughout this research, the 
relative abundance of technical human capacity in certain sectors is the result of two main 
factors. The first factor is the Afghan society’s conscious efforts to value some 
professions, such as medical doctors, engineers, and educators, over others. The second 
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factor relates to the honing of these skills in the process of delivering basic health, 
infrastructure, and education services for Afghans in Afghanistan and for Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan through working for various international and national NGOs during 
the 1980s through the early 2000s. I refer to this as an unintended consequence of aid 
delivery during the decades of conflict, because capacity building was a by-product of aid 
delivery. The main purpose of the international engagement during this period was to 
provide basic essential services in response to the conflict in Afghanistan.  
Background 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country, with terrain characterized by rugged 
mountains through much of the country, and sprawling deserts to the south and west. Its 
geo-strategic location in the heart of Asia makes it an important transitory artery on the 
legendary Silk Route. A modern continuation of Afghanistan’s central role in the region 
is under discussion on building a pipeline to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan, 
through Afghanistan, to Pakistan and India, thus named TAPI based on the first letter of 
the name of each country involved. The discovery of multi-trillion dollar natural 
resources
2
 has the potential to form the backbone of the future economy of the country, 
but it is equally likely to become a bone of contention between different local and 
international groups all vying to share a piece of the pie.  
According to the latest population estimation in 2015, less than a quarter of the 
country’s 27 million people live in urban areas. The vast majority of the population is 





classified as rural – where agriculture makes the primary source of income (Central 
Statistics Office, Afghanistan 2015).
3
 The two dominant ethnic groups in Afghanistan 
are Pashtuns and Tajiks, whose Pashto and Dari languages form the two national 
languages of the country.
4
 Reflecting the ethnic diversity of the country, the 2004 
Afghan Constitution mentions fourteen ethnic groups by name (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2004).  
Social Cleavages 
Afghans take great pride in their over 5,000 year old shared history in the region. 
Invasions and expansionary wars by the Persians, early Islamic caliphate, Mongols, 
British and the Russians have resulted in the constant shift of people and borders. A 
closer look at Afghanistan’s past will reveals that the country’s history has been marred 
by a state of war, instability and armed conflict. The nature of these conflicts, however, 
varies from one context to another. For example, some of the most intense and sustained 
conflicts have included direct wars with foreign occupying forces, such as the three major 
Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, the Cold War and the Soviet 
invasion in the 1980s, and the 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan after the events of 
9/11. Throughout history, one can point to only a few instances of relative stability, the 
longest episode of which was during King Zahir Shah’s forty-year reign from 1933 to 
1973. 
                                                 
3
 The last census conducted in Afghanistan was in 1979. 
 
4
 These include “Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, 
Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and other tribes” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004 Chapter 1, 
Article 4).  
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Fast forward thousands of years of history and zoom in on the last two centuries 
alone (since much of Afghanistan’s present day borders and inhabitants were fixed 
around the mid-18
th
 century), the internal cleavages within the Afghan society have been 
at the root of much of the conflicts. In particular, one pressing source of division within 
the Afghan society has been the domination of the public office along ethnic lines, which 
has led to severe grievances on the part of the minorities who feel excluded and let down 
by the ethnic majority in power. For example, out of the country’s last 268 years since the 
formation of present-day Afghanistan in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Abdali (later known as 
Ahmad Shah Durrani and also known as Ahmad Shah Baba, as Baba is a nick name 
signifying respect to the ruler as the father of the nation), ethnic Pashtuns have dominated 
public office for the entire period with two exceptions. One was a nine-month-rule in 
1929 by a non-Pashtun, Habibullah Kalkani, also known as Bache Saqao or the son of 
water carrier, who was hanged in Kabul presidential palace two weeks after being forced 
out of the palace by forces loyal to Nadir Shah. The other exception was the four-year-
rule by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, during the tumultuous early 
1990s. He, too, was assassinated in a suicide attack in his home in Kabul on September 
20, 2011. The present-day National Unity Government is a form of Lijphart’s (2004) 
consociational democracy with some decentralization and power-sharing between the 
Pashtun president, Ashraf Ghani and Tajik Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah.  
Even within the Pashtuns, which make up the majority of the Afghan population 
(although exact estimates are both unavailable and unlikely to be made available given 
the sensitivity of the topic) central authority has been concentrated around two families, 
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both coming from Kandahar province. One was the Durrani family who formed the 
Durrani Dynasty starting from Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747, and the other was the 
Barekzai Dynasty starting in 1826 with Amir Dost Mohammad Khan until the end of 
Dawood Khan’s reign in 1978. Over the many years, these cleavages have divided the 
population along ethnic lines and created various alliances and oppositions that continue 
to plague the country through to present day.  
In addition to the ethnic divide, the infamous Communist coup d’état of Haft-e-
Sour (the seventh day of the Afghan solar calendar month of Sour, equivalent to April 27, 
1978) and the ensuing Soviet occupation of the country a year later, opened a new bloody 
chapter in Afghanistan’s history. This has added yet another layer of estrangement to the 
already deeply divided Afghan society, the ramifications of which continue to haunt the 
country. For example, many families were torn apart as some members drifted towards 
the Communists and others towards the Mujahedeen in the 1980s. Even more tragic is the 
fact that many others who did not side with any group were assumed to belong to one 
group or the other on the basis of the most trivial indicators. Growing a beard, for 
example, could be seen as a sign of religiosity, thus siding with the Mujahedeen, or 
sending one’s female members of the family to school as a sign of progressiveness, thus 
proximity to Communist ideology. Throughout the past four decades, many have been 
detained, tortured, killed or forced to flee the country due to these issues. Even in today’s 
National Unity Government, many otherwise competent people are dismissed for their 
alleged past affiliations with certain groups. This is especially tragic today when the 
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country needs competent Afghan leaders in all fields to partake in the country’s 
rehabilitation process.  
The start of the Communist coup d’état in 1978 and the take-over of the country 
by the Mujahedeen (which toppled the government of Dr. Najibullah, the last president of 
the extension of the Communist rule) in 1992 share more than a mere resemblance in the 
date; one happened on Haft-e-Sour (the seventh day of Sour, or April 27
th
) and the other 
fourteen years later on Hasht-e-Sour (the eighth day of Sour, or April 28
th
). The 
Communist coup of 1978 by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
5
 is 
marked as a dark day in Afghan history for violently ending the five-year rule of Dawood 
Khan and thus opening another bloody chapter in Afghan history, which continues to 
drag the country and its people into a state of warfare and conflict up to this day. It is 
important to note that Dawood Khan, Zahir Shah’s cousin and brother-in-law, ended the 
forty-year-rule of Zahir Shah in a bloodless coup on July 17, 1973. Upon taking office, he 
ended monarchy and declared Afghanistan a republic. However, at the hands of PDPA 
officials, Dawood Khan and his entire family were executed and buried in a mass grave 
in Kabul’s notorious Pul-e-Charkhi prison. It was not until three decades later in 2008 
that they were given state funerals during the Hamid Karzai’s rule.  
The event of the 8
th
 of Sour (April 28, 1992), which marked the end of the 
Communist rule and the beginning of the Mujahedeen take-over, is much more 
                                                 
5
 The PDPA consisted of two main factions, the Khalq (or people) and Parcham (or Flag). The first year 
after the coup saw Khalqi dominance as Noor Mohammad Taraki, followed by Hafizullah Amin, came to 
power and started a crackdown on the Parchami opposition. Then, Babrak Karmal of the Parcham faction 
took over until he was replaced by Dr. Najibullah, the last of the Communist leaders, in 1986. Dr. 
Najibullah, being in staunch opposition to Pakistan, was hanged in public and his body was dragged on 
Kabul streets by the pro-Pakistani Taliban on September 27, 1994.  
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controversial. To the Mujahedeen and their supporters, it is a special day deserving much 
veneration for freeing Afghanistan from the yoke of Communist oppression and the 
victory of Islam. For its detractors, however, it is a day even worse than the Communist 
coup of 1978, because the in-fighting over power of the Mujahedeen in the early 1990s 
not only destroyed Kabul and killed and maimed thousands of people, but it did so in the 
name of Islam and Jihad, concepts that are near and dear to the 99% Muslim population 
of the country. Controversy surrounding these two dates brings about strong emotions 
and heated debates as the two dates are compared and contrasted each year.  
Ironically, the event of Haft-e-Sour is in a sense the reason for the event of Hasht-
e-Sour to take place fourteen years later. Five years after the rule of King Dawood Khan, 
the Communist Party of PDPA took over the government in 1978 and promoted state 
atheism, which paved the way for Soviet invasion a year later. It was during this time that 
the state was unable to satisfy the ideological needs of the majority of Afghans who 
opposed state atheism. It was at this juncture that saw the rise of the Mujahedeen 
movement, most of whom were university students then, some operating in remote rural 
areas and others being welcomed in neighboring countries, especially Pakistan. I refer to 
the major Sunni groups as the Group of Seven. The ethnic minority group of Hazaras and 
other Shia minorities formed their own groups under the leadership of Mohsini and 
Mazari. The Mujahedeen were also primarily organized along ethnic lines.  
The Durand Line Agreement 
On the external front, although Afghanistan shares borders with six countries 
(Pakistan to the south and east, Iran to the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
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Tajikistan to the north, and China to the north-east), Pakistan remains the most 
important neighbor, given its role in Afghanistan’s security and political stability. In 
fact, the mountainous region around the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has been the 
perfect sanctuary for extremist groups, including the Taliban and affiliates of Da’ish or 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Much of the present-day political tensions 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan can be traced to the disputed border between the two 
countries, known as the Durand Line, which dates back to 1892, long before the birth of 
Pakistan in the 1947 partition of British India.  
Afghanistan’s relationships with Pakistan have remained tense for much of 
history. The tensions began long before the birth of Pakistan and can be traced to the 18
th
 
century rivalries between Tsarist Russia in the north and British India in the south. Much 
of the present day tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan can be traced to the British 
policies, in particular the drawing of the arbitrary line, known as the Durand Line, to 
mark the disputed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the reasons behind 
signing the Durand Agreement was to end the hostilities between Afghanistan and British 
India, which had previously led to several wars of expansion and in particular two major 





 century antagonism between the two great powers of the time, 
the Victorian England and the Tsarist Russia, resulted in a real “Great Game” in Central 
Asia, with Afghanistan’s rough terrain being used as both the buffer zone and the 
battleground (Hopkirk 1994). The constant shifting of the spheres of influence of the two 
powers ostensibly upset Afghanistan, and by extension, the entire region. For example, 
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the first Anglo-Afghan war was in fact a Russian-English war of influence, fought by 
Afghans and Indians on Afghan soil, over the threat of the expansion of each other in the 
region. The armies of Rangit Singh, led by Hari Singh, had faced the Afghan army earlier 
in the 1920s, which led to the end of the first rule of Shah Shuja (known as the British 
puppet among Afghans) and the beginning of the Barekzai Dynasty led by Amir Dost 
Mohammad Khan. This Great Game finally ended after three major wars, almost forty 
years apart, each at 1840, 1880, and 1919. The third Anglo-Afghan war, also known as 
the war of Afghanistan’s Independence, ended on August 8, 1919 with Amanullah Khan 
earning Afghanistan’s complete independence and autonomy, especially over its foreign 
policy (Sidebotham, 1919).  
The history of the Durand Line goes to late 19
th
 century relations between the 
Afghan rulers, in particular Amir Abdurrahman Khan, and British India. In particular, 
Amir Abdurrahman Khan was indebted to the rulers of then British India for helping him 
get to power, and as a result, he would return the favor by appeasing the British 
representatives in some of the most important and consequential decisions. Two of the 
most highly consequential decisions included the accepting of the provisions of the 
Treaty of Gandomak (which included the relinquishing of foreign policy to the British, 
something which he could have renegotiated) and a decade later signing of the agreement 
on the Durand Line on November 21, 1893 between Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and 
Amir Abdurrahman Khan.  
The 2,640 km line cuts through the middle of Pashtun and Baloch tribes, dividing 
them into two arbitrary groups now on different sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 
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In fact, the Baloch are scattered throughout three countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Iran). Since inheriting this line upon their independence from the British rule in 1947, 
both Pakistan and Afghanistan have been fighting over and paying a heavy price for the 
seed of destruction planted by the British Empire. For example, the signatories of the 
agreement have long been buried but their destructive legacy continues to haunt the 
present-day people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Significant controversies surround the 
nature and fate of the agreement more than 120 years after the signing of the treaty. One 
theory, albeit weak in nature, suggests that the Durand Line was theoretically invalid 
based on the following reasons: a) Amir Abdurrahman Khan signed the agreement under 
pressure from the British Empire because the Amir owed his rule to them; and b) that the 
only signed document was the English version and the Amir could not read or understand 
English. Regardless of the plausibility and strength of these arguments, the people on 
both sides of the border have rarely treated the border more than a mere line on paper. 
Pashtuns on both sides of the border have always traded, migrated, inter-married, and 
straddled the line in defiance of the existence of the line and they continue to do so.  
One of the most striking examples of Pashtun solidarity relates to the story of 
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Pashtun independence activist and a close friend of 
Mahatma Gandhi, who at his own request, was buried across the border in Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan upon his death in January 1988. His burial took place at a time when the 
Soviet Army was still in Afghanistan and the Mujahedeen were actively fighting the then 
government of Dr. Najibullah. Despite the security risks, tens of thousands of mourners 
marched from Peshawar to Jalalabad, stepping on the Durand Line on their way in a 
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symbolic display of Pashtun unity. Ghaffar Khan’s grandson, Asfandyar Wali Khan, a 
Pakistani Member of Parliament and president of the Awami National Party, is noted for 
making headlines for his strong stance on Pashtun solidarity on both sides of the border 
and for constantly echoing that the “Durand Line is not acceptable to anyone” 
(Afghanistan Times 2015, 1). 
Another complementary theory about the Durand Line, although not confirmed by 
Pakistani sources, claims that the agreement would be null and void 100 years after its 
signing date, after which the people of the region would decide whether they want to 
remain under the British rule (now Pakistani rule) or the Afghan rule or choose to remain 
autonomous. It is not a coincidence that exactly 99 years after the passage of this 
agreement, i.e. in 1992, Pakistan unleashed the Mujahedeen groups that they had hosted, 
trained, and financed for over a decade. The idea would have been to wreak such havoc 
in Afghanistan in early 1990s that neither Afghanistan would be in a position to reclaim 
their lost territory nor would the people southeast of the border would choose to leave the 
relative peace of Pakistani rule and be governed under the shattered Afghan flag. In fact, 
former president, Dr. Najibullah had predicted this scenario before vacating the palace in 
1992. The alternative scenario he had predicted was the imposition of a puppet 
government in power in Afghanistan that would be more Pakistan-friendly.  
The rise of the Taliban, directly housed, trained and supported by Pakistan, after 
the Mujahedeen lent further credence to this hypothesis. The close ties between Pakistan 
and the Taliban, much to the chagrin of Pakistani government who try to deny it, have 
come to the forefront of the media now. For example, famous Pakistani author and 
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journalist, Ahmed Rashid (2008, LII) calls Pakistan “the base area, recruiting ground, and 
logistics center for both al Qaeda and the Taliban.” Furthermore, on February 13, 2015, 
the ex-president of Pakistan and army chief, Perves Musharraf, admitted that “Pakistani 
spies in the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) cultivated the Taliban after 2001” 
(Boone 2015). In addition, there are many other media sources establishing the links 
between Pakistan and the Taliban insurgency.  
Pakistan: an Insecure Neighbor  
In addition to the Durand Line predicament, Pakistan has also been struggling 
with several other thorny domestic and regional issues, such as a national identity crisis, 
dominant military, including frequent exercise of Martial Law, and uneasy relationships 
with its neighbors, including Afghanistan to the north and west and India to the south and 
east. Most of the troubles in Afghanistan with Pakistani connection can be traced to one 
or more of these issues, which can in turn be traced to some of the practices in the 
colonial era.  On the issue of identity crisis, Ian Talbot’s (2005, 1) opening sentence in 
his book on Pakistan: A Modern History is illustrative of the point:  
Pakistan for much of its history has been in a state searching for a national 
identity. The overlap of regional, Pakistani and religious identities was articulated 
most clearly by the Pashtun nationalist Wali Khan nearly a decade ago when he 
declared that he has been a Pashtun for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years and 
a Pakistani for forty years. 
These internal rifts and regional quandaries have contributed to Pakistan viewing 
itself with an immense sense of insecurity and vulnerability, which has led to their 
adopting policies that have often backfired. Some of the most prominent examples of 
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such policies include a) the efforts to unify the country by forcing a common language 
upon all the extremely diverse pockets of the population, resulting in the separation of 
East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1971, and other separatist movements especially by the 
Pashtun and Baloch tribes in the north and the west, b) overinvesting in the military 
defensive strategies at the expense of socio-economic development including developing 
nuclear arms, c) a conscious policy decision to create and nurture Islamic extremism as a 
weapon to be used against any potential foreign interference (ready to be deployed in 
East Pakistan before 1971, or to be deployed in Kashmir, India and Afghanistan up until 
today), and d) the unrelenting effort to mold public opinion against a monstrous image of 
the archenemy, i.e. India. 
Pakistan’s sense of internal insecurity is best exemplified through the extreme 
measures they have taken to ensure its elusive national unity. As early as 1948, prominent 
separatist Pashtun leaders – including Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan
6
 – were often subject to 
arrest, imprisonment and in some cases even execution to nip the problem in the bud and 
quell any future separatist movements. This and other policies clearly backfired when 
East Pakistan was separated in 1971, during a horrendous liberation wars, which resulted 
in the death of more than three million Bengali civilians and hundreds of thousands more 
wounded or displaced.  
One consequence of Pakistan’s efforts to unify its inhabitants has been the 
creation of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which are semi-
autonomous areas between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and parts of Afghanistan. 
                                                 
6
 Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was opposed to the idea of the partition and in favor of Hindu-Muslim unity, 
as he is famously quoted to have said the partition to him meant throwing them “to the wolves” (Talbot 
2005, 432).  
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FATA consists of seven tribal agencies or tribal districts and six Frontier Regions. 
Despite its small population of about four million people (about 2% of Pakistan’s 
population) and its rather small size of about 10,000 square miles (about 4% the area of 
Texas), FATA has been the center of much controversy as the hotbed of the Taliban, Al-
Qaeda and numerous other extremist groups. For example, FATA has been described by 
former U.S. president, George Bush, as “wilder than the Wild West” (Stolberg 2007). 
One of the anomalies of FATA is the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), implemented 
in 1901 with its origins in the 1877 Murderous Outrages Regulation (MOR) enacted by 
the British Empire of the time. Due to the enactment of the FCR, the jurisdictions of the 
Pakistani Supreme Court and High Court stop at the gates of FATA and Provincially 
Administered Tribal Areas (PATA).  
The FATA region has some of the worst socio-economic indicators, even when 
compared to the rest of Pakistan. For example, adult suffrage was not extended to the 
citizens of the region until 1996 (Fair, Howenstein, and Thier 2006). The traditional 
governance structures in the region have made it an ideal breeding ground for terrorism 
and a source of instability for the region and beyond. As a result, the region’s fate, 
especially since 9/11, seems to be stuck in a vicious cycle of insurgent attacks with 
Pakistani ISI support, American criticism or drone attacks (sometimes both), Pakistani 
military action against the region, further anger of the insurgents, and this cycle repeats 
itself. It is important to note that FATA has historically been a no-go zone for Pakistani 
military, and the recent military attacks on FATA regions are carried out either to 
retaliate for Taliban attacks on Pakistani interests, such as a school shooting in 2014, or 
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to appease external critics. In his book, Descent into Chaos, Pakistani author and 
journalist, Ahmed Rashid (2008, 265) describes FATA in the early years after 9/11 as 
follows:  
FATA became a multilayered terrorist cake. At its base were Pakistan Pashtun 
tribesmen, soon to become Taliban in their own right, who provided the hideouts 
and logistical support. Above them were the Afghan Taliban who settled there 
after 9/11, followed by militants from Central Asia, Chechnya, Africa, China, and 
Kashmir, and topped by Arabs who forged a protective ring around bin Laden. 
FATA became the world’s “terrorism central.” 
A thorough appreciation of the complexities in Afghanistan, especially pertaining 
to its geo-political relations, is essential for achieving political stability and economic 
development (Loyn 2009). Unless the international community and the Afghan leaders 
develop a deep understanding of these complexities, mistakes made in the past are bound 
to repeat themselves and development aspirations will bear no fruits. Afghanistan’s past 
half century offers at least three missed opportunities, which have obvious and significant 
implications for peace and development today.  
The first opportunity of the last half century emerged in 1973 during the reign of 
President Dawood Khan who ended his cousin Zahir Shah’s forty-year kingdom, which 
had maintained relative security but did not improve the economic conditions of the 
people. Had President Dawood Khan been more cognizant of the Soviet infiltration, he 
could have prevented the coup d’état of Haft-e-Sour (discussed in some detail earlier) and 
Afghanistan would have been on a completely different trajectory. 
The second missed opportunity arose almost a decade later in 1989 when the 
Russian troops pulled out of Afghanistan, which was technically a victory for all key 
stakeholders except the Russians. One of the reasons that some Afghans are distrustful of 
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the post-2001 interventions in Afghanistan is their perceptions of being abandoned by the 
international community, in particular the United States, after the end of the Cold War in 
1992, which spelt disaster for Afghanistan and the region.  
The third missed opportunity occurred during the early years of the post-Taliban 
period when the United States’ light footprint policy and the Bush Administration’s 
refusal to engage in nation building contributed to a revival of the Taliban movement 
after they were almost completely vanquished. The war in Iraq was more than just a 
distraction, because “the billions spent in Iraq were the billions that were not spent in 
Afghanistan” (Kofi Annan, in Rashid 2008, XLI).  
To summarize, these two issues, the internal cleavages and tensions relating to the 
relationships with Pakistan lie at the core of understanding the security situation in 
Afghanistan. The National Unity Government and President Ashraf Ghani’s foreign 
relations (particularly with Pakistan) mirror these dynamics. In fact, President Ghani 
displays in-depth appreciation for these intricacies in his domestic and foreign policies. In 
particular, he has emphasized the explicit need for peace for both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan after having been in a state of conflict for the past fourteen years. According 
to President Ghani, the two nations must work together to address the “changing ecology 
of terror” that respects no boundaries and threatens both countries and the entire region. 
Speaking at a forum, co-hosted by USIP and the Atlantic Council, he said
7
: 
First, we have to define the problem. The problem, fundamentally, is not about 
peace with Taliban. The problem is fundamentally about peace between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. For 13 years, we have been in an undeclared state of hostilities. 
                                                 
7
 The forum was streamlined live on the USIP website on March 25, 2015 and is available online at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yLq6_S-Sk00 accessed on June 10, 2015. 
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And this is the definition that we offered to our Pakistani counterparts. They have 
accepted this definition of the problem. That’s the breakthrough. The state of 
Pakistan and the state of Afghanistan… must reach acceptance of each other and 
the necessity that we need each other to prevent the region from sinking into 
chaos.  
Afghanistan in the Post-2001 Era 
The year 2001 was a pivotal year for Afghanistan, with an outpouring of attention 
from the international community, especially on the military and development fronts. 
Following the events of 9/11 and the Taliban refusing to hand over Osama Bin Laden 
(the leader of the Al-Qaeda group) to the United States, the U.S.-led coalition entered 
Afghanistan, overthrowing the Taliban and establishing a new interim government 
headed by Hamid Karzai. In fact, it was just one day after the event of 9/11 that the UN 
Security Council adopted resolution 1368, calling on all States “to work together urgently 
to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks” 
(United Nations 2001a, 1). On the same day, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) invoked Article 5 regarding the collective-defense provisions, declaring the 
attack against the United States as an attack against all NATO members. Meanwhile in 
Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance – the last remaining opposition front to the Taliban – 
were ready to lend their support in ousting the Taliban regime, even though their leader 
(Ahmad Shah Massoud) was assassinated just two days prior to 9/11. Therefore, armed 
with the U.N. Security Council Resolution and NATO’s article 5 at the international 
level, and significant on-the-ground support from the Northern Alliance, it was only a 
matter of weeks before the Taliban were deposed, and some of its leadership members 
scattered across the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, however, 
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despite the formation of a new government and the significant international support over 
the past fourteen years, both in terms of military and development assistance, a 
resurgence of the Taliban and ISIS threaten the relative stability achieved since 2001. 
On December 5
th
, 2001, the Bonn Conference was held in Germany, which 
established an Afghan Interim Authority, under the leadership of Hamid Karzai, until an 
interim government could be formed six months later. As planned, in June 2002, a Loya 
Jirga was convened, which elected Hamid Karzai as the interim head of the Afghan 
Transitional Authority to serve for two years until presidential elections in 2004. The 
Loya Jirga, a Pashto term for Grand Assembly, is a deeply-ingrained informal institution, 
which has been formalized in the 2004 Afghan Constitution as “the highest manifestation 
of the will of the Afghan people” and with one entire chapter detailing its form and 
purpose (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004 Chapter 6, Article 110).  
Hamid Karzai, a little known leader before 2001, managed to stay in power for 
more than a decade by getting elected through general elections for two consecutive 
terms in office, first in 2004 and then again in 2009. Although the extent to which these 
presidential and other provincial council elections were truly free and fair is highly 
contested, they have continued to count as major achievements for their lack of precedent 
in the past. For example, the 2004 elections which Hamid Karzai won with 54% of the 
votes, notwithstanding the many allegations of fraud, is eulogized as “Afghanistan’s first 
democratic election” (Morgan 2007, 60). Similarly, the 2014 elections, despite the 
inconclusive nature of the results that led to the formation of the National Unity 
Government, has been “hailed as a historic step” given its first democratic transition of 
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power from one elected leader to the next (United Nations 2014).  However, it is not 
surprising that democratic consolidation cannot keep pace with other developments in the 
country, both because democratization is a more challenging task and also because unlike 
popular perceptions, the incentives of local elites rarely align with those of external 
peacemakers in bringing about real democratic reform for Afghanistan (Zürcher et al., 
2013).  
One of the key ways in which the Bonn Agreement paved the way for the 
upcoming development of the country was a clause in which the participants in the U.N. 
talks on Afghanistan requested the international community “to reaffirm, strengthen and 
implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction 
of Afghanistan” (United Nations 2001b). This paved the way for a number of 
international meetings and conferences on Afghanistan, during which the international 
community and donor agencies pledged contributions to ensure the country’s future 
security and development. On the security front, while the U.S.-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) helped dismantle Al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban, the creation of 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through the UN Security Council 
authorization ensured the security of the interim authority in Kabul and surrounding 
areas. However, it wasn’t until August of 2003 that NATO formally assumed the 
leadership role of ISAF, and two months later ISAF’s mandate was broadened to cover 
any area in Afghanistan (NATO 2003). On the development front, the creation of the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March of 2002 by the 
UN Security Council was another major step in the reconstruction process. UNAMA was 
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designed to, among other things, manage and coordinate all humanitarian and 
development assistance in Afghanistan. 
At the international level, several conferences were held on Afghanistan, thus 
ensuring a constant flow of development assistance. The first important meeting was the 
“International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan” held in Tokyo, 
Japan in January 2002, chaired by Hamid Karzai, and co-chaired by representatives from 
Japan, the U.S., the E.U. and Saudi Arabia (Tokyo Conference Co-chairs 2002). Three 
points are central to our thesis. First, it was the first major conference on Afghanistan in 
the post-Taliban era that received significant international attention. The conference was 
attended by representatives from 61 countries and 21 organizations. The international 
community pledged more than 4.5 billion USD in development assistance, 1.8 billion of 
which was set aside for 2002 alone. It was during this conference that the idea of a “trust 
fund” managed by the World Bank was discussed as a way to channel all donors’ 
contributions. This later became known as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(ARTF). Second, this conference reiterated the critical role that Afghan NGOs could play 
in the reconstruction process based on their years of experience delivering assistance to 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Afghans in Afghanistan during the Taliban and pre-
Taliban eras. In fact, NGO representatives had a separate meeting on the first day of the 
conference and presented their findings to the plenary session at the conference. Third, 
the conference identified six priority areas, including health and education as important 
areas that must be prioritized and especially supported. The other four areas included 
administrative capacity, infrastructure, economic system, and rural development.  
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Table 1 Key international conferences on Afghanistan after 2001 
Date Conference Title Key Decisions 
Dec 2001 
The International Conference on 
Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany 
Establishing the Afghan Interim 
Authority, under Hamid Karzai’s 
leadership  
Jan 2002 
International Conference on 
Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan, Tokyo Japan 
4.5 billion USD in development 
assistance pledged  
Mar - Apr 
2004 
The International Conference on 
Afghanistan, Berlin, Germany 
8.2 billion USD pledged for 2004-
07 as multi-year commitment for 
better predictability 
Jan - Feb 
2006 
The London Conference on 
Afghanistan, London, England 
Afghanistan Compact (2006-11) 
signed, and 10.5 billion USD 
pledged  
Jul 2007 
Rome Conference on the Rule of 
Law in Afghanistan, Rome, Italy 
Special emphasis on strengthening 
rule of law as per Afghanistan 
Compact & ANDS 
Jun 2008 
The International Conference in 
Support of Afghanistan, Paris, 
France 
20 billion USD pledged, reinforcing 
support for the Afghan Compact 
Mar 2009 
Special Conference on 
Afghanistan, Moscow, Russia 
The regional and global impact of 
drug production in Afghanistan  
Mar 2009 
The International Conference on 
Afghanistan, The Hague, 
Netherlands 
UNAMA’s role emphasized; 
Priority sectors: governance, 
economy, security, especially 
relating to Pakistan 
Jan 2010 The London Conference 
Support Afghan-led political 
strategy 
Jul 2010 Kabul, Afghanistan  
Donors committed to channeling at 
least 50% of aid through 
government budget in two years 
Nov 2011 
The Istanbul Conference on 
Afghanistan, Istanbul, Turkey  
Promote regional security and 
cooperation in the heart of Asia 
Dec 2011 
The International Conference on 
Afghanistan, Bonn, Germany 
Support for the transformation 
decade beyond 2014 
Jul 2012 The Tokyo, Japan 
Established the Tokyo Mutual 
Accountability Framework 
(TMAF), and 16 billion USD 
pledged 
Dec 2014 London, England 
Afghanistan presented a reform 
vision of “realizing self-reliance” 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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As Table 1 illustrates, an important feature of all of the most important 
international conferences on Afghanistan includes an increasingly higher commitment 
of development assistance by the international community as Afghanistan continues to 
prove its ability to spend the funds appropriately. In fact, towards the middle and late 
2000s, “work in silos and ‘stove-piping’ were overcome to a significant extent” 
(Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada 2015, 4). More and more funds were 
being channeled through the Afghan government in line with the sectoral priorities as 
identified by Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which is the 
equivalent of the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. One key turning point 
was the July 2010 Conference that was held in Kabul to symbolize improved local 
capacity and increased Afghan ownership of the development process in Afghanistan. 
One of the most important decisions made during this conference was a commitment by 
the donor agencies and countries to channel at least 50 percent of development 
assistance through the Afghan government's core budget within two years. This move 
would further ensure that development assistance was more aligned with national 
priorities as defined by the ANDS and Afghanistan Compact. This move also signaled 
increased local ownership of the development process as outlined in the 2008 Paris 
Declaration of Aid Effectiveness.  
To put the volumes of development assistance disbursed to Afghanistan into 
perspective since the overthrow of the Taliban, Afghanistan has become one of the 
world’s largest recipients of foreign aid, whether measured in total ODA received or 
ODA as a percentage of recipient country’s GDP (See Figure 1). In the last decade, 
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Afghanistan has surpassed all countries, except Iraq, in its total volume of aid received. 
In terms of aid as a percentage of recipient country GNI over the last decade, 
Afghanistan is only surpassed by Liberia and the small island state of Micronesia. At its 
peak in late 2000s, Afghanistan received nearly US$7 billion in total annual aid, aid up 
to 50% of its GDP and up to US$250 aid in per capita terms (OECD-DAC 2014).  
Figure 1 Aid to Afghanistan (Current US$ Millions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
 
Afghanistan is the fifth largest recipient of foreign aid when calculated by total 
ODA received from 1960 to 2013. As illustrated in Figure 2, Afghanistan is only 
preceded by India, Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan respectively. Pakistan has always received 
more aid than Afghanistan, with the exception of the last decade. Its closer ties, in both 
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2015). While Pakistan received a total of US$56 billion during the 1960-2013 period, 
Afghanistan received US$56 during the same period (OECD-DAC 2014). The nearly 
perfect correlation between the flows of aid to the two nations is a reflection of their 
shared fate in the region. For example, each time there is an increase of unrest in 
Afghanistan, the tide of Afghan refugees flow towards Pakistan. In response to the 
refugee influx, Pakistan receives increased foreign assistance, both directly to Pakistani 
government and aid organizations and indirectly through the inflow of aid and 
remittances to Afghans in Pakistan.  
 
Figure 2 Top 20 aid recipients, 1960-2013 total (Current US$ Billions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
























Although official statistics are hardly available, Afghanistan has received 
significant amounts of aid from Soviet Russia during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Meanwhile, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan received substantial amounts of 
humanitarian assistance from the international community through multilateral aid 
agencies and international NGOs during the 1980s and the early 2000s. Interviews with 
Afghan aid workers who helped deliver these humanitarian services reveal that a 
significant portion of these efforts were concentrated at delivering basic services, focused 
in the areas of basic health and nutrition, primary education and literacy, and basic 
infrastructure, especially in refugee camps in the then North-Western Frontier Province 
of Pakistan. 
In fact, it was during these decades of conflict that Afghans, both those working 
for NGOs in Afghanistan and those delivering humanitarian assistance to Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan, developed their technical, managerial, and service delivery 
capacities as an unintended consequence of aid delivery through a process of learning by 
doing. When Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan reached at noticeable size, the influx of humanitarian aid by the international 
community filled the gap created by the years of war and political unrest. After meeting 
basic shelter requirements, the top two priority areas were health and education.  
Before 2002, the NGO and donor community were active both inside and outside 
of Afghanistan trying to help the poor and the disadvantaged through humanitarian 
services such as those delivered in the numerous refugee camps located in the Frontier 
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Province of Pakistan. Following the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, a lot of the 
Afghan refugees from neighboring countries returned home, mostly through the UNHCR 
repatriation programs. With the return of IDPs came the NGOs previously operating 
outside the country along with a whole new range of NGOs at local, international and 
multinational levels. For example, according to the Agency Coordinating Body for 
Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the number of registered NGOs increased from 280 in 2002 to 
1,400 in 2008 and several thousand more by 2014 (only a few of which have voluntarily 
registered with different coordinating bodies or the Ministry of Planning or the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs). In fact, some interviewees conceded that in the early years after the 
Taliban withdrawal, starting a new NGO was like opening up a new business venture, 
because of the abundance of donor funding, the majority of which were only delivered 
through NGOs. To their credit, however, the NGO sector’s flexibility and mobility 
allowed them to deliver needed services to all corners of the country at a time when the 
Afghan government did not have the capacity to do so. In addition to their flexible 
structures, their ability to offer wages much higher than the government helped them 
attract more qualified staff (Dost and Khan 2015).  
It is important to note that before 2002, the Afghan government’s MoPH was in 
charge of direct health care service delivery. Their lack of access to remote regions, 
however, left the health services unequally distributed across the country, with the rural 
regions under-served. This, however, changed in the post-Taliban era when a conscious 
decision was made for the MoPH to switch from service delivery to stewardship role in 
the health sector, leaving the health care service delivery to NGOs. This strategy served 
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them well at that time because the NGOs enjoyed two features that the MoPH lacked: 
reasonably developed local capacity to deliver health services, and using existing network 
of branches across the country that allowed them easier access to remote and hard-to-
reach areas.  
The significantly sharp rise in levels of foreign aid in the last decade deserves 
closer scrutiny. The volume of aid disbursed over the last ten years (2004-2014, 
measured in current prices) is the same as the total amount of aid disbursed in the 
preceding four and a half decades.  Even in real terms (2013 constant prices), the amount 
disbursed over the last ten years is nearly half of the entire amount disbursed from 1960 
to 2004.  
The turn of the millennium is also important because it brought new large 
recipients of aid and replaced some older ones like Egypt and India, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. Together, these ten countries received more than a quarter of all aid to 
developing countries, or US$335 million out of a total of 1.29 billion disbursed over this 
period. Among them, Iraq and Afghanistan have taken center stage post 9/11 by both 
ranking among the world’s top ten aid recipients. In fact, the two countries together 
received almost 10% of all the aid sent to developing countries during the 2003-2013 
decade, with Iraq having received nearly US$67 billion, and Afghanistan US$51 billion 
during the same period. Afghanistan alone has received more aid during this period than 
the entire region of Sub-Saharan Africa, making it the second largest recipient of aid in 




Figure 3 Top ten aid recipients of the 2003-2013 decade (Current US$ Millions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
 
The United States is the largest donor, both to Afghanistan as well as to all other 
aid recipient countries. It is interesting to notice that although the United States is 
Afghanistan’s largest donor, Afghanistan is not the largest recipient of American aid (See 
Figure 4). In fact, the following countries have historically received more aid than 
Afghanistan: Egypt, Israel, India, Iraq, Pakistan and Vietnam (OECD-DAC 2014). It is 
also important to note that much of the development fund flows from Soviet and other 
sources during the 1980s are poorly recorded and are thus not adequately reflected in 


























Figure 4 Afghanistan’s top 10 donors, 1960-2014 (Current US$ Millions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
 
Afghanistan’s heavy reliance on foreign aid has earned itself the title of “an 
extreme outlier in its dependence on aid” (World Bank 2012b, 9). This same report 
exposes Afghanistan’s historical reliance on external sources of finance as follows 
(World Bank 2012b, 10):  
Dependence on external financing—aid or other financial inflows—is nothing 
new for Afghanistan: it received massive amounts of Soviet aid in the 1980s and 
early 1990s; it was one of the highest per capita aid recipients in the world during 
the 1960s and 1970s; Afghan rulers received subsidies from Britain during much 
of the 19th century; and in its earliest years plunder from the Indian subcontinent 
was a main source of financing for the Afghan state. Historically, the regime 
rarely had to mobilize large revenues from its own people to cover costs and 
provide services, so this aspect of the social contract between state and society has 
long been missing. Instead, the historical pattern was often to use external 
resources to “buy loyalty” and provide security and political stability.  
In fact, in analyzing the wage-differentials between civil servants and those 
working for development organizations in Afghanistan, Dost and Khan (2015) emphasize 
the threat posed by the fiscal unsustainability of the public sector in Afghanistan at the 
















current levels of domestic revenues. Despite the significant debt relief that Afghanistan 
has received historically – most recently in 2011 after officially becoming a Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) – the country lacks the ability to generate sufficient 
revenues to cover its costs and service its debts, which hovers around 10% of the 
country’s GDP (World Bank 2015).  
A report by the World Bank (2012), called “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking 
Beyond 2014,” extensively examines the sustainability of the country in the absence of 
foreign aid and concludes that public spending is unsustainable, both fiscally and also 
administratively. The future is fiscally unsustainable due to the current levels of domestic 
revenue-to-GDP ratio, projected to reach 17.5% in 2021/22. These numbers are based on 
the potential for the country’s minerals wealth to start paying dividends as early as 
2016/17, and are not high enough to cover the cost of sustaining the public sector. The 
future is unsustainable administratively, because instead of building capacity, it has been 
substituted by borrowing it from abroad, which has created a parallel secondary civil 
service. In this context, President Ashraf Ghani’s policies which are aimed towards 
realizing “self-reliance by enhancing productivity, growth and revenues” are a welcomed 
change (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2014, 4).  
Aid Effectiveness vs. Government Effectiveness 
At the surface, it may appear that this study conflates government effectiveness 
with aid effectiveness. In order to clarify the inseparable link between the two issues, a 
brief discussion of the flow of funds (including ODA) may be in order. In the post-2001 
Afghanistan, ODA funds flow through one of two channels, with changing proportions 
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between the two over time. The two channels of fund flows are referred to as “on-
budget” and “off-budget” referring to whether external sources of funding are 
channeled through the government’s core budget or that they bypass the government 
altogether (World Bank 2012a). External or off-budget spending, estimated to constitute 
about 80% of total development assistance, refers to those funds that are directly spent 
by the donor agencies without passing through the hands of the Afghan government 
(World Bank 2012b, 49). On-budget spending, on the other hand, passes through 
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance and is therefore better aligned with national priorities 
and programs.  
The Afghan government’s core budget, or on-budget spending, is further 
divided into two groups, operating and development funds.  The bulk of the operating 
budget is earmarked to cover public servant salaries, including salaries for teachers, 
members of the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the Afghan National Police (ANP). 
It also covers non-wage expenses, such as operating and maintenance. The development 
budget, which is often about one-third of the government’s core budget (the operating 
budget making the remaining two-thirds), covers development programs identified 
through national priority setting exercises across sectors as in the ANDS. The majority 
of development budget funds are channeled through multi-donor trust funds, such as the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The major source of funding for the 
implementation of the BPHS, for example, is the government’s development budget.  
 
 53 
This by-passing of the government has come under criticism by many because 
of its perceived ineffectiveness and detachment from national priority areas (e.g. 
Pounds 2006; Nixon 2007; Waldman 2008). For example, Waldman (2008, 1) shows 
that “it is estimated [to be] a staggering 40% [of all aid spent in Afghanistan] has 
returned to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries.” Similarly, the 
Word Bank (2012a, 2) is most vocal about this issue by pointing the following:  
Despite the large volume of aid, most international spending “on” Afghanistan is 
not spent “in” Afghanistan, as it leaves the economy through imports, expatriated 
profits of contractors, and outward remittances. The local content of external 
budget aid is estimated at only 10–25 percent, compared with around 70–95 
percent for on-budget aid. With the bulk of aid (88 percent) going through the 
external budget, its local economic impact is limited. 
 One of the challenges in this study is the relationship between a discussion of 
aid effectiveness across sectors and government effectiveness in policy management 
and service delivery. These two concepts are closely linked for two reasons. First is the 
critical role that the Afghan government plays in setting national priorities and 
coordinating aid efforts. Second is the essential role that development assistance plays 
in financing the operations of the government and even services offered beyond the 
control of the government.  
At the level of public perceptions, almost all kinds of service delivery – 
especially in the areas of health and education – are automatically considered 
government provided, regardless of their source of financing these services. For 
example, a national survey of the Afghan people, conducted annually by the Asia 
Foundation, found that “when asked to identify the funder for local development 
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projects, Afghans are most likely to cite the Afghan government (24.5%), followed by 
the United States (22.6%)” (Warren and Hopkins 2015, 9). Another study conducted to 
assess the impact of development cooperation in North East Afghanistan finds that “in 
four out of eight sectors (jobs, income opportunities, schooling and access to health) 
respondents credit the government more often than development actors with better 
access to these services” (Böhnke, Koehler, and Zürcher 2015, 21).  
This attribution of service delivery to the government in Afghanistan happens at 
a time when donor assistance consistently funds more than two-thirds of Afghanistan’s 
core budget, not to mention the billions of dollars of off-budget development assistance 
that bypasses the government budget (See Figure 5). The Afghan government, however, 
is not in denial of their lighter role in financing development by admitting that “the 
significant difference between off- and on-budget executions indicates that the Afghan 
Government has played little role compared to international donors, when it comes to 




Figure 5 Government's core budget by source of financing, 2013-2016 
 
Source: National Budget Document, 2013-2016 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 
2016; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2014; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Finance 2013; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2012) 
Figure 6 illustrates the allocation of the core government budget across sectors 
for the year 2016 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2016). Given 
the intense security threats posed by different factions of Taliban, Da’ish and other 
groups, security expenditures account for 40% of the national budget. This is followed 
by the “Infrastructure and Natural Resources” sector that constitute 20% of the core 
budget, covering expenses in the areas of infrastructure, roads, dams, airports, and 
mineral extraction. The education sector constitutes the third largest component of 
national budget and most of the budget is allocated towards salaries of teachers and 
lecturers that fall under the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education 
respectively. It is important to note that despite the success of the health sector in 













lowest percentages of the national budget (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of 
Economy 2014). 
Figure 6 Allocation of national budget by sectors in 2016 
 
Source: National Budget for the year 2016 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2016) 
 
BPHS and EPHS 
At the core of Afghanistan’s MoPH strategy lies the development and 
implementation of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) in order to standardize 
services, expand coverage, and address key determinants of mortality and morbidity 
across the country. For this reason, “the cornerstone of the emergence of a new Afghan 
health system is the Basic Package of Health Services, because it addresses the most 


















mortality and morbidity” (Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of 
Health 2003, 44).  
The main purpose of the BPHS was twofold, “(1) to provide a standardized 
package of basic services which forms the core of service delivery in all primary health 
care facilities and (2) to promote a redistribution of health services by providing equitable 
access, especially in underserved areas” and it served those purposes well (Transitional 
Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health 2003). Since then, this package 
has undergone two revisions, one in 2005 and another in 2010. The first revision in 2005 
elevated mental health and disability from second tier status to on par with the other five 
components, while also adding HIV/AIDS and blood transfusion to the package. Some of 
the key changes after the second revision in 2010 include the addition of eye care and two 
new types of health facilities, namely Mobile Health Teams (MHTs) and Health Sub-
Centers (HSCs). The seven key components of BPHS are listed below, as adapted from 
BPHS document (Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health 
2003): 
1. Maternal and Newborn Health 
- Antenatal Care 
- Delivery Care 
- Postpartum Care 
- Family Planning 
- Care of the Newborn 
2. Child Health and Immunization 
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- Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) 
- Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) 
3. Public Nutrition 
- Prevention of Malnutrition 
- Assessment of Malnutrition 
4. Communicable Diseases Treatment and Control 
- Control of Tuberculosis 
- Control of Malaria 
- Prevention of HIV and AIDS 
5. Mental Health 
- Mental Health Education and Awareness 
- Case Identification, Diagnosis and Treatment  
6. Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Services  
- Disability Awareness, Prevention, and Education 
- Provision of Physical Rehabilitation Services 
- Case Identification, Referral, and Follow-up 
7. Regular Supply of Essential Drugs 
- List of all essential drugs needed 
 
While the development of the BPHS was a high priority in the post-Taliban 
environment of Afghanistan, this package stopped at the level of District Hospital (DH), 
leaving tertiary or hospital care out of the focus. As a result, and in line with the 
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directions identified in the ANDS (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008) and Health and 
Nutrition Sector Strategy (HNSS) 2008, the MoPH wanted to also develop tertiary care to 
complement the BPHS. Consequently, the Essential Package of Hospital Services 
(EPHS) was adopted in July 2005 with three main purposes: 
(1) to identify a standardized package of hospital services at each level of 
hospital, (2) to provide a guide for the MoPH, private sector, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and donors on how the hospital sector should be staffed, 
equipped, and provide materials and drugs, and (3) to promote a health referral 
system that integrates the BPHS with hospitals. (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Public Health 2005a, 2) 
As the then minister of public health, Dr. Sayed Mohammad Amin Fatimie says 
in the foreword to the 2005 revised BPHS document, “these two documents, the BPHS 
2005/1384 and the EPHS together define the Afghan health system’s entire referral 
system, from the health post at the village level to tertiary care in the major urban 
centers” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Health 2005b, vii). The 










Figure 7 The relationship between BPHS and EPHS 
 
Source: Adapted from BPHS Document (Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of 
Health 2003) 
 
In summary, this chapter provided the necessary background to contextualize the 
study of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, with particular focus on human capacity 
development in the health sector during the decades of conflict before 2001. It is against 
this backdrop that a deeper analysis of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan needs to take 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE AID EFFECTIVENESS LITRATURE  
  
 
This chapter discusses the large and growing body of aid effectiveness literature, 
with an aim to situate my thesis within the wider debates to date on the conditions under 
which aid is more likely to work. In order to achieve this, I start with a broad level 
discussion of foreign aid as one of several financial inputs that finance development. In 
particular, I show that despite the increasingly overshadowing presence of other sources 
of finance, aid should continue to interest development scholars because of its relatively 
more significant role in development, especially in some of the world’s smallest and least 
developed economies. Next, I discuss the different ways to measure foreign aid and show 
that the measurement choice – e.g. total aid disbursed vs. aid as a percentage of donor 
country income – is highly consequential for analysis, interpretation and country ranking. 
Then, I explore the reasons for the expansion of foreign aid volumes over time despite the 
lack of conclusive evidence to support the narrowly defined aid narrative, i.e. that aid 
promotes economic growth in recipient countries. These reasons may be classified as the 
strategic, humanitarian, theoretical, methodological, and ideological cases for aid.  
In the next stage, I broaden the debate by discussing some of the limitations posed 
by relying on the narrow definition of aid effectiveness in terms of GDP growth alone. I 
discuss the importance of other metrics, including the Human Development Index (HDI), 
poverty reduction, Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals, and most 
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importantly sector-specific outcomes, including human development in the areas of 
health and education. Following a brief discussion of aid in conflict affected countries, I 
unpack the concept of “capacity” by defining the term and discussing various typologies. 
Finally, I situate my proposed thesis within the debates on aid effectiveness and show 
that it fits squarely within the contingency school as it tries to uncover the conditions 
under which aid may be more effective.  
Aid as a Source of Development Finance 
A typical developing country usually enjoys a healthy menu of options to finance 
its development initiatives from external sources, where aid is but just one out of several 
competing components. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) classifies external 
sources of development finance in a simple two-by-two matrix as illustrated in Figure 8. 
The precise definition of ODA has varied since it was first defined in 1969 by OECD-
DAC and then revised in 1972. ODA’s current definition is: 
those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to 
multilateral institutions which are: 
i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by 
their executive agencies; and 
ii. each transaction of which: 
a. is administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and 
b. is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 
per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). (OECD 2008) 
 
Other official flows (OOFs) are differentiated from ODA either because OOFs are 





 Examples of OOFs include non-concessional development loans 
or direct export credits. Similarly, private grants, such as a grant by the Clinton 
Foundation, are offered by foundations and non-government organizations (NGOs) in 
donor countries at concessional rates. On the other hand, private flows – such as foreign 





Figure 8 OECD-DAC classification of development finance options 
 Concessional Non-concessional 
Official ODA OOF 




*Data on remittances and loan guarantees are not reported in OECD-DAC Statistics. 
 
In addition to these four elements, two other sources of development finance, 
which have taken the center stage over the past decade given their stellar growth rates, 
include loan guarantees and private remittances.
10
 As Figure 9 illustrates, private flows 
                                                 
8
 It was not until 1969 that OECD-DAC adopted the separation of ODA from OOF based on the former’s 
exclusive emphasis on promoting the economic and social development of developing countries. 
 
9
 For the definition of these and other related terms, please refer to OECD-DAC’s Glossary of Key Terms 
and Concepts online at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dac-glossary.htm  
 
10
 The World Bank defines remittances as follows: “Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and 
compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or 
received by resident households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all 
current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the 
income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are 
not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the 
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such as FDI and remittances alone make up more than two-thirds of all resources flowing 
from OECD member countries to developing countries.  
 
 
Figure 9 Resource flows from OECD to developing countries, 1960-2013 Total 
(Current Prices, US$ Millions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014). Data on Remittances were taken from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators Database (2014). 
 
Non-ODA elements emerged primarily after the 1970s, peaking once in the late 
1990s and again in 2010 (see Figure 10). Private flows such as FDI and remittances have 
experienced the fastest growth over time, surpassing ODA levels in absolute terms. In 
fact, in the last decade alone, non-ODA components (OOFs, Private Flows and Net 
                                                                                                                                                 
sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees. 















Private Grants) have more than quadrupled (from US$58.2 billion in 2003 to US$309.9 
billion in 2013). Over the same period, remittances have grown 72% (from US$114.1 
billion in 2003 to US$196.7 billion in 2013), while ODA has grown 94% (from US$69.6 
billion in 2003 to US$135.1 billion in 2013), pointing to the diminishing relative 
importance of aid as a source of development finance (World Bank 2015; OECD-DAC 
2014).  
 
Figure 10 Pattern of resource flows from OECD to developing countries, total flows, 
1960-2013 (Current Prices, US$ Millions) 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
Note: Data on Remittances were taken from World Development Indicators Database (2014). 
 
It is important to note, however, that despite the increasingly overshadowing 
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practitioners alike, mainly for three reasons. First, only ODA and private grants are given 
to recipient countries with the primary purpose of promoting development and improving 
the welfare of the developing countries. Secondly, non-ODA flows and remittances are 
not evenly distributed among all recipient countries. In fact, most non-ODA flows go to 
middle income countries and the poorest countries continue to lack the institutional 
capacity to attract private flows. For instance, in the year 2011, non-ODA flows 
constituted approximately 83% of all flows to middle-income countries, and only 17% of 
them to low-income countries. This is not surprising in light of the fact that private 
investment is rarely channeled to the least developed countries with weaker institutions, 
such as protection of property rights, and higher risk of investment default. In fact, Dollar 
and Easterly (1999) show that private investment is attracted mostly to countries that 
combine aid with a good policy environment, a characteristic of middle income countries 
and not that of the least developed countries. Thirdly, ODA alone makes up a 
considerably large amount of aid when put into perspective. For example, total ODA 
disbursed by OECD member countries alone over the past five and a half decades 
amounts to more than four trillion dollars in 2013 constant prices.
11
 In addition, for 
certain countries, such as small island or donor darling countries, ODA makes up a 
significant portion of recipient country’s government expenditures, often exceeding 50%. 
This makes aid a vital component of recipient country economies.  
                                                 
11
 This excludes all non-OECD members, such as Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and 
China, all of which have been increasingly important donor countries since the 1980s. Currently, there are 
29 OECD-DAC members: Australia, Austria,Belgium,Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European 
Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (OECD-DAC 2015).  
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Measuring Aid Flows 
Aid is usually measured by one or more of the following indicators: net ODA, net 
ODA as a percentage of donor country’s gross national income (GNI), net ODA per 
capita of recipient country, or net ODA as a percentage of recipient country’s GNI 
(Radelet 2006). Each indicator may be measured in either current dollars (nominal prices) 
or in constant dollars adjusted for inflation and fluctuations in exchange rates between 
U.S. dollars and the donor country’s currency for a given period of time.  
Figure 11 illustrates total ODA from DAC countries from 1960 to 2014. It shows 
that total ODA disbursement from DAC members rose steadily in absolute terms from 
1960 all the way to early 1990, following which it dipped to US$48.7 billion in 1997 in 
the wake of the economic recession of the 1990s. ODA levels did not rebound until the 
turn of the millennium, with a rapid growth partly driven by the post-9/11 flows to 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The year 2014 has been the historic peak of ODA at a staggering 
US$135 billion. Although some European countries are slashing their aid budgets, it is 
hard to imagine that aid levels will decline beyond 2014 in light of the humanitarian 
crises due to the rise of the Islamic State, the Ebola outbreak and the continuing high 
demand for aid in some of the largest aid recipient countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, and Palestinian territories.  
By contrast, total ODA as a percentage of donor country GNI has been declining, 
especially during the 1960s and 1990s. Following a dip in 1973 after the oil price shocks, 
aid as a percentage of GNI hovered between 0.3% and 0.4% during the 1970s and 1980s, 
until it dropped again to its historic low level of 0.21% in the years 1997 and 2001. 
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Although the steep rise in absolute levels of aid in 2000s managed to pick up aid in 
relative terms, it continues to linger around an average of 0.3%, far below the United 













































































Total ODA (Constant Prices, 2013 USD Billions)
Total ODA (Current Prices, USD Billions)
Total ODA as % of Donor Country GNI
Source: OECD-DAC Statistics (2014) 
 
It is important to note, however, that data analysis and interpretation are highly 
sensitive to the choice of variables and indicators. To illustrate the point, consider Figure 
11, which reports total ODA disbursed by DAC countries on the left-hand-side vertical 
axis and ODA as a percentage of donor country GNI on the right hand side vertical axis. 
                                                 
12
 This target dates back to the year 1958 when the World Council of Churches proposed the idea of one 
percent target to all United Nations Delegations (Führer 1994). Later in 1970, the United Nations adopted 
the 0.7% target as follows: “Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official 
development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net 
amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the decade” (UN 
General Assembly Resolution 2626 (24 October 1970) in OECD 2010, 1). 
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If one were to consider the left-hand-side axis, one would conclude that overall, aid levels 
in 2013 constant prices have almost quadrupled from about US$37 billion in 1960 to 
nearly US$135 billion in 2014. The slope of the line, depicting the rate of increase in 
ODA disbursements, increases when disbursements are measured in current prices as 
compared to constant prices.  On the other hand, if one were to consider the right-hand-
side axis, one would conclude that overall, donors have become less generous with aid 
disbursements, because relative to their incomes, they are contributing 0.2 percentage 
points less aid (as a percentage of their GNI) than the levels they used to contribute in the 
early 1960s. Although DAC countries are giving more aid in absolute terms (even after 
adjustments for inflation), it is increasingly a smaller percentage of their income, because 
they are getting richer at a rate faster than the rate at which they are increasing their 
ODA. 
The choice of measurement indicator also affects the ranking of countries, both 
the recipient as well as the donor countries. For example, in absolute terms, the United 
States has been the largest donor by far, followed by Japan, Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom (see Figure 12). When measured as a percentage of donor country’s 
GNI, however, donor rankings change dramatically (see Figure 13). For example, the top 
two donor countries in absolute terms, i.e. the United States and Japan, are ranked 17th 
and 18th respectively in their aid disbursements relative to the sizes of their domestic 
economies. On the other hand, Scandinavian countries, such as Norway and Sweden are 
catapulted as the number one and number three most generous donor countries 
respectively, measured by their aid disbursement relative to the sizes of their domestic 
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economies. In fact, only Norway, Netherlands and Sweden exceed the United Nations 
target of giving at least 0.7% of donor GNI in aid. As illustrated in Figure 13, the 2014 
numbers put the following four countries ahead of the UN target: Sweden (1.1%), 
Luxemburg (1.07%), Norway (0.99%), Denmark (0.85%) and UK (0.71%).  
 
Figure 12 Top 20 largest donor countries, total ODA disbursed 1960-2014 (Current 
Prices, US$ Millions) 
 
Source: OECD DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
 























Figure 13 Top 20 most generous donor countries in history 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
History of Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid, in one form or another, has existed for centuries. In fact, the transfer 
of resources, including gold, has been used as an important foreign policy tool to secure 
peace or form new alliances since even before the invention of the nation-state concept. 
Some of the earliest signs of foreign aid, defined here broadly as resource flows from the 
rich to the poor, can be observed since at least the 18
th
 century in the form of missionary 





























schools, and the Colonial Budget Offices. Edwards (2015, 298) calls the British Colonial 
Development Act of 1929 “the first legal statute dealing expressly with official aid.” 
However, the modern structure of development assistance took shape after the Second 
World War through the creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
For example, at a commencement speech to the graduating class of Harvard 
University in 1947, General George Marshall, the then U.S. Secretary of State appointed 
by President Truman, emphasized the importance of providing aid abroad for achieving 
security at home:  
it is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in 
the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no 
political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is not directed against any 
country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. (Marshall 1947) 
Gradually, Marshall’s call for aid to fight hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos 
has become the cornerstone of American foreign aid policy. For the United States, the 
world’s largest donor in absolute terms, the foundations of foreign aid were laid by 
President Truman. In his Inaugural Address at the Capitol on January 20, 1949, President 
Truman (1949) famously said: 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in 
conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of 
disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap 
and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in 
history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of 
these people.… Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help 
themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the 
right of all people.  
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President Truman’s legacy has continued to the present through various 
administrations. For example, the establishment of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) by President Kennedy following the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 further solidified United States’ commitment to international development. Outside 
the US, the establishment of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) under the 
OECD in 1960 marked the earliest efforts to coordinate aid from developed countries to 
the developing world. This period was critical because of an upward trend in the flow of 
aid from DAC and non-DAC donor countries alike, against the backdrop of the Cold War 
rivalries. 
The Aid Narrative 
Much of the intellectual history of foreign aid dates back to the post-WWII 
period. For example, Walt Rostow’s (1960) Stages of Economic Growth popularized the 
idea of “take-off” as a step towards achieving economic development and arriving at the 
promised age of mass consumption after a successful drive to maturity. In his article on 
the “Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-eastern Europe,” Paul Rosentein-
Rodan (1943) is credited with developing the idea of the “Big Push” – although he did 
not use this specific term in his paper – as a model of economic development. He 
basically argued in favor of large-scale investments in industrialization to absorb the 
unemployed masses in developing countries in order to escape a low level equilibrium 
trap and embark on a trajectory of economic growth.  
At the heart of the earlier big push narrative lies the belief that what is holding 
back the developing countries from embarking on economic growth is insufficient initial 
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investments, especially in large infrastructure projects. Here, foreign aid comes to the 
rescue by filling this investment gap, which will jump start the economy and lead to a 
take-off, thus creating a virtuous cycle of more growth and higher returns to investment. 
This narrative was formalized in a “two-gap” model, also known as financing gap model, 
or “aid-financed investment approach to development” (Dollar and Easterly 1999, 548), 
developed by Chenery and Bruno (1962) and Chenery and Strout (1966), in which the 
first gap is related to savings and the second gap is related to trade in order to generate 
foreign exchange
13
. The two-gap model is in large part an extension of the Harrod-Domer 
model, which despite having been originally developed to explain business cycle and 
growth, has had significant influence on development theory over time. Hirschman's 
(1958) emphasis on investing in industries with strong forward and backward linkages 
completed the narrative, which according to critics is still the only major narrative 
guiding development effort despite its many theoretical flaws and lack of empirical 
support. For example, Easterly (2003, 34) posits that “the idea that ‘aid buys growth’ is 
an integral part of the founding myth and ongoing mission of the aid bureaucracies.” 
Since then, the big push model has found traction in many circles. For example, 
building on this model, Jeffrey Sachs and others have reinvigorated the idea of ending 
extreme poverty through the fusion of large sums of foreign aid dollars into poor 
countries. As Easterly (2006) argues, the turn of the century brought about a “big push 
Déjà Vu” despite the scarcity of evidence, in his view, to support such classic narrative of 
aid-driven economic development.  
                                                 
13
 Since then, there has been an explosion of other-gap models including three-gap model developed by 




These early intellectual developments formed the cornerstone of foreign aid 
infrastructure both domestically in the US and abroad. For example, as Wiarda (1999, 49) 
argues: 
for a long time (and often continuing to today), these ideals of the causative 
relationships between economic and social change and democratization 
represented the ideological foundation of the U.S. foreign aid program directed at 
the developing countries. 
He also points to the key role that Rostow played as an architect of U.S. foreign 
aid program in the early 1960s, which gave rise to programs such as Peace Corps, the 
Alliance for Peace, and aid to various sectors and groups including the peasants, trade 
unions, political parties, education, mass communication, and community development. 
More recently, the development of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (and 
now the Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs) may also be considered a brainchild 
of this renewed commitment to fighting poverty with the tools of foreign aid.  
Debates to Date on Aid Effectiveness  
As the volume of aid has grown, more than quadrupling its volume in 1960 in 
constant dollars,
14
 so has the literature on aid effectiveness, with ardent supporters and 
critical opponents contesting both the legacy and the future relevance of foreign aid. The 
vast literature on foreign aid effectiveness is an interesting case of polarized views, some 
considering it a panacea and others a complete failure. For example, in line with the view 
that aid works, the entrance of the Word Bank headquarters in Washington, DC, is 
                                                 
14
 In 2013 constant prices, total ODA has nearly quadruples from US$38 million in 1960 to US$135 
million in 2014.  In current prices, however, the increase is almost 29 times as much, from US$4.7 million 
in 1960 to US$135 million in 2014. 
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inscribed with the slogan “our dream is a world free of poverty.” In opposition to the 
effectiveness of aid, one of the greatest development economists, Peter Bauer (1975 in 
Shleifer 2009, 379–380) has famously criticized aid for being “a transfer of resources 
from the taxpayer of donor country to the government of a recipient country.” 
Some of the main proponents of foreign aid include Jeffrey Sachs (2006), Joseph 
Stiglitz (2006; 2002), Nicholas Stern (1974) and others, who have lately been joined by 
celebrities such as Bono and Angelina Jolie. The proponents of foreign aid attribute the 
reduction of global poverty and other achievements in health, education and well-being in 
developing world to foreign aid. For example, they point to the economic success of large 
aid recipients such as Botswana, Indonesia, South Korea, Tanzania, and Mozambique as 
evidence in support of foreign aid. Even in the cases of apparent failure of foreign aid to 
achieve results, they argue that aid has prevented conditions from further deterioration. 
They therefore constantly call for an increase in the volume of aid to the 0.7% of donor 
countries’ GNI target in order for aid to be more effective in its fight against poverty.   
Some of the most noted critics, on the other hand, include Milton Friedman 
(1958), Peter Bauer (1972), Paul Mosley (2015) , Peter Boone (1996), William Easterly 
(2005), and Dambisa Moyo (2009). They argue that the majority of aid recipient 
countries, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Haiti, and Papua New 
Guinea, have failed to show results despite the inflow of billions of foreign aid dollars for 
more than five decades. For example, in her provocatively titled book, Dead Aid, 
Dambisa Moyo (2009, xix) argues that “aid has helped make the poor poorer, and growth 
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slower.” Other critics charge that aid has worsened weak governments, helped the elite, 
distorted local economies or has simply been wasted. 
One recent shift in thinking about and in the practice of defining aid effectiveness 
by the development community is in defining it not at the level of impact, outcome or 
output, but implicitly defining aid effectiveness at the level of input, namely through the 
volume of aid disbursed. This practice essentially equates every dollar of aid input to 
comparable units of outcome and impact, an assumption that cannot be further from the 
truth. This shift in thinking is summarized by Judith Tendler (1975 in Easterly 2003, 34) 
as follows: 
A donor organization’s sense of mission, then, relates not necessarily to economic 
development but to the commitment of resources, the moving of money. . . . The 
estimates of total capital needs for development assistance in relation to supply 
seem to have been the implicit standard by which donor organizations have 
guided their behavior and judged their performance . . . the quantitative measure 
has gained its supremacy by default. Other definitions of success and failure of 
development assistance efforts have been hard to come by. 
Keeping in mind the diversity of opinions regarding the right measure of aid 
effectiveness, for the remainder of this chapter, I choose to focus on economic growth of 
recipient countries as the outcome variable of interest, which is the most common 
measure of aid effectiveness in the literature. Establishing the causal mechanism between 
aid disbursements on the one hand and growth on the other helps us categorize the 
voluminous literature on aid effectiveness into a few distinct groups. In fact, as depicted 
in Figure 14, the aid effectiveness literature is divided into three broad categories based 
on the hypothesized causal mechanism between aid and growth (Doucouliagos and 
Paldam 2009; Radelet 2006; Hansen and Tarp 2000). While the first and second 
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categories estimate the causal relationship between aid and economic growth without 
specifying any conditions, the third category argues that aid will be effective only under 
certain conditions.  
 
Figure 14 Three waves of literature on aid effectiveness 
 
Source: Adapted from Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009, 441)  
 
The first wave of literature, which relied on growth theories focusing on factor 
accumulation, failed to show support for the aid effectiveness narrative. For example, 
Boone (1996) found that aid was going primarily to public consumption instead of 
investment, thus simply enlarging the government and not necessarily contributing to 
growth even if the theory was sound. Some also found evidence to the contrary, namely 
that aid actually decreased saving (Griffin and Enos 1970; Weisskopf 1972). 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) also find that only 25% of aid goes to accumulation, 
while the remaining 75% goes to public consumption, which is shown to negatively 
affect growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003).  
In a related line of argument, some scholars have studied the impact of aid on 
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expenditure, because “aid funds pass through a policy maker’s hand prior to reaching 
their destination” (Khan 2003, 351). More recently, Mosley (2015, 106) links fiscal 
behavior directly with aid effectiveness by arguing that: 
tax effort and the ability of the state to diversify its taxation structure, we find, are 
significantly linked to growth and poverty indicators. The key message for policy 
is that a broadening of the tax structure in low-income countries is crucial in order 
to enable those countries to escape from the ‘weak-state–low-tax trap,’ and to 
make aid effective. 
 
Similarly, the second wave of literature, which argues that aid has a direct 
relationship to growth, finds little support in literature. For example, Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2009) find that although this model has been tested with nearly 400 control 
variables, there is still scant evidence to support the claim of the model. Bauer (1972) 
actually found a zero or negative relationship between aid and growth.  
The third wave, however, seems to have stood the test of time and replication 
better than the preceding two waves, thus deserving a deeper look inside. This wave of 
literature, which I call the contingent growth category, posits that aid may or may not 
lead to growth depending on a number of conditions. The specific conditions under which 
aid may be more effective is large and growing. Radelet (2006), for example, further 
classifies the third wave into three sub-groups, arguing that the conditions under which 
aid could be more effective fall into one of three sub-categories.
15
 My proposed 
hypothesis, i.e. that relative effectiveness of aid is conditional upon local capacity, falls 
best under the first sub-category discussed below.  
                                                 
15
 It is worth noting again that my proposed hypothesis on the centrality of local capacity for aid 
effectiveness falls best under the first sub-category.  
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1. Recipient country characteristics: an entire sub-group of literature deals with the 
effectiveness of aid conditional on certain key characteristics of the recipient 
country. For example, Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett (1995) argued that aid 
would be more successful in countries with stronger civil liberties. Boone (1996) 
found that short-term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more 
successful means of reducing poverty than other programs. Burnside and Dollar's 
(2000) argument that aid works in a “good policy environment” defined as the 
weighted sum of budget surplus, inflation rate and trade openness, also falls in 
this category.  Since the Burnside and Dollar paper, many papers have reacted to 
their results, some supporting while others refuting it in a state that Easterly 
(2003, 23) has called a “political football.” For example, Rajan and Subramanian 
(2005) find no evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical 
environments. Similarly, Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2003) use the exact 
same specification as Burnside and Dollar, but simply added more data. Here, 
they show that the “good policy environment” argument in fact could not be 
replicated. Hansen and Tarp (2000) also find that aid in all likelihood increases 
the growth rate, and this result is not conditional on good policy. Dollar and 
Easterly (1999) salvage the good policy argument by finding that aid, if offered in 
a good policy environment, paves the way for attracting private investment, which 
would otherwise be crowded out.  
2. Donor practices: Another strand of literature shows that aid may be more effective 
if a) aid is channeled multilaterally and not bilaterally, b) more aid is provided as 
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untied, c) aid is provided with better coordination among various donor agencies 
(Bigsten and Tengstam 2015), c) donors reduce fragmentation and instead 
concentrate on a few countries (Brown and Swiss 2013), and d) aid is coupled 
with greater ownership and participation of recipient countries. For instance, 
Winters (2010, 218) finds that “foreign aid functions better—both at the macro-
level of aid flows and at the micro-level of individual aid projects—when there is 
more government and implementing agency accountability” measured by 
participation.   
3. Aid typology: The last sub-strand of literature shows that different kinds of aid 
are aimed at different outcomes and treating them all under one variable may be 
misleading. For example, Clemens et al. (2012) study three types of aid, including 
aid given for humanitarian purposes, aid channeled to health and education 
sectors, and aid spent on infrastructure, and they find that only the third type is 
correlated with growth.  
Does the Evidence Support the Aid Narrative? 
Considering all, the preponderance of evidence, especially those coming from 
cross country regressions relating aid to growth, suggest that aid does not work, with the 
exception of certain cases within the third wave of literature, namely conditional 
effectiveness of aid. Hristos Doucouliagos and Martin Paldam (2009; 2011) support this 
position through combining the results of decades of studies in meta-regression analysis. 
For example in a paper titled appropriately “The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad 
Results of 40 Years of Research,” they show that the results of 97 econometric studies as 
 
 82 
of 2004 show that aid has not been effective, primarily because of Dutch disease 
(Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009). They updated their list in 2011 and correspondingly 
changed the title of their paper to “The Ineffectiveness of Development Aid on Growth” 
[emphasis added] and show that the net effect of aid on growth, through 105 papers and 
1217 estimates, is positive, but of no statistical or economic significance (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam 2011).  
The litany of hypothesized reasons that make aid ineffective is long and 
expanding, and are sometimes at odds with each other. They include the following: too 
little money; too much money; overreliance on non-government organization (NGOs), 
which are not designed to promote growth; too much recipient government involvement 
and allegations of corruption; bypassing local governments; low absorption capacity; 
multiple layers of sub-contracting; misaligned incentive structures among the many 
principals and agents (Martens et al. 2008). 
If the preponderance of evidence is against the effectiveness of foreign aid, why 
does aid continue to not only survive but also thrive? Before attempting to answer this 
question, however, this section briefly addresses the question of why donor countries 
provide aid to developing countries, regardless of the evidence on aid effectiveness, or 
the lack thereof. Despite much overlap, these are two distinct questions, as clarified 
below.  
Donor Motivations  
Why do the governments of rich countries provide aid to poorer countries? Unlike 
the literature on aid effectiveness, the question of donor motivation reverses the model by 
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treating aid flows as the dependent variable and various potential donor motivations for 
aid-giving as explanatory or independent variables.  
At the theoretical level, the donor country motivations for providing aid may best 
be illustrated on a continuum from altruism on the one hand and self-interest on the other. 
Those closer to the altruistic or idealist camp posit that aid is and should be given on the 
basis of recipient countries’ needs with less or no regard to all other considerations. Much 
of the “humanitarian assistance,” especially those channeled through smaller NGOs and 
provided by individual donors falls closer to this category. On the other end of the 
spectrum lies the Marxist and Neo-Marxist view, which is concerned with how aid may 
be used as a tool at the hands of the rich countries to subjugate the poor or at least 
maintain global power relations. In between these polarized positions lies the majority 
view that see aid as serving both the needs of the poor as well as meeting the strategic 
interests of the donor countries.  
The reality of the motivations on the ground is an empirical question that may be 
tested with data. For example, if altruism was the main force driving aid flows, at least 
three conditions must be satisfied. First, aid must flow to those regions of the world with 
greatest need, e.g. measured by the levels of poverty in recipient countries.  Second, aid 
flows must stop once the need is satisfied in comparison to other regions of the world. 
Third, in order to take away the incentive from the recipient country governments to 
become perpetually aid dependent, certain conditions must be imposed, monitored and 
enforced. In reality, however, it is not hard to find evidence that shows how the three 
conditions are violated: i) on all measures of aid, some relatively richer countries receive 
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more aid than many poorer countries; ii) the discontinuation of aid flows is determined by 
factors other than the reduction in levels of need; and iii) conditions are not always 
imposed, and when they are, they are rarely followed through.  
 
Figure 15 Top ten recipients of American ODA from 1960 to 2013 (Constant 
Dollars, 2013 US$ Billions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
 
Furthermore, aid is not always given to the poor, best demonstrated by the list of 
top ten recipients of American aid in Figure 15. In fact, between 1975 and 1996, Egypt 
and Israel accounted for more than 45% of total American aid of US$195 billion 
disbursed to more than 100 recipients. Finally, need-driven aid should not be tied, but the 
reality as depicted in Figure 16 paints a different picture for many of the donor countries. 
Similarly, Ellmers (2011, 4) finds that “more than 50% of total official development 
assistance, is spent on procuring goods and services for development projects from 
external providers.”  















Figure 16 Percentage of official tied aid for DAC members in 2013 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics, table 23 (2014).  
Note that Slovenia did not report tying status for 2013.  
 































The extreme Neo-Marxist view, i.e. that aid is given to subjugate the poor and 
maintain global power relations, also fails logical and empirical tests. The fluctuations in 
the flow of aid over time, without corresponding changes in the donor countries’ 
incentive structure, cannot be explained by this view. While such a polarized and 
dichotomous representation of aid motives may be criticized for it “underestimates the 
complex interplay of hard-nosed realism and human ideals,” I believe that the concept of 
a continuum helps the reader see the entire landscape and situate particular viewpoints 
relative to others in an ordinal fashion (Breuning 1994, 358).  
The view of aid motivations between these two extremes, i.e. altruism and self-
interest, best explains aid flows both over time and across countries. Proponents of this 
view – embraced by almost all scholars, yet still lying across a continuum separated by 
their belief in the relative proportion of aid being motivated by altruism vs. self-interest –
believe that aid serves both the needs of the poor and the strategic interests of the donor 
countries. An example that best illustrates this point is the U.S. aid provided to “friendly” 
nations during the Cold War, which was given with the explicit purpose of curtailing the 
Soviet “encroachment” in addition to promoting development.
16
 As Qian (2014) points 
out, the top recipients of foreign aid, especially of American aid, are countries that are 
politically important to the top donor countries, such as Vietnam during the 1970s, China 
during the reform era of the 1980s and 1990s, and Iraq and Afghanistan since the event of 
9/11. Yet it is also true that the largest donor for many least developed countries, in 
absolute terms, is the United States. Therefore, as De Haan (2009, 3) points out, “its 
[aid’s] principles always reflect a combination of motives, and aid practices tend to create 
                                                 
16
 For example, read on the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and its amendment in 1959.  
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their own dynamics, as do all policies, through the institutions responsible for their 
implementation.” 
In a much cited article, Alesina and Dollar (2000, 33) find that “the direction of 
foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the 
economic needs and policy performance of the recipients.” Examples of strategic 
interests may include compensation for colonial practices, efforts to expand the market 
for one’s goods; to increase one’s influence and soft power in the region; to make new 
political allies or continue to please old allies; to signal diplomatic approval of a new 
regime in power; to reward good behavior such as the reduction of barriers to free flow of 
goods, financial resources, people or ideas; and to improve infrastructure to facilitate the 
expansion of extractive industries. Riddell et al. (2008) argues that aid-giving behavior by 
donor countries is best explained by a combination of factors and objectives bundled 
together, including humanitarian, economic, political, strategic, cultural, historical, and 
moral imperatives. The real debate, therefore, is just about the degree to which aid may 
be given for altruistic and self-serving reasons, not either-or. The recently increasing 
pattern of South-South aid flows lends further credibility to a complex interplay of 
motivations influencing aid policy.  
The Aid Continuation Puzzle  
In the preceding section, we asked why the donor countries deliver aid in the first 
place. We mapped donor motivations on a continuum from altruism to self-interest, and 
showed that there is almost universal agreement that donor countries’ aid policies are 
informed by a combination of both altruism and self-interest, the degree of which is up 
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for debate. This section asks a different question, albeit with overlapping responses. In 
particular, I show that the preponderance of evidence is stacked against the effectiveness 
of foreign aid, yet aid volumes continue to expand even in real terms. This section, 
therefore, asks why governments of rich countries continue to provide aid despite a lack 
of evidence to show that it works. Elaborating on this question forms the main subjects of 
discussion in this section.  
There are many reasons for the continued thriving of foreign aid despite the lack 
of sufficient evidence to support that it works. The most obvious answer, stemming from 
the discussion in the previous section, is that aid continues to grow because it at least 
serves the strategic self-interests of the donor countries. This, however, is only a partial 
response. In order to summarize, I group potential responses to this question into five 
major categories, namely the strategic, humanitarian, theoretical, methodological, and 
ideological case for aid. 
 
A. The Strategic Motive  
Aid may also continue to exist and expand because even if it does not achieve 
growth, it still serves the other strategic interests of the donor countries. In line with the 
view that the primary motivations of donor countries are political and strategic, and by 
extension development outcomes are secondary, aid will continue to exist for as long as 
the primary interests of the donor countries are safeguarded. In addition to the political 
interests, tied aid, also known as “boomerang aid,” may in fact benefit the donor 
countries economic interests. In addition to economic interests, foreign aid may also buy 
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donor countries soft power by influencing public opinion (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and 
Wood 2014). Lastly, the aid infrastructure – including multilateral and bilateral aid 
agencies, private contractors, foundations, and international and local NGOs – has grown 
so large and ubiquitous that path dependence and institutional stickiness come in the way 
of any major reform. For these reasons and more, proponents of this view see little reason 
for aid to subside, especially when it comes at an average cost of about 0.3% of donor 
country income.  
 
B. The Humanitarian Case 
One of the reasons that foreign aid continues to thrive despite the lack of evidence 
to support the aid narrative is the moral or humanitarian case (e.g., Lumsdaine 1993). 
Even after acknowledging the failure of foreign aid to deliver on its promises, the people 
and governments of rich countries will continue the effort to deliver aid to those less 
fortunate than them, driven by their values and ideals. For example, Stern (1974), 
considers aid a “moral obligation” on the part of the rich in the developed world to help 
those in the developing world, where even the rich experience a lower standard of living 
than the poor in developed countries. This argument resonates more in today’s globalized 
world where despite the increased interconnectedness, the gap between the winners and 






C. The Theoretical Defense  
At a theoretical level, some critics of aid have challenged the aid narrative, but 
continue to stand behind aid on the grounds that even if aid cannot buy growth, it can at 
least improve people’s lives in other ways, albeit relatively much less ambitious, such as 
providing short term employment, temporary relief, and other band aid solutions. 
Mosley’s (1986) “micro-macro paradox” is a testament to the fact that aid, at least at the 
micro level, achieves certain objectives, thus benefiting the poor. He observed that much 
of the macro-level evidence, i.e. the cross country regression analyses that failed to prove 
a robust relationship between aid and GDP growth, point towards aid ineffectiveness. On 
the other hand, much of the micro-level evidence, i.e. ex post project level studies 
conducted by the World Bank that showed “success” measured by more than ten percent 
rates of return, point towards aid effectiveness.  Therefore, it could be argued that even if 
aid fails to achieve growth, it helps achieve other smaller goals. As Easterly (2005, 11) 
argues, expecting the existing foreign aid infrastructure to achieve economic growth is 
like expecting a cow to win the Kentucky Derby.  In essence, the theoretical case for aid 
questions the somewhat narrowly-framed definition of aid effectiveness in terms of GDP 
growth.  
Others argue that the aid ineffectiveness literature is understandable because aid 
goes to countries and regions that need it the most, and not those that have the highest 
potential to attain sustained growth. For example, summarizing key findings of the DAC 




Aid is not only concentrated in countries with the most difficult and intractable 
development problems; substantial amounts of it must be used to cope with 
emergency situations arising from natural calamities, refugee influxes or strife. It 
is not at all surprising, therefore, that many of the major aid recipients are not 
among the fast-growing countries. Almost all have been helped significantly by 
aid to accelerate social development and to lay at least some of the foundations 
for rapid economic progress.  
While this may have been true in the early years and for certain kinds of aid, such 
as humanitarian assistance, this view that aid goes to the poorest countries is not 
supported by evidence. In fact, Qian (2014, 13) shows, using more recent data, that 
“countries that are richer in total and in per capita terms receive much more aid, while 
factors such as poor economic growth or the occurrence of natural disasters has very little 
influence.” She further shows that only about 1.69% to 5.25% of total aid is given to the 
poorest twenty percent of countries in any given year.  
Führer (1994, 40) further argues that “aid has to be more concerned with creating 
the fundamental conditions for its effectiveness.” This view, however, is also refuted by 
Deaton (2013, 273), who in his recent book The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the 
Origins of Inequality, shows that “when the ‘conditions for development’ are present, aid 
is not required. When local conditions are hostile to development, aid is not useful, and it 
will do harm if it perpetuates those conditions.” 
 
D. The Methodological Challenges 
One reason that aid continues to thrive despite lack of evidence is that the 
evidence is not considered to be convincing enough. Proponents of this view continue to 
hold on to the aid narrative by respecting the theory and casting doubt on the empirics. In 
fact, much of the earlier literature refuting the aid narrative is often dismissed for its lack 
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of methodological rigor to account for endogeneity. The endogeneity problem likens the 
aid-growth nexus to a chicken-and-egg problem where it may be difficult to establish the 
direction of causality.  
The advancement in modern quantitative theory and techniques renewed hopes in 
determining for a fact the fate of the long standing debate on aid effectiveness literature. 
The quantitative advancements, however, have not only failed in reducing the debate but 
it has in fact added to it because of the sensitivity of the statistical models to the choice of 
estimator and the set of control variables (Hansen and Tarp 2000). Cross country analyses 
are also taken with a grain of salt because sometimes the effect is so small relative to 
noise that the two become indistinguishable (Roodman 2007).  
The strong conviction to show evidence in support of the aid narrative has led 
some to engage in creative ways including obfuscation, data mining, and spin control. For 
instance, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009, 444) show that “the development aid data 
have been so thoroughly mined that it is highly likely that some type I errors [acceptance 
of false aid-effect] have been published and that many ‘significant’ aid effects are not in 
fact statistically significant or practically relevant.” In a more sobering statement, 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2015, 26) conclude from the often contradictory findings that 
“Let us face it: Economists are human!” Echoing similar reactions, Arndt, Jones, and 
Tarp (2010, 4) state that “if the profession has experienced serious difficulties estimating 
the causal effect of schooling on earnings in developed countries, then it should not be 




The diversity of opinion on the strength of evidence is understandable because 
much of the existing literature indeed treats all kinds of aid as one homogenous unit, 
which it is not because one can arguably expect aid to have a different impact depending 
on whether it is bilateral or multilateral, tied or untied, humanitarian or non-humanitarian, 
cash or in-kind transfer, spent in the donor or the recipient country, spent on one sector or 
another, etc.  In addition to the kind of aid, Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) discuss the 
causal mechanism “black box” that needs to be deconstructed and unpacked. 
Yet others argue that the real challenge emanates from both theoretical and 
methodological origins. For example, Bjørnskov (2013, 4) argues that foreign aid must be 
viewed as a “multidimensional international transfer” in which different types of aid can 
have different kinds of impact along the economic, social, reconstruction and other 
dimensions. Therefore, estimating the effects of aid given for social purposes on 
economic indicators, for example, is a theoretical mistake. For this reason, many focus on 
estimating the effects of aid on specific sectors, such as education or health, rather than 
on aggregate economic indicators (Michaelowa and Weber 2007; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, 
and Thiele 2008; Mishra and Newhouse 2009). 
Kilby and Dreher (2010) attempt to separate aid inflows depending on the motives 
of different donors, suggesting that aid given with political motives is less likely to 
contribute to development. Collodel and Kotze (2014, 197) similarly argue that “if after 
more than 50 years of research, we still do not have a conclusive answer to the question 
of whether aid is effective, then we should examine whether the methodology currently 




E. Ideological Reasons  
Even when some analysts invoke empirical evidence and theoretical explanations, 
their identification and selection of facts is grounded in deep seated ideological 
convictions. The proponents of this view will defend the sanctity of the aid narrative with 
unrelenting effort, and instead point to other potential flaws in the aid giving process, 
including the volume of aid as either too much or too little. For example, some argue that 
one of the main reasons aid is not working is because it has fallen much short of its 0.7% 
of donor country GDP target, thus unable to generate enough momentum for a big push 
(Sachs 2006). Others argue that aid has not been spent on the actual drivers of growth, 
although Easterly (2003) argues we do not really know what those actual drivers of 
growth are and what we do know changes over time.  
A whole body of literature on aid conditionality has been developed on the 
premise that the real culprit is recipient country governments that do not exercise fiscal 
prudence. But even aid conditionality suffers from several challenges, such as lack of 
agreement on what conditions to impose,
17
 the number of conditions and the sectors on 
which to impose conditions, and enforcing conditions and pulling the plug when 
conditions are violated. Bearce and Tirone (2010) find that aid is actually more effective 
at boosting growth when strategic benefits of donors are small, such as the post- cold war 
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 Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus are just to name a few examples. For a more 
detailed analysis of this point, refer to (Easterly 2012) “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” or refer 
to (Edwards 2015) for a discussion of the evolution of the thinking behind development, from the “planning 
approach “ of the 1950s to neo-classical models of the 1960s, and a current focus on “small” projects. 
Similarly, in contrast to neoliberal’s small-state, market-centered approach to development and building on 
Chalmers (Johnson 1982) influential work on developmental state, (Joshi 2012) illustrates three non-
Western pathways to achieving development, as measured by the MDGs, namely human-, natural- and 
social-capital developmental state paths.  
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period of the 1990s, because donors can more credibly threaten to curtail aid if economic 
reform conditions are not met by recipient countries. 
Another effort to salvage the aid narrative is the introduction of Effective 
Development Assistance (EDA) instead of ODA, to account for the non-grant component 
of ODA (Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven 1998). But even this did not help, because 
recipient governments behave as if all of ODA was EDA given their short time horizons. 
Similarly, Hynes and Scott (2013, 2) propose measuring Official Development Effort 
(ODE), instead of ODA, in order to “exclude domestic expenditures on in-donor 
refugees, overseas students, and ‘development awareness’ programmes.”  
Recognizing the limitations of ODA as a measure of aid, OECD-DAC developed 
the concept of Country Programmable Aid (CPA), an idea first discussed at the DAC 
Workshop on Scaling up for Results and Aid Allocations in February 2007. OECD 
(2014, 420) defines CPA as the proportion of ODA “over which host countries have, or 
could have, significant say.” Although DAC has retroactively made CPA data available 
from 2000 onwards, the data after 2007 is relatively more robust. As illustrated in Figure 
17, on average, only about half of all aid disbursement by DAC members count as CPA, 
















Figure 17 Country Programmable Aid (CPA) relative to ODA (Constant 2011 
Prices, US$ Millions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014) 
 
Others argue that aid itself is a mixed bag of positive and negative effects and the 
negative effects cancel out the positive. Examples of the negative side effects include the 
Dutch Disease undermining competitiveness and export of manufacturing (Bjerg, 
Bjørnskov, and Holm 2011), the distortionary effects of changing relative prices (Rajan 
and Subramanian 2009), aid spent on short run political gains as opposed to long run 
growth, and the fungibility of aid. In the absence of a proven better alternative to, 
therefore, aid may be viewed as a “regrettable necessity” to help some of the people some 
of the time in some places (Basu 1999).  In summary, a deeper etiological assessment of 
the aid continuation puzzle, despite lack of evidence to show that it leads to growth, must 
be founded on a myriad of interrelated strategic, humanitarian, methodological, 
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How to Make Aid Work? 
To make aid work, various solutions have been proposed. For example, a World 
Bank study by (Baker 2000, vi) argued in favor of conducting more evaluations because 
“despite the billions of dollars spent on development assistance each year, there is still 
very little known about the actual impact of projects on the poor.”  Similarly, in his book, 
Making Aid Work, Abhijit Banerjee (2007) makes a strong case for why donors should 
fund only those programs that have been proven to work through Randomized Control 
Trials (RCTs) which are “the simplest and best way of assessing the impact of a 
program” (Banerjee 2007, 10). Easterly (2006) argues against unrealistic and grandiose 
plans to end poverty through the existing foreign aid machinery, because aid agencies can 
do incremental good, but they cannot end world poverty. Development agencies, 
especially the World Bank and the OECD through multiple declarations and fora on aid, 
have called for aid conditionality, improved coordination, increased transparency and 
accountability, and local ownership as possible ways to improve aid effectiveness.
18
  
Hubbard and Duggan (2009, 3) in their book, The Aid Trap, devised a plan, in 
light of the Marshall Plan, to use aid to end poverty through supporting the business 
sector because “switching aid to the local business sector in order to cultivate a middle 
class is the oldest, surest, and only way to eliminate poverty in poor countries.” Easterly 
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 For example the 2002 Monterrey conference focused on financing development. The 2003 High Level 
Forum on Harmonization and the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasized ownership, 
alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. The 2008, 3
rd
 High Level 
Forum in Accra, Ghana emphasized strengthening country ownership over development, building more 
effective and inclusive partnerships for development, and focusing on development results. Finally, the 
2011 fourth High Level Forum in Busan, South Korea focused on local ownership, alignment of 
development programs around a country’s development strategy, harmonization of practices to reduce 
transaction costs, avoidance of fragmented efforts and the creation of results frameworks. 
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(2005) argues that the aid bureaucracy is not working and the solution will come from 
relying on decentralized markets to match those who want to help the poor with the poor 
themselves freely expressing their needs and aspirations. Gulrajani (2014) is among the 
few who focus on the organizational challenges of managing aid and therefore sees 
solutions in improving aid effectiveness in unpacking and improving on the 
organizational procedures within aid agencies. She examines empirical evidence from 
donor dynamics in Norway, the UK and Canada to push for a new and important lens 
through which to view and improve aid functioning.  
Despite these dismal results, there is hope for optimism. For instance, 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2015) show that there is a recent rise in the size of the 
estimates of aid effectiveness, based on the new literature from 2007 onwards, although 
they caution that the improvement could be simply an artifact. Studying 141 papers with 
1,777 estimates produced over 43 years since 1960, they show that the average effect of 
aid on growth is +0.03 with a standard deviation of 0.01, thus making the estimator 
statistically significant, but still economically negligible. This result of “positive but 
small” relationship between aid and growth has also been confirmed by others (Rajan and 
Subramanian 2005; Hansen and Tarp 2000; Arndt, Jones, and Tarp 2010). Similarly, 
Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) ask if we have come full circle in our studies of aid 
effectiveness. They show, using Program Evaluation literature, which aid does in fact 
lead to growth, but only in the long run. Addison, Mavrotas, and McGillivra (2005), for 
example, show that growth would have been lower and poverty higher in the absence of 
aid and that all criticisms of aid at the macroeconomic level were not supported by the 
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bulk of research. More recently, Galiani, Knack, and Xu (2014) found aid increased 
growth by focusing on 35 poor countries using improved identification strategies, similar 
to a regression discontinuity design.  
Birdsall and Savedoff's (2011) promising new model of Cash on Delivery (COD) 
has yet to be tested and provide evidence of its effectiveness. However, at least in theory, 
the cash on delivery model has a number of advantages over older models of aid. In 
particular, it proposes paying for specific outcomes, which will address three main 
challenges with the existing aid model. These include a) focusing on results rather than 
disbursements, b) encouraging innovation, and c) strengthening government 
accountability to their citizens.  
Alternative Measures of Aid Effectiveness 
Given the dominant role that development economists, especially those with 
reductionist tendencies, have played in the earlier intellectual and institutional 
developments of foreign aid infrastructure, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
much of the literature has defined aid effectiveness in economic terms. In particular, the 
ultimate outcome variable of interest has been defined as GDP growth rate. In the 
immediate aftermath of World War Two, “an obsession grew with economic growth 
models and national income accounts,” notes Mahbub ul Haq (1995, 24), one of the 
founding fathers of Human Development Reports,
19
 “people as the agents of change and 
beneficiaries of development were often forgotten…the delinking of ends and means 
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 According to Mahbub ul Haq himself (1995, 25), he was the first to propose the idea of developing an 
annual report on human development to William Draper III, the UNDP Administrator, in the spring of 
1989, and just a year later in May of 1990, the first Human Development Report was produced.  
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began, with economic science often obsessed with means.” In fact, sometimes this 
obsession ran so deep that the means-ends distinction was starting to look fuzzy, with 
growth having replaced human development as the ends. For example, even when some 
studies assessed the effectiveness of foreign aid against more immediate outcomes, such 
as life expectancy or educational achievements, the implicit assumption was that these 
outcomes are valuable because they will ultimately contribute to increased growth at the 
national level.  
An exclusive focus on growth may be criticized for the measure’s failing to 
account for real wellbeing of the people as the ultimate intended beneficiaries of aid and 
growth. This is not to claim that growth is intrinsically an unfit indicator of wellbeing, 
rather it is the kind of growth that matters as a means, and not the end in itself, to human 
wellbeing. For example, much of the critique currently raised against growth as the 
outcome variable would be weakened had growth always been more inclusive and 
equitable. Even though growth is often uneven, it still benefits the country as a whole. 
No society has in the long run been able to sustain the welfare of its people 
without continuous injections of economic growth. But growth on its own is not 
sufficient – it has to be translated into improvements in people's lives. Economic 
growth is not the end of human development. It is one important means. (UNDP 
1992, 12) 
This view on the superiority of growth as the outcome variable started to change 
as more and more critiques were made. For example, a key turning point was when a 
Nobel laureate in economics, Theodore W. Schultz (1981), argued that improvements in 
people’s education and health should be viewed as important investments that would in 
turn promote economic development. In particular, he demonstrated that investing in 
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people’s acquired abilities – through education, work experience, and good health – will 
make people more productive and thus valuable contributors to growth (Schultz 1981). 
At first sight, even this seems to be premised on the instrumental value of health and 
education as means to growth, not on their intrinsic value. However, this was still an 
important pronouncement at a time when previously health and education were mostly 
considered consumption goods, to be afforded only after more essential needs had been 
met, thus always taking a secondary status especially vis-à-vis growth promotion. When 
these ideas were later directly reflected in the Human Development Reports, a two-way 
relationship between investments in human development and growth was also explicitly 
stated, for example, as follows: “people contribute to growth, and growth contributes to 
human well-being” (UNDP 1992, 12). 
The first Human Development Report (UNDP 1990, 1) has human development 
as its theme and clearly states that: 
This report is about people – and about how development enlarges their choices… 
human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical 
of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated 
and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living.  
The last three concepts, namely life expectancy, literacy, and per capita GDP, 
constituted the three key components of what makes the Human Development Index 
(HDI). The HDI, and human development theory more broadly, is inspired in part by the 
works of another Nobel laureate economist, Amartya Sen (e.g., in Development as 
Freedom, 1999), and especially his works on the capability approach, developed in partial 
refutation of the classical utilitarian approach that “reduces all qualities into quanta of 
utilities” (Khan 2014, 107).  
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More recent literature, as those discussed under aid motivations, suggest that the 
real motivations behind aid-giving are not primarily or exclusively the economic growth 
of the recipient countries. Therefore, it is argued that the literature on aid effectiveness 
must also reflect that diversity in the literature’s dependant variable (Collodel and Kotze 
2014). It is therefore not surprising that the use of growth as the dependent variable does 
not constitute agreement on the definition of aid effectiveness. For example, Radelet 
(2006, 7) argues that the main objective of foreign aid has been one of the following four: 
 to stimulate economic growth through building infrastructure, supporting 
productive sectors such as agriculture, or generating new ideas and technologies,  
 to strengthen  education, health, environmental, or political systems,  
 to support subsistence consumption of food and other commodities, especially 
during relief operations or humanitarian crises, or  
 to help stabilize an economy following economic shocks. 
 
According to Helmut Führer (1994), OECD-DAC member countries adopted a 
statement as early as in 1977 that emphasized the idea of “basic human needs” as not just 
a substitute for but also a key component of economic growth. As a result, recognizing 
that development is ultimately about meeting basic human needs, several alternatives to 
economic growth have been proposed, including HDI, poverty reduction, and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), now the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). To take this debate one step further, the 2014 Human Development Report 
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(UNDP 2014, 1) focuses on sustainability of impact as an added dimension to the 
measure of development by arguing the following: 
Real progress on human development, then, is not only a matter of enlarging 
people’s critical choices and their ability to be educated, be healthy, have a 
reasonable standard of living and feel safe. It is also a matter of how secure these 
achievements are and whether conditions are sufficient for sustained human 
development. 
 
Aid in Conflict Affected Countries 
Conflicts can take fully functioning states to the status of fragile, failing, or failed 




A failed state is characterised by: (a) breakdown of law and order where state 
institutions lose their monopoly on the legitimate use of force and are unable to 
protect their citizens, or those institutions are used to oppress and terrorise 
citizens; (b) weak or disintegrated capacity to respond to citizens’ needs and 
desires, provide basic public services, assure citizens’ welfare or support normal 
economic activity; (c) at the international level, lack of a credible entity that 
represents the state beyond its borders. (Derick W. Brinkerhoff 2005, 4) 
 
An entirely separate body of literature, from the one discussed earlier on aid 
effectiveness, deals with the role of development assistance in fragile states and conflict 
affected countries, including the “securitization” of foreign aid (Brown and Grävingholt 
2015). For instance, the Journal of Conflict, Security and Development deals almost 
exclusively with this subject area. Similarly, a number of studies under the Empirical 
                                                 
20
 For a more thorough treatment of failed and fragile states, see Robert Rotberg’s classic edited book on 
“When States Fail: Causes and Consequences” which also provides a sharp and clearly-delineated 
definition of various cases of strong, weak, failed, and failing state typologies along the dimensions of 
political goods that states can or cannot produce (Rotberg 2003). 
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Studies of Conflict (ESOC) project  investigate the relationship between aid and its 
ability to promote peace in conflict affected regions, and they find that only certain 
specific types of aid, such as targeted and low-profile conditional transfers to needy 
families, can reduce conflict (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2015).  
In the context of Afghanistan, it has been identified that development actors face 
critical dilemmas when balancing the need between short term security gains and long 
term development goals, which have led some to propose peace conditionality, i.e. tying 
the flow of aid to steps taken towards reducing local conflict and working towards peace 
(Boyce 2008; Fishstein and Wilder 2012). Others argue for an almost delinking of 
security and development, especially when assessing the overall impact of international 
community’s engagement in conflict affected countries. For example, studying the 
relationship between aid and security in Afghanistan, Fishstein and Wilder (2012, 6) 
remind the readers that setback in the security sector should not undermine gains on the 
development front: 
Including decreases in infant and maternal mortality, dramatic increases in school 
enrollment rates for boys and girls, a media revolution, major improvements in 
roads and infrastructure, and greater connectivity through telecommunication 
networks. 
Simultaneous to the growth of literature dealing with aid in conflict affected 
regions, a new set of institutions have been set up since the turn of the 21
st
 century in 
recognition of the need to respond to conflict-affected countries differently from other 
low-income countries (Baranyi and Desrosiers 2012). For example, OECD-DAC’s 
International Network on Conflict Affected and Fragile States (INCAF) has facilitated 
the development of new body of literature on aid in fragile states since 2008, in addition 
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to developing the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” which “proposes key 
peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, focuses on new ways of engaging, and identifies 
commitments to build mutual trust and achieve better results in fragile states” 
(International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2009, 1). The New Deal has 
been hailed for its inclusive and participatory process, which has included significant 
participation from 19 conflict affected countries and civil society organizations, while the 
key criticism against it has been the rather long time horizon required for these principles 
to be consolidated (Nussbaum, Zorbas, and Koros 2012).  
In 2007, OECD-DAC’s Fragile States Group (FSG) adopted a list of Fragile 
States Principles (FSPs), designed in particular “to complement the partnership 
commitments set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” (OECD-DAC 2007, 
1). In addition to these, Baranyi and Desrosiers (2012) mention the following three: a) the 
establishment of the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Taskforce in 2002 by 
the World Bank, 2) the USAID’s taking on the language of ‘fragile states’ as the first 
donor in 2004, and recognizing the need to develop new approaches accordingly, and 3) 
the UK’s hosting a Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States 
in 2005, which led to a Section on Fragile States in the Paris Declaration.  
The Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness was one in a series of high-level fora 
and conferences held to discuss new ways of making aid more effective. Some of these 
conferences include the Monterry Consensus in 2002 with a focus on various domestic 
and international financing mechanisms, the Rome Conference of 2003, which with its 
focus on harmonization and alignment paved the way for the Paris Declaration in 2005, 
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the Accra conference of 2008, and the Busan conference of 2011. Among them, the Paris 
Declaration has been the most influential, with its particular focus on the following five 
overarching principles (OECD 2012).  
1. Ownership: Recipient countries setting their own strategies for poverty reduction 
2. Alignment: Donor countries aligning their interventions behind recipient country 
priorities 
3. Harmonization: Donor countries coordinating their activities to avoid duplication 
of efforts 
4. Results: Recipient and donor countries focusing on measurable development 
results  
5. Mutual accountability: All concerned partners are accountable for development 
results 
 
Although calls for similar principles have often been made in the past, it is the 
first time that the Paris Declaration has made these principles the cornerstone of aid 
effectiveness debate. Strict adherence to these principles, however, has been elusive, in 
part due to the institutional stickiness of large donor agencies, varied expectations among 
donor countries, and lack of credible incentive mechanisms on the part of developing 
country governments. It is for these and other reasons that assessments of aid practices, 
based on the principles of Paris Declaration, have almost always fallen short. For 
example, a 2011 review of progress towards implementing these principles found that: 
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At the global level, only one out of the 13 targets established for 2010 – co-
ordinated technical co-operation (a measure of the extent to which donors co-
ordinate their efforts to support countries’ capacity development objectives) – has 
been met, albeit by a narrow margin. (OECD 2012, 15) 
Booth (Booth 2012, 538) attributes these failures to the over-stretching of the 
principles far beyond just “country ownership” making the end result an “over-decorated 
Christmas tree.” 
In the context of Afghanistan, the principles do not seem to have fared very 
favorably either (Roberts 2010). In particular, Roberts argues that true ownership is 
weakened given the disproportionately high influence that foreigners carry in domestic 
policy decisions and the large gap between the people and the central government; 
alignment is irrelevant when the Afghan government lacks the capacity to determine their 
own priorities in the first place; harmonization is nearly impossible given the bloated and 
overly complicated international presence; managing for results is not the number one 
priority when diverse actors bring divergent agendas;  and finally lack of ownership 
undermines the prospects of mutual accountability.  
While these and similar observations are shared by many analysts studying or 
working in Afghanistan, I argue that such broad generalizations, although valid at the 
country level, obscures the far more important variations across various departments and 
sectors within the Afghan government. For example, as I will show in later chapters, 
while it is true that foreign expertise, called international Externally Funded Staff (EFS), 
dominate certain ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance given the extreme shortage 
of local human capacities in this area, other ministries, such as the Ministry of Public 
Health, has always prided itself on relying more on local expertise than on EFSs. A 
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deeper look at the functioning of aid management practices across sectors will, therefore, 
yield a different image on the performance of Afghanistan against the principles laid out 
in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  
In dealing with conflict affected countries more broadly, development assistance 
becomes an integral tool and instrument for meaningful engagement with developing 
country governments. This is a welcome move at a time when greater calls are made for 
brining the state back in (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). In fact, in their book 
on The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, Paris and Sisk (2009, 1) note an important shift in 
peacebuilding strategy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, namely a shift from traditional 
peacebuilding operations (typically involving UN forces to monitor ceasefire or patrol 
neutral zones) to statebuilding or the “strengthening of legitimate governmental 
institutions” in post conflict societies. They further construe this new statebuilding 
strategy as a particular approach to peacebuilding, except that statebuilding, by definition, 
rests on the belief that building sustainable peace requires functioning government 
institutions, which in turn requires longer term commitment by the international 
community to work alongside the host country governments to develop the latter’s 
capacities as was the case in Timor Leste. 
However, the increased engagement in conflict-affected countries, despite the 
development of new set of institutions to guide their operations, has met a number of 
challenges. In particular, a number of dilemmas and contradictions have been identified 
in the process of engaging with conflict affected countries (Paris and Sisk 2009; Derick 
W. Brinkerhoff 2010; Boyce 2008; Baranyi and Desrosiers 2012; Smillie 2001). For 
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example, Boyce (2008) discusses the inherent dilemma between short term peacebuilding 
goals and longer term development objectives, which are often at odds with one another, 
the pursuit of one undermining the prospects of the other. Similarly, Paris and Sisk 
(2009) identify five critical contradictions in working in conflict affected countries, 
including 1) outside intervention vs. fostering local-government, 2) international control 
being required to establish local ownership, 3) universal values promoted as remedies for 
local problems, 4) statebuilding requiring both a distance as well as a reaffirmation of the 
history, and 5) short-term imperatives being at odds with longer-term objectives. 
These dilemmas are real and pose serious challenges to the international 
community’s engagement in these countries. For example, it is well-documented that 
civil wars and violent conflicts not only kill and maim people (Ghobarah, Huth, and 
Russett 2003), they also have enormous economic consequences, including the 
destruction of human and physical capital, disruption of social order, diversion of public 
spending, dis-saving and ensuring reduction in capital stock, and portfolio substitution 
out of the country (Collier 1999).  
It is, therefore, the right role for post-conflict reconstruction to focus on 
(re)building state institutions, alleviate poverty and horizontal inequalities, and bring 
about political and economic stability (Fearon and Laitin 2004). But the real question 
concerns “how” statebuilding must be carried out. For instance, in the case of 
Afghanistan, Suhrke (2009) has carefully crafted her chapter’s title as “the dangers of a 
tight embrace: externally assisted statebuilding in Afghanistan.” In this chapter, she 
discusses some of the negative consequences of the heavy dose of development 
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assistance for Afghanistan, which has, among other things, created dependency, neo-
colonialism and trusteeship, and undermined the state’s ability to generate domestic 
revenues through taxes. This is a real challenge, especially when the state’s revenue-
generating capacity through tax collection is considered an important component of state 
capacity (Joshi 2011; Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Morgan 2010). 
 
Aid Effectiveness and Local Capacity 
Statebuilding, loosely defined around the restoration of recipient nation state’s 
authority, legitimacy, and capacity, is invariably closely tied to the existing levels of state 
capacity at various levels. Without any existing capacities, external statebuilding is sure 
to face all the dilemmas discussed earlier. For example, how can the host country regain 
its legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders when they don’t have even the absorption 
capacity to spend the resources provided to them by their international counterparts, let 
alone the capacity to generate their own revenues to finance reconstruction and 
development? How can they take ownership of the process when they lack the capacity to 
steer the direction of development and set their own priorities should they be placed in 
the driver’s seat?  
As it is becoming evident, however, the term capacity can have multiple 
connotations, dimensions, and applications, and thus become a malleable concept. To 
begin, a definition of the term is in order, followed by a discussion of its various 
typologies. Fortunately, this task has already been undertaken by many others interested 
in the interplay of this concept in development practice.  Capacity may be defined as “the 
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aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions necessary to act effectively 
to achieve some intended purpose” (Derick W. Brinkerhoff 2010, 66). This definition has 
put more emphasis on the means (such as aptitudes, resources, relationships and 
facilitating conditions) used to achieve open-ended “intended” objectives. Peter Morgan 
(in Smillie 2001, 16), on the other hand, defines capacity as “the ability of individuals, 
groups, institutions, organizations and societies to identify and meet development 
challenges over time.” This definition, focusing on different levels, from individuals to 
societies, defines capacity more specifically in the context of development. Both 
definitions, however, see capacity as the means to achieve certain ends. A third definition 
emphasizes the empowerment element be arguing that the main purpose of capacity 
building is “to empower and strengthen institutions and the ability of people to take 
control of activities that affect their lives” (Juma 2002, 166). 
A typology of different kinds of capacity will be helpful in clarifying the concept 
further. Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) discuss five core capabilities, a term used 
interchangeably with capacities. First is the capability to commit and engage, referring to 
the actors’ ability to mobilize financial, human, and organizational resources; create 
space for action; and actually engage collectively to achieve various intended ends 
through the exercise of all their other capabilities.  
Second is the capability to carry out various tasks, including technical, service 
delivery, and logistical tasks. Given the requirement of sector-specific technical 
expertise, such as experienced doctors, engineers, lawyers, and educators, this area of 
capability may have been affected the most through conflict’s impact on brain drain. 
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Actors must exhibit the ability to transform inputs into meaningful outputs and outcomes 
and go beyond the call of duty to add value for the end users of their services. This is the 
key capability area that I will show lies at the heart of variations in aid effectiveness 
across sectors in Afghanistan, where technical skills in certain areas, such as medicine 
and engineering, are relatively more abundant than in other areas. In the area of health 
governance, it is particularly important that the state has the ability “to manage the 
policy-making process effectively, to plan and design programmatic interventions, and to 
enforce and implement health policy decisions made” (D. W. Brinkerhoff and Bossert 
2014, 688–689). I will show that those in the leadership positions at Afghanistan’s 
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) have exhibited this ability to a large extent, which has 
contributed to their outperforming other sectors. It is important to highlight, however, 
that effective management capacity has been in short supply and unevenly distributed 
across the country. This will is an important consideration because my analysis will 
reveal that significant gains have been achieved in spite of a lack of effective 
management capacity all across the health sector, which has put more pressure on 
technical and service delivery capacities alone.  
The third typology of capability is the ability to attract support, including 
financial and otherwise. This capability refers to the actors’ ability to establish and 
manage diverse alliances and partnerships; build legitimacy; and handle competition and 
politics. In my observation, this is one area where most recipient country leaders are well-
endowed with, except the ability to generate domestic revenues through taxation. The 
problem of inadequate attention to domestic revenue generation is likely to stay for as 
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long as the inflow of development assistance is divorced from the recipient state’s ability 
to take concrete steps towards achieving financial self-sufficiency. President Ashraf 
Ghani’s roadmap, also presented at the 2014 London Conference, sets out to do exactly 
that, at least on paper (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2014).  
More broadly, the incentive structure of local elites and political leaders must be 
carefully monitored, and when possible, nudged to align them with development 
priorities. For example, Booth (2012) argues that unlike the implicit assumption of the 
Paris Declaration, developing country leaders are not necessarily development-oriented, 
and therefore, donor countries can take a more proactive role in nudging them to make 
development more attractive than their other short term goals and priorities. Similarly, 
Zurcher (2012) finds that one of the main reasons development assistance has not been 
very effective in Afghanistan is the mis-aligned incentives of local elites who lack the 
political will to implement changes fearing that they might threaten their existing power 
relations. This could change, however, if the elites realize that the continuation of aid 
dollars hinges on their willingness to implement difficult changes.  
The fourth capability refers to the actors’ ability to adapt and self-renew in light 
progress and changing internal and external contexts. The fifth and final capability is to 
balance diversity and coherence, a tall order that has proven hard to materialize in 
Afghanistan with the exception of few sectors. This type of capability refers in particular 
to the actors’ ability to develop a shared vision despite seemingly disparate interventions; 
to balance the need to control with the ability to allow flexibility; to coordinate and 
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harmonize plans in highly complex environments; and to effectively manage stability and 
change.  
The typology discussed above by Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) may be 
characterized as different competencies organized by functions or activities, such as the 
ability to engage, to carry out certain tasks, to attract support, to adapt, and to balance. 
This, however, is only one dimension along which to classify various types of capacities. 
Smillie (2001, 11) presents a three-by-three matrix of different types of capacities along 
two dimensions, namely by level (organization, sector, institutions) and by means-
process-ends dimension.  
The specific kind of capacity that this research is particularly interested in lies at 
the intersection of societal level and the ability to carry out various technical and service 
delivery tasks (Brinkerhoff and Morgan’s second typology discussed above). Managerial 
capacity seems to matter only in as much as it complements technical and service 
delivery capacity. Effective managerial capacity would have been crucial in increasing 
the efficiency with which resources were used. In fact, one interviewee with significant 
experience in the area of development, both in Afghanistan and internationally, put 
managerial capacity at the core of success in achieving development outcomes. In 
particular, he was critical of the lack of managerial capacity at all levels of the 
government. In his view, Afghanistan’s existing gains in health care service delivery, 
despite this lack of managerial capacity, is all the more impressive. He argues, however, 
that success would have been much more visible had more attention been paid to building 
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and developing adequate managerial capacity of the health sector personnel. The 
following statement summarizes his thoughts: 
I consider lack of adequate capacity in management to be a critical aspect of why 
the billions of dollars spent on healthcare systems have not yielded the type of 
results that it could potentially have yielded. In the presence of adequate 
management capacity in healthcare service delivery, the indicators, which are 
great right now, would have been significantly better and it would have already 
put Afghanistan on par with other more advanced developing countries.  The 
child and maternal mortality rates would have been lower, the access to healthcare 
for all would have been more widespread, cost effectiveness of expansion and 
service delivery would have been more favorable, quality of service delivery 
would have been higher, capacity development of health workers would have 
been more effective, and reliability of Afghans on Pakistan, India, the Gulf and 
other countries for specialized healthcare would have been significantly lower. 
 
The fact that local human capacity matters for development is not novel. What I 
consider the key contribution of this study, however, is the causal role it can play in 
making the difference between less and more effective aid, holding everything else 
constant. In other words, local capacity as a conditional variable in the aid effectiveness 
literature seems to have not received significant attention. This research may be the 
starting point of the recognition of the role of local human capacity in making aid work.  
Situating my Research within the Literature 
The extreme polarization of the debates is a sign that the truth must lie somewhere 
in between, or as Bates (1997, 166) said “when arguments become polarized, it often 
signals that divisions are falsely drawn.” In the same way, I believe one of the main 
reasons for the diversity of opinion regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid, as sketched 
above, lies in the fact that aid effectiveness has often been defined rather too narrowly in 
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terms of GDP growth alone. Expanding this definition to include sector-specific 
development outcomes, such as drops in mortality rates and school enrollment rates, 
would broaden the debate and allow for identifying variations in aid effectiveness across 
sectors, the analysis of which could yield policy informing contingent generalizations.  
In addition, all forms of development assistance have often been viewed as a one-
dimensional tool, encompassing the grassroots activities, the utopian “big push” plans 
and everything in between. As Easterly (2003, 40) stated, “the idea of aggregating all this 
diversity into a ‘developing world’ that will ‘take off’ with foreign aid is a heroic 
simplification.” The debate could, therefore, benefit from a more nuanced assessment of 
the various kinds of aid under different circumstances. In my analysis, I will develop and 
test the hypothesis that aid is more effective in sectors with greater levels of local human 
capacity to transform aid dollars into meaningful outputs and outcomes. My proposed 
hypothesis about the centrality of local capacity in making aid work is especially in line 
with the argument that “in order to be genuinely effective, foreign aid must have the right 
FACE,” where FACE is defined as the Foreign Aid Complementary Elements, such as 
private investment, human capital, and governance structures (Khan 2003, 347). This 
research fits squarely within the contingent school of literature on aid effectiveness, 





CHAPTER FOUR: THE MACRO LEVEL EVIDENCE 
 
The previous chapter provided an extensive review of literature on aid 
effectiveness, with a particular focus on the definition of aid effectiveness at the macro 
level, measured as the GDP growth rate. This chapter is an attempt to empirically test the 
relationship between volumes of aid and macro level economic indicators in Afghanistan. 
To provide some background, this chapter discusses trends in aid flows globally, focusing 
on Afghanistan as historically being one of the top recipients of aid. Following that, I will 
provide a macro level view of major achievements and setbacks of the last decade along 
the economic, political, and social dimensions. Finally, I will present key findings from 
three models, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
regressions, and finally Three-State Least Squares (3SLS) aimed at uncovering 
relationships between volumes of aid and various measures of economic development. 
This chapter will show that if aid effectiveness is narrowly defined in terms of GDP 
growth rates, the results may be both too sensitive to the choice of variables and 
measurement and might also be less likely to generate contingent generalizations that 
could be used to inform policy on improving aid effectiveness.  
Global Aid Flows 
Aid flows have risen significantly in the last fifty years in both current and 
constant prices, peaking around 1992 at the end of the Cold War and rebounding at the 
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turn of the millennium, following the event of 9/11. As discussed in the earlier chapters, 
much of the bilateral aid goes to those recipient countries where the donor countries see 
some political and strategic interests, including previous colonial ties, potential market 
for the donor’s exports, buying of political allegiance, and an interest in expanding one’s 
soft power in the region. A view of the total aid flows, including bilateral and 
multilateral, dilutes this clear relationship between donors and recipients. In fact, simply 
disaggregating total aid flows by regions reveals that much of the flows of aid may in fact 
be dictated by economic needs of the recipient countries, in addition to serving the 
foreign policy interests of donor countries (Riddell et al. 2008).  
Figure 18 illustrates that regionally, Africa has been the largest recipient of 
foreign aid, having received nearly US$1 trillion out of the total US$3.4 trillion dollars in 
ODA from 1960 to 2013. Africa is followed by Asia that received US$863 billion or 26% 
of total ODA during the same period (OECD-DAC 2014). This macro level perspective 
supports the view that much of the aid in fact flows to regions with the largest numbers of 
people below the poverty line.  
Over the 1960-2013 period, Afghanistan was the fifth largest recipient of official 
aid, preceded by India, Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan respectively (OECD-DAC 2014). In the 
post-2001 world, however, both the total volume as well as the pattern of aid flows 
changed. In terms of volume of aid, the amount of official aid in real terms disbursed 
since 2001 is almost equal to the amount of official aid disbursed through the entire 
period from 1960 to 2001. For example, in the 2003-2016 decade, Afghanistan received a 
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total of US$51 billion in official aid, making it the world’s second largest recipient of aid 
in absolute terms, preceded by Iraq that received US$67 billion (OECD-DAC 2014). 
 
Figure 18 Global ODA flows from 1960 to 2014 (Current US$ Millions) 
 
Source: OECD-DAC Aid Statistics (2014)  
The Macro Level Analysis 
What has been the impact of aid on Afghanistan? The question of aid 
effectiveness in the context of Afghanistan has received significant attention, especially 
during the last five years as the international community was hoping to prepare the 
country for transition to self-sustainability beyond 2014, the year when the majority of 
U.S. troops were scheduled to return home. Most of these studies have taken one of three 
forms.  
One group of studies comes primarily from the Afghan government sources, often 
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evaluate the performance of the country against the eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), with the fourth and final report on this topic published by the Ministry of 
Economy in December of 2013 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005; Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan 2008a; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2010; 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 2013).  
The second group of studies comprises external assessments of a particular 
segment of the Afghan society. For instance, since its establishment by the U.S. Congress 
in 2007, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has 
conducted dozens of studies of specific reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Since the 
primary objective of these investigations is to “detect and prevent waste, fraud, and 
abuse,” most SIGAR reports focus on the mismanagement of aid dollars and are therefore 
critical of the reconstruction efforts (SIGAR 2015b, 1). Recent examples of these include 
the following:  1) DoD’s Compressed Natural Gas Filling Station in Afghanistan: An Ill-
Conceived $43 Million Project (SIGAR 2015b), and 2) Power Grid Project at the 
Counter Narcotics Strip Mall in Kabul: Construction Met Contract Requirements but 
Electrical System Was Not Deemed Operable Until More Than 18 Months After Project 
Completion (SIGAR 2015a). 
Finally, the third group of studies includes project and program evaluations 
commissioned by various development agencies and conducted by contracted third-party 
organizations. Most of these reports and assessments are used internally by program 




This study, however, will be different from the above studies on the basis of its 
more systematic and deeper analysis of the effectiveness of foreign aid in Afghanistan in 
a way that will derive meaningful contingent generalizations to inform future policy and 
practice. Since the end of the Taliban era, progress in Afghanistan has been mixed. Some 
of the key political, economic, and social achievements include rapid economic growth 
with relatively controlled levels of inflation (with large fluctuations); the introduction of 
new currency in 2002 that reset the Afghani-US$ exchange rate from 48,000:1 to 50:1; 
improved public sector administration and financial management; gains in health and 
education; a historical transfer of power through relatively peaceful and democratic 
elections in 2014; improved women’s participation in public life, including a nomination 
of the first female in the Supreme Court in 2015 (but was turned down by the 
Parliament);  an explosive growth of media, including newspapers, radio and television; 
and nearly full mobile phone coverage across the country.  
Economically, with an average growth rate nearing double digits, Afghanistan’s 
economy has put up an impressing growth performance since the 2002 American 
intervention in the country (World Bank 2014).
21
 GDP per capita, in purchasing power 
parity, has more than doubled from about US$700 in 2002 to nearly US$1,600 in 2013. 
The level of GDP has gone up from US$2.4 billion in 2002 (or US$3.7 billion in 1979, 
the highest in pre-2002 era) to more than US$20 billion in 2013 (World Bank 2014). 
While the rising levels of GDP reflect the increasing injections of foreign aid dollars and 
                                                 
21
 Despite the continuing inflow of significant aid dollars, however, the drawdown of the international 
military forces from the country since 2014 has had a noticeable downward effect on growth rates. For 
example, GDP growth rates in 2014 and 2015 were down to 3.7% and 1.3% respectively (Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2016, 2). 
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military expenditure, the growth rate is driven by a variety of factors, including 
productivity in the agricultural and service sectors in the country.  
In the security sector, Afghanistan’s National Army, National Police and National 
Security forces are now more than 350,000 strong (excluding the nearly 30,000 Afghan 
Local Police), which enabled the country to take over the security of the country from the 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in 2014 (Schroden et al. 2014). 
International forces are down from their 2010 peak of nearly 100,000 troops to about 
10,000 in 2014 (Belasco 2014). Significant challenges remain in terms of corruption 
permeating the entire country, but from the perspective of governance and rule of law, 
Afghanistan has functioning legal institutions. This proved through Afghanistan’s three 
rounds of relatively successful and moderately peaceful presidential and local elections.  
Indicators of social development are not any less impressive. For instance, the 
number of schools has more than doubled from its 2001 levels, from 6,000 to more than 
14,000 in 2014 (UNDP 2013). Not surprisingly, parallel to the explosive increase in 
number of schools, primary and secondary school enrollment has grown more than eight 
times from its 2001 levels, from 1.1 million students to more than 8 million students in 
2014, almost 40% of which are girls. The country’s higher education has also 
experienced significant growth, with the number of private institutions of higher 
education mushrooming from nearly zero to more than 150.  
Health indicators illustrate the progress made since the overthrow of Taliban in 
2002. The number of health facilities has more than quadrupled from 496 in 2002 to more 
than 2,300 in 2014, which has seen health outcomes dramatically improved. For example, 
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maternal mortality rates dropped by almost 80% from 1,600 per 100,000 live births in 
2002 to 327 per 100,000 live births in 2014. Infant mortality rates were more than halved 
from 165 per 1,000 live births in 2002 to 68 per 1,000 live births in 2014. Mortality rates 
among children under 5 years of age declined from 257 per 1,000 live births in 2002 to 
94 per 1,000 live births in 2014.  
The National Solidarity Program (NSP), a flagship program under the Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), has delivered basic infrastructure to 
rural areas around the country through elected Community Development Councils 
(CDCs). This program relies on basic engineering capacities, and is considered one of the 
most successful projects in Afghanistan (Briggs, Atkins, & Gilmour, 2012).  
Afghanistan enjoys a dramatically improved network of roads connecting cities 
and populations across the country compared to the pre-2002 era, thus significantly 
reducing travel times. This has helped the developments in media to be explosive, with 
the number of private television stations around the country reaching nearly 100. 
Similarly, Afghanistan has made significant strides in athletics. Examples include 
winning the country’s first ever Olympic medal in Taekwondo, significant growth in 
Cricket and tremendous achievements in football, including the first South Asian 
championship in 2014. These advancements, combined with better electricity and mobile 
phone coverage, have contributed to an overall improvement in Afghan society and 
quality of life in the country.  
Despite these achievements, significant challenges remain. For example, 
Afghanistan continues to lag behind as one of the world’s least developed countries with 
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a per capita income of less than US$1,000, and ranked amongst the bottom 20 countries 
according to Human Development Index (HDI) score. More than a third of the population 
continues to live below the official poverty line, three-quarters are illiterate and 
unemployment rate is about 35%. Above all, much of the country’s progress is heavily 
dependent on foreign aid and all the gains are vulnerable to threats of insecurity, 
corruption and illicit economic activities, including the production and trade of narcotics. 
It is for these and other reasons that “despite  mutual  efforts  by  the  government  of 
Afghanistan and the international community toward accepted  principles  of  the  aid  
effectiveness,  it  is still evaluated as unsatisfactory” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Economy 2014, 8). 
While a listing of key achievements made since the overthrow of the Taliban is 
important, it does not answer the more important questions about aid effectiveness. In 
particular, it does not clearly lay out the relationship between volumes of aid and 
outcomes achieved. It does not answer the counterfactual question, nor does it answer 
how the situation in Afghanistan would have been if there had been no foreign aid. It also 
does not answer the question of efficiency, i.e. could the country have achieved even 
higher levels of improvement with the given resources. And lastly, it does not lend to 
producing lessons learned that can inform future policy and practice. For these reasons, in 
this chapter and the next, I assess more systematically the links between volume of 
official aid and outcomes achieved.  
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Data, Variables and Key Findings 
In order to study the impact of aid on macro level indicators in Afghanistan, I 
extract data from mainly two sources: the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World 
Bank 2014) and the OECD-DAC Database of Aid Statistics (OECD-DAC 2014).  
 
Figure 19 GDP growth rates for Afghanistan in WDI database 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
As discussed in chapter three, one of the most common ways of assessing the 
impact of aid on recipient countries is by exploring the relationship between the volume 































this is not an easy task because of data unavailability. In fact, excluding the last decade, 
even data on economic growth is missing (see Figure 19). The paucity of reliable data is 
well documented. Unavailability of data for the case of Afghanistan is especially acute, 
as illustrated in this quote (World Bank 2012b, v): 
it is well known that collecting reliable data on Afghanistan is extremely difficult. 
Moreover, much of the information that is available is subject to large margins of 
uncertainty, as well as often problems of incompleteness, incomparability, etc. 
Data are frequently changed and updated. Collecting and triangulating data on 
issues such as jobs, aid inflows, and security costs has posed a major challenge...  
Although data on ODA is available for Afghanistan from 1960, the unavailability 
of other important indicators pose at least three limitations (see Table 2). First, the 
paucity of data limits our ability to apply more sophisticated quantitative analyses, such 
as the use of disaggregated time series data to investigate causality. The unavailability of 
data for most indicators from 1960 to the present forces us to focus only on the last 
decade. Incidentally, figures clearly indicate that in the last ten years, official aid in 
Afghanistan has begun to occupy a much larger part of the picture. Second, in order to 
account for fluctuations in inflation and exchange rates, constant prices would have been 
preferred to current prices. However, the only key variable available in constant prices is 
net ODA levels, which are available in both current prices as well as in 2012 constant 
prices. Given the unavailability of data on inflation, whether measured through consumer 
price index or as GDP deflator, we cannot convert the remaining variables from current 
to constant prices. As a result, we have to limit our analysis to variables in current 
dollars, except otherwise noted. Third, the most common macro level indicator of interest 
in assessing the impact of aid at the national and international levels if GDP growth rates. 
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However, the unavailability of data on economic growth (except for the last ten years) 
forces us to analyze the relationship between levels of GDP and official aid.  
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Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Based on the available data, we can develop and test a simple time series model, 
correlating official aid with GDP figures. In line with the theoretical argument, we would 
expect a positive relationship between official aid and GDP. Before running regressions, 
it is worth testing this relationship by looking at the extent of correlation between the 
available indicators. In particular, we focus on GDP levels as our dependent or outcome 
variable, and we focus on four measures of aid as the independent or explanatory 
variables. These include total official aid to Afghanistan in nominal variables, total 
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official aid in 2012 constant prices, official aid as a percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP, 
and official aid per capita.  
 
Table 3 Correlation between GDP and ODA levels 
-------------+---------------------------------------------- 
             |   GDP      AidCurr$ AidConst$ Aid/GDP  Aid pc 
-------------+---------------------------------------------- 
         GDP |   1.0000 
Aid Current  |   0.9473   1.0000 
Aid Constant |   0.9352   0.9980   1.0000 
     Aid/GDP |   0.6973   0.8497   0.8772   1.0000 





As illustrated in Table 3, this simple test of correlation reveals that the levels of 
net ODA and GDP display almost perfect correlation. The degree of correlation between 
levels of GDP and nominal aid is strongest at 0.9473, while the weakest relationship is 
between levels of GDP and aid per as a percentage of GDP, which can be explained by 
the fluctuating figures of the latter. In the post-2001 era, the overall strong correlation 
between measures of GDP and aid is not surprising since when foreign aid has played a 
central role in the reconstruction of the country following three decades of war.  
Beyond the simple correlation, we can run simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions to analyze the direction and statistical significance of the relationship 
between the outcome and explanatory variables. Given the available data, we manage to 
run five different regression models, utilizing three measures of economic wellbeing, 
namely GDP growth rates, levels of GDP in current dollars and GDP per capita, and three 
measures of official aid, namely net ODA as a percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP, net 
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ODA in current dollars and net ODA per capita. Overall, we would expect a positive 
relationship between measures of economic development and levels of foreign aid.  
Discussion of Regression Results 
Key results of the five regression models are presented in Table 4 below. The 
coefficients on all the regressions are positive, which suggests a direct correlation 
between measures of economic development and aid, thus confirming the findings of 
Table 2 on the measure of correlation. The magnitude and statistical significance of each 
regression, however, deserves closer scrutiny.  
The first row in Table 4 shows the relationship between the natural logarithm of 
GDP growth rates and net ODA as a percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP. Given that the 
data for GDP growth rates are only available since 2003, I restricted the first regression to 
the period from 2003 to 2014. The results indicate that a one percent increase in net ODA 
as a percentage of GDP is associated with a 0.035 percentage points increase in GDP 
growth rates. Although the sign of the coefficient is positive as predicted, the relationship 
is not statistically significant, suggesting that the observed increase in GDP growth rates 
could have been due to factors other than the injection of official aid in the economy. In 
fact, this is also supported by a small R-squared value of 0.09 (not displayed in Table 4), 
which suggests that the given model only explains about 9% of variations in GDP growth 
rates. This finding should not come as a surprise when researchers fail to find a 
statistically significant positive relationship between economic growth and aid in forty 




Table 4 OLS regression results 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
No. Dependent Variable  Independent Variable Constant Coefficient (SE) p-value
22
 Data Range 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1) GDP Growth (ln) Net ODA as % of GDP .0412 0.035 (.037) 0.37 2003-2014  
2) GDP Current $  Net ODA Current  1.58e+09 2.283 (.205) 0.00 1960-2014*  
3) GDP Current $  Net ODA Current  2.05e+08 2.544 (.361) 0.00 2001-2014  
4) GDP per capita  Net ODA per capita 139.17 1.811 (.201) 0.00 1960-2014* 
5) GDP per capita  Net ODA per capita 38.04 2.361 (.370) 0.00 2001-2014 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Includes missing values for the period 1982-2000 
One of the key shortcomings of the first model was the small number of data 
points. The unavailability of data on GDP growth rates means the model was restricted to 
the last thirteen years. In models two and three, I overcome this challenge by including 
data from 1960 through 2014, but I unavoidably introduce two new challenges. First, I 
have to replace GDP growth rates, a better indicator of economic development, with 
levels of GDP in current dollars. Second, although data for aid is available for the entire 
period from 1960 through 2014, data for GDP levels are unavailable for the period from 
1982 through 2000. For this reason, we run this regression in two forms, one for the 
entire period and another for the period from 2001 to 2014. The second and the third 
models are, therefore, the same except that the latter restricts the analysis to the last 13 
years for which we have complete data on both key indicators.  
                                                 
22
 The p-value may be interpreted as follows: if the null hypothesis was right, i.e. there was no relationship 
between ODA as a percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP and GDP growth rate (the null hypothesis states that 
the GDP growth coefficient is zero), the probability of finding a relationship of 0.035 magnitude is 0.37. 
Since this probability is much higher than the conventionally accepted threshold of 0.05, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis. In other words, the observed magnitude of 0.035 is so close to the prediction of the null 
hypothesis that we cannot plausibly reject the null hypothesis. With a standard error of 0.037, the observed 
magnitude of 0.035 is only about one standard deviation away from zero, thus too close to warrant a 
rejection of the null hypothesis.   
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What I find is that there is not only a strong correlation between measures levels 
of GDP and foreign aid, but the relationship is statistically significant at a five percent 
level. The regression result may be interpreted as follows: each dollar of foreign aid 
infused in the country is associated with a $2.28 increase in levels of GDP. Restricting 
this model to the last 13 years alone when complete data is available on both indicators 
increases the magnitude of the relationship, such that each additional dollar of aid is 
associated with a $2.54 increase in level of GDP. Again, these findings are not surprising 
in a country where foreign aid constitutes between one-half and two-thirds of GDP.  
Finally, I tested this relationship at a per capita level. Rows four and five of Table 
4 present our findings from regressing GDP per capita against levels of official aid per 
capita. Like the case of rows two and three, data for GDP per capita are unavailable for 
the period from 1982 through 2000. For this reason, the key distinction between rows 
four and five is that the latter limits the analysis to the period 2001-2014 for which we 
have complete data for both variables.  
As expected, the coefficients for both models four and five have a positive sign, 
indicating a positive relationship between the two variables, and both are statistically 
significant at 5% level. The results may be interpreted as follows: considering the entire 
period from 1960 to 2014, each dollar of foreign aid per capita is associated with a $1.81 
increase in GDP per capita. Limiting our attention to the period from 2001 to 2014, the 
magnitude of this relationship increases in a way that each dollar of foreign aid per capita 
is associated with a $2.36 increase in GDP per capita.  
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The Endogeneity Problem  
The discussion above is based on the following theoretical model: 
Growtht = β0 + β1Aidt + εt 
This model suggest that GDP growth rate (or GDP levels in regressions 2-5) is an 
increasing function of Aid measured by ODA as a percentage of GDP, net ODA and net 
ODA per capita. This model, however, may be criticized for paying inadequate attention 
to the issues of reverse causality and endogeneity of Aid. This critique is grounded on the 
assumption that aid may in fact be determined by the low levels of economic growth, not 
the other way around. The problem of endogeneity poses serious threats to the estimators 
because “an explanatory variable that is determined simultaneously with the dependent 
variable is generally correlated with the error term, which leads to bias and inconsistency 
in OLS” (Wooldridge 2009, 550). In addition, there may be other omitted variables that 
are correlated with the error term (ε) and thus biasing these results.  
One solution to the endogeneity problem is to use an instrument variable that 
meets the “exclusion restriction” criteria, i.e. a variable that is not correlated with the 
error term (ε) but is correlated with the outcome variable only through its effect on the 
independent variable. A specific form of the use of instrument variable is the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) method when we have another exogenous variable that can be used 
as an instrument. In such circumstances, the 2SLS estimator may be said to be consistent 
and unbiased. 
While Aid may be endogenous (because both Aid and Growth may co-vary due to 
the same factors, and also Aid may be correlated with the error term), Aid(t-1) is assumed 
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to be exogenous. This is based on the principle that “since a time trend is exogenous, it 
can always serve as its own instrumental variable” (Wooldridge 2009, 532). Therefore, in 
this case, I use the lagged variable of Aid as the exogenous instrument variable. In time 
series analysis, it is usually the case that lagged variables are correlated with the original 
variable, but not correlated with the error term at time t precisely because the lagged 
variable, by definition, was generated at an earlier time, such as t-1. One serious threat to 
the assumed exogeneity of the lagged variable, however, comes from the autocorrelation 
of error terms. For this reason, I run the Breusch–Godfrey test for autocorrelation using 
the “estat bgodfrey” command in STATA. If this test reveals that the first lag also suffers 
from autocorrelation problem, second or third level lags may be used instead to mitigate 
this challenge.  
After running an OLS regression between natural log of GDP growth rate and net 
ODA as a percentage of GDP, the p-value for the first lag on the Breusch–Godfrey test is 
greater than 0.05, and therefore I see no need to apply more distant lags. The results are 
presented in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5 STATA output for the Breusch–Godfrey test for autocorrelation 
estat bgodfrey, lags (1 2 3 4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lags(p)  |          chi2               df                 Prob > chi2 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1     |          3.082               1                   0.0792 
       2     |          3.100               2                   0.2123 
       3     |          3.319               3                   0.3450 
       4     |          3.524               4                   0.4742 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




I run similar models of 2SLS to reproduce the same five regression results as 
those discussed in Table 4, the difference being that these results are from 2SLS as 
opposed to OLS. These results are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Regression results, using two-stage least squares (2SLS) method 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
No. Dependent Variable  Independent Variable Constant  Coefficient (SE) p-value Data Range 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1) GDP Growth (ln)  Net ODA as % of GDP -.977  0.069 (.060)  0.27 2003-2014  
2) GDP Current $  Net ODA Current 1.4e+09  2.406 (.142)  0.00 1960-2014*  
3) GDP Current $  Net ODA Current -3.5e+09   3.313 (.594)  0.00 2001-2014  
4) GDP per capita  Net ODA per capita 376.03  6.115 (1.178) 0.00 1960-2014* 
5) GDP per capita  Net ODA per capita 258.83  6.726 (1.504) 0.00 2001-2014 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Includes missing values for the period 1982-2000 
 
These results may be interpreted as follows. The first row suggests that a one 
percent increase in net ODA as a percentage of GDP is associated with a 0.069 
percentage points increase in GDP growth rates, as opposed to 0.035 in Table 4 using 
OLS. Similar to the OLS regression, this relationship is not statistically significant. Rows 
two and three explore the relationship between net ODA and GDP levels. It shows that 
each dollar of foreign aid infused in the country is associated with a $2.40 increase in 
levels of GDP, as opposed to $2.28 in the case of OLS. Restricting this model to the last 
13 years, this magnitude increases to $3.31. Finally, rows four and five explore the 
relationship between net ODA per capita and GDP per capita. Row four suggests that 
each dollar of foreign aid per capita is associated with a $6.11 increase in GDP per capita 
for the entire period from 1960 to 2014. Limiting our attention to the period from 2001 to 
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2014, however, the magnitude of this relationship increases slightly to $6.72. Except for 
the first row, all estimated relationships are statistically significant.  
In order to determine if the 2SLS is an improvement over the OLS method, the 
Hausman test may be applied, which compares the difference between the two estimates. 
With a P-value of greater than 0.05, the results do not support the case for 2SLS. One 
reason for this might be the rather insignificant number of data points. For the first 
regression between GDP growth and ODA as a percentage of GDP, this model had to be 
limited to the most recent 11 years because of missing data for GDP growth rates before 
2002.  
Another important weakness of 2SLS, although a significant improvement over 
OLS, is that although 2SLS produce unbiased estimates, they may not be the most 
efficient. One way to make up for this shortcoming is by using three-stage least squares 
(3SLS), which is a particular form of Simultaneous Equations Modeling (SEM). In 
particular, “system estimation methods are generally more efficient than estimating each 
equation by 2SLS. The most common system estimation method in the context of SEMs 
is three stage least squares” (Wooldridge 2009, 560). If applied correctly, with maximum 
likelihood estimation, 3SLS can reach the Cramer-Rao lower bound, thus producing more 
efficient estimates than 2SLS, if not always the most efficient estimate. One of the 
reasons that 3SLS may not be perfectly applied with the given data is the limited number 
of data points – the same challenge that undermined the 2SLS estimates.  
In order to overcome this challenge, I combine GDP growth rate data from a 
difference source, namely from the United Nations’  (United Nations 2015). One of the 
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main advantages of this database is that it complements the other two main databases I 
am using, namely the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) 
and the OECD-DAC Database of Aid Statistics (OECD-DAC 2014), by providing data 
on GDP growth rates for Afghanistan for the entire period from 1970 through 2014. An 
important drawback of this database is that the data from the two sources do not match 
perfectly. In fact, the degree of correlation between GDP growth rates from the two 
sources for the period of overlap from 2003 to 2014 is only 0.7.  
 
Figure 20 Comparing data from UN and WDI 
 



































































































































With these caveats in mind, I run 3SLS on the following basic model: 
reg3 (lnGr unODAperY lagAidperY) (unODAperY lnGr PR) 
where,  
- lnGr is the natural logarithm of GDP growth rate 
- unODAperY is net ODA as a percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP 
- lagAidperY is the first lagged variable for net ODA as a percentage of 
Afghanistan’s GDP 
- PR is political rights, derived from the Freedom in the World Country 
Ratings database (Freedom House 2016) 
In this model, the basic assumption is that aid and growth variables are 
simultaneously determined, one affecting the other. In order to estimate the relationship 
between these two variables, 3SLS needs at least two predetermined or exogenous 
variables, one in each of the two simultaneous equations. In the first equation, I have 
treated the first lagged variable of net ODA as a percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP as the 
exogenous variable. In the second equation, I have treated the political rights variable as 
the exogenous variable. In such scenarios, “we typically call a lagged endogenous 
variable in an SEM a predetermined variable. Lags of exogenous variables are also 





Table 7 Regression results, using three-stage least squares (3SLS) method 
 
Three-stage least-squares regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnGr               25      2    .977121      0.221       3.72   0.1560 




             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnGr         | 
   unODAperY |   .0545498   .0521598     1.05   0.296    -.0476816    .1567811 
  lagAidperY |  -.0356962   .0515215    -0.69   0.488    -.1366766    .0652841 
       _cons |   1.309729   .2861933     4.58   0.000     .7488004    1.870657 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
unODAperY    | 
        lnGr |    621.216   11283.87     0.06   0.956    -21494.76    22737.19 
          PR |    276.118   5408.543     0.05   0.959    -10324.43    10876.67 
       _cons |  -2766.277   53081.47    -0.05   0.958      -106804    101271.5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Endogenous variables:  lnGr unODAperY  
Exogenous variables:   lagAidperY PR  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Regression results are presented in Table 7. The highlighted row shows that a one 
percent increase in net ODA as a percentage of GDP is associated with a 0.054 
percentage points increase in GDP growth rates. This relationship, however, is not 
statistically significant given a p-value of 0.296. When compared to OLS and 2SLS 
regression results discussed earlier (see Tables 4 and 6), this value of 0.054 lies between 
the OLS estimate of 0.035 and 2SLS estimate of 0.069, thus indicating potential 
understatement by OLS estimator and overstatement by 2SLS.  
Concluding Remarks 
Despite the paucity of credible data, this chapter was an attempt to investigate the 
relationships between the flows of development assistance and macroeconomic 
indicators, in particular GDP growth rates. The analysis in this chapter revealed that 
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while there are positive and statistically significant relationships between aid and levels 
of GDP, there was little evidence to show that aid promoted growth, the key indicator 
often used to measure aid effectiveness.  
Whereas much of the gains of the last decade, such as those in health and 
education, provide real evidence for the impact of aid on the Afghan society, the 
regression results should be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. First, 
missing data for many indicators and many years significantly limit the scope and 
strength of statistical analysis. For example, as mentioned previously, data for the most 
basic and important variable, i.e. GDP growth rate, is unavailable in the WDI database 
for the entire period, except for the last decade. Data for most variables, including levels 
of GDP, are missing for a twenty-year period between 1982 and 2002, coinciding with 
the Soviet invasion of the country and the ensuing conflicts until the American 
intervention in 2001. Furthermore, in order to account for inflation and exchange rate 
variations, the use of variables in constant dollars would have been preferred to the use of 
variables in current dollars. The unavailability of data in constant terms (except for net 
ODA) rules out analysis in constant dollars.  
Second, one has to acknowledge the methodological limitations so as not to 
erroneously equate correlation with causation. Conditions for establishing causality could 
not be strictly satisfied in this rudimentary analysis, even after attempting to use 
instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares model and three- stage least squares. 
One should, therefore, exercise caution before attributing all the gains to the flow of 
official development assistance alone. For example, it is not unreasonable to imagine that 
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these improvements could have been, at least partially, due to factors other than ODA 
flows, such as the nearly one trillion dollar dollars spent on war. Lastly, although the 
regression results found consistently positive relationship between aid and growth, the 
relationship was not statistically significant given the p-values of large than 0.05.  
While these findings are both interesting and informative, they are not conclusive 
about the question of aid effectiveness, thus pointing to the misleadingly narrow 
conception of aid effectiveness if defined primarily in terms of GDP growth. In addition, 
without a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms, this kind of analysis alone 
does not lend itself to informing policy and drawing lessons learned on how to make aid 
more effective in the future. One way to arrive at contingent generalizations is to identify 
variations in aid effectiveness within the country. Aid effectiveness must be defined in 
terms of development outcomes across sectors. The next step would involve singling out 
instances where aid has been relatively more successful. Next, the causal mechanisms 
must be mapped out and finally one could arrive at the conditions under which aid is 
more effective. In the following chapters, I set out to do exactly this.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE MICRO LEVEL EVIDENCE I 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed that aid-growth relationship in Afghanistan is 
spurious, and despite the use of various estimations (including two-stage and three-stage 
least squares) a statistically significant relationship between aid and GDP growth rate 
could not be established. While an investigation of the aid-growth nexus is important, it 
can be misleading because the impact of aid on a country cannot be well-represented by 
narrowly focusing on growth alone. It can undermine valuable gains in the area of human 
development, including both health and education. In addition, a preoccupation with 
growth alone obscures the far more important question of variations in aid effectiveness 
within the country and across sectors. I find that at a cross-sectoral level, development 
progress in Afghanistan when measured in sector-specific development outcomes 
presents significant variations that can be exploited to find out where was aid most 
effective and why. Although the country has made significant strides since 2001 in basic 
health, education, and rural development sectors, it has fared less well in other areas such 
as social protection, mining, and urban development.  
This chapter will discuss the selection of the sectors and present a ranking of aid 
effectiveness in each sector. After setting up the problem statement (i.e. the variations in 
aid effectiveness across sectors that are operating under essentially the same overall 
conditions), I discuss process tracing which is the methodology of choice and best fit for 
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this study. I also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of case study approach and in 
particular process tracing vis-à-vis large-N statistical analysis, and show that given the 
theory-confirming nature of this study, case study approach is better suited for this study. 
This chapter ends with a description of the steps involved in conducting process tracing 
and thus sets the stage for a more in-depth process tracing of the health sector in 
particular, as the most successful sector in Afghanistan in the following chapter.  
The Sectors: an Overview 
The sectors chosen for this study are outlined in the Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) (2008-2013), a document produced by the Government 
of Afghanistan that serves as the country’s first and only Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP). The ANDS took a stock of conditions that existed in 2006, set priorities 
and objectives and clarified programs and projects needed to achieve those set targets and 
goals, with commitment from the international community to support the development 
process.  
The ANDS was in fact a written commitment by the Afghan government and its 
international counterparts to achieve the objectives and implement the plans laid out in 
the Afghanistan Compact. The Compact is a political agreement that documented the 
obligations and roles of the international community and the Afghan Government after 
the 2006 London Conference. This important conference was chaired by British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai, and UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, and was attended by representatives from 66 states and 15 international 
organizations. It is, therefore, not surprising that there are similarities between the 
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priority areas and targets identified in the two documents. In fact, ANDS puts the 
benchmarks in these two documents and the MDGs on par by saying that “the 
effectiveness of aid can be measured against attainment of MDG, Compact and ANDS 
poverty reduction targets” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008, 155). 
 

































































































































Source: Adapted from Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) document (Islamic Republic of 




As illustrated in Table 8, the ANDS sets the stage by organizing Afghanistan’s 
key priority areas into three main pillars: 1) Security, 2) Governance, and 3) Economic 
and Social Development. It further expands the three main pillars into eight sub-pillars: 
1) Security, 2) Good Governance and Rule of Law, 3) Infrastructure and Natural 
Resources, 4) Education and Culture, 5) Health and Nutrition, 6) Agriculture Rural 
Development, 7) Social Protection and 8) Economic Governance. From these eight sub-
pillars emerge 17 sectors, 13 of which are grouped under the third main pillar, namely 
Economic and Social Development. Finally, these 17 sectors are complemented with six 
cross-cutting focus areas, including 1) Regional Cooperation, 2) Counter Narcotics, 3) 
Anti-Corruption, 4) Gender Equity, 5) Capacity Building, and 6) Environment.  
The ANDS is the culmination of several years of work by the Afghan government 
and the international community, in particular the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank. From the Afghan government, the process was handled under the 
leadership of the Higher Oversight Committee, including the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Finance, Economy, Justice, Education, Commerce and Industry and the National 
Security Advisor. The ANDS was drafted in a participatory process, involving several 
rounds of consultation with around 17,000 stakeholders, almost half of which were 
women. After the document’s approval by the Afghan Cabinet in April 2008, it was 
presented at the Paris Conference in June of that year. According to an evaluation of the 
ANDS in 2014, the ANDS was implemented over a five-year period with a budget of 
nearly US$15.6 billion, compared to the budgeted amount of US$35.9 billion, estimated 
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at the time of drafting the ANDS (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 
2014). 
The ANDS was supposed to undergo a thorough review process, with the first 
progress report scheduled for March of 2009 followed by annual reviews, and revisions 
to the document to be incorporated September of 2010. Confusion about the ownership of 
the ANDS review process within the Afghan government seems to have contributed to 
inadequate attention given to the quality of the review process. The main source of 
confusion seems to be between the Afghan government’s Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Economy. The division of responsibility between these two ministries 
regarding the coordination of ANDS and monitoring its results is hampering coordination 
and progress. The line ministries have raised this issue at both ministerial and 
international donors’ meetings. If measures are not taken to amend this separation of 
responsibility, appropriate planning, budgeting and reporting on progress toward sector 
results cannot be guaranteed.  
One of the interviewees – a senior level international development expert with 
significant experience in Afghanistan, including at the time of initial developments of 
ANDS – was particularly critical of the international community and by extension, the 
Afghan government, for their failure to follow through the ANDS. In fact, she argued the 
ANDS was written on paper but never implemented in practice. Instead, she continues, 
the international community jumped from one strategy document governing development 
in Afghanistan to another strategy document. Having mentioned these challenges with 
ANDS, it remains a key authoritative document that this research relies on for providing 
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a ranking of the various sectors in achieving their objectives in Afghanistan at the 
national level.   
While these variations in performance are important, they are not very useful at 
answering the question, i.e. where was aid most effective and why, because success in 
achieving better health outcomes is not readily comparable to the failure in countering 
corruption or insecurity. In fact, corruption, insecurity and narcotics are cross-cutting 
issues that affect almost uniformly all other sectors. Therefore, a more useful comparative 
analysis would involve assessing the impact of aid across relatively more comparable 
sectors, such as health, education, rural development, agriculture and mining. If 
significant variations emerge in the performance of these sectors, a good research 
question will identify the potential factors that explain variations in aid effectiveness 
across sectors. In particular, in line with Mill’s method of similarity and difference, 
factors that are present in more successful cases and absent in less successful ones, may 
be identified as the key causal variables that explain aid effectiveness.  
According to the country’s first Afghanistan Mortality Survey (APHI/MoPH et al. 
2011), the health sector has improved greatly with the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) 
declining significantly from 1600 (per 100,000 live births) in 2002 to 327 in 2010. Over 
the same period, Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) has declined from 165 (per 1,000 live 
births) to 77, and mortality rate among children less than 5 years of age has declined from 
257 (per 1,000 live births) to 97 (APHI/MoPH et al. 2011). In the education sector, the 
number of active schools has more than doubled from nearly six thousand in 2001 to 
nearly 14 thousand in 2011 (UNDP 2013). Over the same period of time, primary and 
 
 147 
secondary school enrollment has multiplied from 1.1 million to 7.2 million, half of which 
are girls (UNDP 2013).  
In the area of rural development, through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development’s (MRRD) flagship National Solidarity Program (NSP), the country has 
improved local governance, promoted rural reconstruction and contributed towards 
poverty reduction through the creation of Community Development Councils (CDCs).  
In the area of agriculture, Afghanistan continues to rely on imported agricultural 
products despite the fact that Afghanistan is primarily an agrarian economy with nearly 
80% of the labor force working in agriculture (World Bank 2012). In fact, the latest 
figures indicate that Afghanistan spends nearly US$3 billion a year to import agricultural 
products (World Bank 2014). To put this figure into perspective, it is nearly 15% of total 
GDP of US$20 billion, or almost equivalent to the entire export value of the country. 
Conversely, only 24% of the GDP originates in agriculture, the remaining coming from 
the industry and service sectors.  
Figure 22 establishes the health sector as the best performing sector, with an 
overall achievement rate of 88%. The sector that performed least well is the private sector 
development with an achievement rate of only 44%. Therefore, the ANDS calls the 
health sector “the most successful sector” compared to all other sectors identified in the 
document (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 2014, 18).  
Although a thorough assessment of the process used to arrive at these 
achievement rates lies beyond the scope of this research, a closer look at the outcomes 





 As Table 9 shows, the performance of the health sector was assessed against 
three overarching outcomes and twelve specific indicators.
24
 The three outcomes include 
“increased quality of health care services” with a focus on quantity and quality of 
healthcare infrastructure, “increased access to health care service” with a focus on 
citizens’ access to well-equipped health facilities and communicable disease detection 
and treatment rates, and “effective reproductive and child health system” with a focus on 
mortality rates among mothers, children and infants, and immunization coverage.  
Figure 21 Ranking of sectors by their performance 
 
Source: Afghanistan National Development Strategy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of 
Economy 2014) 
                                                 
23
 For a more thorough reading of the process, see ANDS 2008-2013 document (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2008).  
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 It is important to note that in the actual ANDS evaluation, there are thirteen indicators. Upon closer look, 
I found that the second indicator under the third outcome, i.e. % of children under one year having received 
measles antigen, is repeated in the first indicator. The reason for this repetition is probably due to the fact 
that measles antigen rate has a different baseline than other vaccinations. For details, refer to Appendix A.  
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Table 9 The health sector’s outcomes and indicators according to ANDS 
Expected Outcomes Indicators 
1. Increased quality 
of health care 
services 
 Number of functional public and private hospitals set up 
 Number of provinces where organized structure is in 
place 
 Index on the progress of putting in place quality health 
care services 
 Overall score on Balanced Scorecard 
2. Increased access 
to health care 
service 
 % of population within two hours walking distance from 
PHC services 
 Number of health facilities, district, provincial and 
regional hospitals equipped with standard package of 
defined clinical and diagnostic services 
 % of TB cases detected and treated 






 % of children under 1 year having received measles 
antigen, DPT & hepatitis dosage and polio drops 
 Maternal mortality ratio 
 Under 5 mortality rate in the country (%) 
 Infant mortality rate (IMR) in the country (%) 
Source: Adapted from the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
2008, p.255-256) 
 
Among the three outcome areas, Afghanistan’s health sector outperformed its 
targets in dropping mortality rates and improving immunization coverage. The ANDS 
evaluation notes that 100% of targets under the third outcome were met. While the health 
sector’s performance under the second outcome was also near perfect, where it under-
performed was in improving the quality of health care services with its four indicators 
focusing on the number of functional hospitals, the number of provinces with organized 
structures in place, the index on quality health care services, and overall score on 
Balanced Scorecard, a measure developed to assess overall performance of the sector 
across the country.  
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This is not surprising given the difficulty in ensuring both access and quality of 
care, especially in remote districts and areas of active conflict. This aspect of the 
challenge was in fact confirmed by my own experiences on the ground. For example, in 
2015, I led a team of researchers in Afghanistan in conducting a Public Expenditure 
Tracking Survey (PETS) of the health sector, which required the surveying of a carefully 
selected sample of 140 health facilities across eight provinces distributed across the 
country’s seven regions (Dost 2015). One of the main challenges in this study was to 
ensure that the sample of health facilities was representative of the entire population 
because any systematic exclusion of health facilities would bias our findings. This, 
however, proved a formidable challenge as we had to constantly drop a large number of 
health facilities from the sample due to security threats in certain parts of the country. In 
fact, the final list of health facilities surveyed had 35 facilities dropped from the 
originally envisaged 140 sample size. This single example puts the situation into 
perspective by illustrating that if a small survey team cannot be easily deployed for a 
short visit to all the regions, ensuring adequate access to quality health care across the 
country is an unfathomable challenge.  
This discussion brings us to the topic of the absolute and relative performance of 
the health sector in Afghanistan. When this study refers to the health sector as “the most 
successful” sector in the country, it is not the same as saying that Afghanistan’s health 
care challenges have been resolved. Rather, this must be understood in relation to other 
sectors in the country. In fact, at the international level, even when compared to 
neighboring countries or other countries with similar income levels, health indicators in 
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Afghanistan, including mortality rates, are among the worst in the world. In addition, 
these relative gains have been achieved at the expense of highly inflated costs, mostly 
due to the security challenges associated with delivering services to remote and conflict-
ridden regions around the country. The following figures from the 2015 national survey 
of the Afghan people, conducted by the Asia Foundation, shows the achievements of the 
health sector as perceived by ordinary citizens into perspective (Warren and Hopkins 
2015, 9):  
Overall, 49.1% of respondents say they are somewhat or very satisfied with their 
access to clinics and hospitals, and 42.4% report satisfaction with their access to 
medicine. Among rural Afghans, just 44.3% of respondents are satisfied with 
clinics and hospitals in their area, while 38.3% are satisfied with access to 
medicine. In contrast, a majority of urban Afghans are satisfied with clinics and 
hospitals (63.5%) and availability of medicine (54.6%). 
This study is designed to provide a contextually meaningful explanation for why 
the health sector has achieved 88% of its stated targets, while all other sectors lag behind. 
In particular, it explores answers to the question of how the health sector made it from 
being in a state of “near total disrepair” in 2002 to “the most successful sector” in 2014 
(Waldman and Hanif 2002, i; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 
2014, 18). How did the health sector develop a relatively well-functioning health service 
system “out of almost nothing in post-2001 Afghanistan” (Michael, Pavignani, and Hill 
2013, 322)? To answer these questions, we need to go deeper into the health sector and 




The way I have set this study up, this research design combines Mill’s method of 
agreement and differences in what he called, Concomitant Variation (Mill 1925). 
According to the method of difference (or most similar design), cases differ only in their 
dependent or outcome variables, while the majority of the independent variables appear 
to be the same. As a result, the variation in dependent variable may be attributed to the 
variations in one or more independent variables. An application of this design in my 
study involves the comparison of one or more “relatively successful” sectors with one or 
more of the “relatively less successful” sectors. Given that all the sectors operate under 
essentially the same environment, any variations identified in the two groups of cases 
may in fact be the causal variable that makes the difference between more and less 
success. More specifically, we would expect the more successful sectors to enjoy higher 
levels of local capacity than the less successful sectors, holding everything else constant.  
Likewise, according to the method of agreement (or most different design), cases 
differ in most of their independent or explanatory variables, while they all share the same 
dependent or outcome variable. As a result, the one common independent variable that is 
shared among all the cases may be identified as the causal variable. An application of this 
design in my study involves the comparison of several “successful” sectors among 
themselves. As a result, “success” may be attributed to the one common independent 
variable that is present in all cases. More specifically, we would expect all the successful 
cases to have a relatively higher level of local capacity in common.  
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The combined method of agreement and different (Concomitant Variation) 
requires a comparison of a few successful cases with a few less successful cases. In line 
with the expectations of this design, I expect that we will find higher levels of local 
capacity in the more successful cases and lower levels of local capacity in the less 
successful cases. I provide further evidence in support of the local capacity argument by 
studying the health sector in further detail and looking for the causal mechanism and 
signs of other predictions of the local capacity hypothesis. One of the key advantages of 
this method of comparison is that it controls for all external confounding variables, such 
as type of aid, and donor commitment because all sectors operate under the same 
environment. The focus, therefore, remains on the internal or local factors within the aid 
recipient country, which I believe has received little attention in the study of aid 
effectiveness as an explanatory variable.  
However, it is well documented that complete adherence to Mill’s methods is not 
feasible in most studies in the social sciences, because the method essentially requires 
that the units of comparison be identical or different in all but one aspect. In other words, 
Mill’s method works under three very strict conditions. First, the causal relations must be 
deterministic regularities involving conditions that are either necessary or sufficient for a 
specified outcome. Second, all causally-relevant variables must be identified prior to the 
analysis. And third, there must be available for study cases that represent the full range of 
all logically and socially possible causal paths (George and McKeown 1985). In fact, 
Mill himself considers this as “completely out of the question” due to the issue of 
equifinality or the possibility of different causal paths leading to the same outcome (Mill 
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1925, 3). While agreeing with such objections, although “founded on a too exacting 
scientific standard,” Lijphart’s solution is less exacting that Mill’s, and states “this 
standard should be approximated as closely as possible” (Lijphart 1971, 688), which is 
the intention of my study.  
In response to these challenges regarding complete adherence to Mill’s methods, 
several solutions have been proposed. One key solution is to combine Mill’s method with 
the method of process tracing to compensate for the limitations in the application of 
Mill’s methods, although it cannot completely eliminate the challenges (Levy 2002). The 
method of process tracing is defined as  “a procedure for identifying steps in a causal 
process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a 
particular historical context” (George and Bennett 2005, 176).  
The method of process tracing can be used to effectively identify not only key 
causal variables, but also the causal paths to the outcome and check for spuriousness, 
even in a single case. The main reason for this is that the method of process tracing is an 
empirically strong method that compares observations with hypothesized intervening 
variables and events based on prior theories. There is an element of “progressive 
theorizing” to explain not only existing variations, but also new puzzles and anomalies 
(Lakatos 1970; George and Bennett 2005).  
One of the main requirements for carrying out an effective process tracing is “a 
case-based methodology that can be applied successfully only with good knowledge of 
individual cases [emphasis added]” (Mahoney 2010, 131). I have developed a deep 
understanding of the development context in Afghanistan in general, and the health sector 
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in particular, through several years of studying and working in the country, 
predominantly in the post-2001 era. My knowledge of the region’s culture and history, 
coupled with my on-the-ground experiences in the areas of health, education, 
peacebuilding, and capacity development, have provided me with a unique perspective on 
investigating complex development challenges in the country. For example, in the health 
sector, I have contributed to some major studies and evaluations with significant policy 
implications, such as the costing of the revised Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) 
in 2011, the evaluation of Health System Strengthening in 2013, and a Public 
Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) of the health sector in 2015 (Dost 2015).
25
  
In addition to my personal experiences, this study relies heavily on both primary 
and secondary qualitative and quantitative data gathered through desk review, 
consultations with senior executives at the Afghan government and donor agencies, in-
depth interviews conducted with various stakeholders including NGO and health facility 
leaders, and field observations, including focus group discussions with health staff and 
patients at the point of service delivery. The recruitment of interviewees took place on the 
basis of their relevance and expertise on the subject matter.   
Before the instruments, including interview and focus group guides, could be 
developed, it was important to review relevant documents pertaining to Afghanistan’s 
development at the national level, including health policy and strategy documents. It is 
important to note that the data collection instruments were customized to respondent 
type. For example, the questionnaires used in a health facility manager was significantly 
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 These documents are not referenced there because of their unavailability to the public. However, they 
may be made available by the MoPH upon formal request.  
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different from one used to interview a senior level official at the MoPH. The data from all 
sources, however, were used to triangulate the findings. Where significant differences 
emerged, further probes were conducted to identify the reasons for variations across the 
different sources. One of the key advantages of mixed methods, as was carried out in this 
study, is that the qualitative data can help fill the gaps identified through the quantitative 
component of the study. Once all the data from fieldwork were gathered, the data analysis 
stage began, with an aim to glean common emerging themes that provided answers to the 
specific research questions.  
All ethical guidelines and codes of conduct were strictly adhered to throughout 
the fieldwork, including those set by the University of Denver’s Institutional Review 
Board. For example, an implicit consent was elicited at the time of recruiting 
interviewees. However, before an interview was conducted, a written consent form was 
provided to all the study participants, where they were given ample information on what 
their participation meant, what kind of questions would be asked, that their participation 
was completely voluntary with no risks to them, that they had the option to refuse to 
answer any question at any point in time, and that they had the right to end the interview 
at any point in time.
26
  
The Method of Process Tracing 
According to Peter Hall (2013), the origins of process tracing may be traced to 
George (1979) or Campbell (1975). Since then, it has had its own trajectory and growth. 
For example, when first popularized, this method was primarily used in the science of 
                                                 
26
 For more details, see the information sheet in Appendix B. 
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decision making in organizations (George and McKeown 1985). More recently, the 
method has been used by a large number of political scientists to trace any causal 
relationship between independent and outcome variables. As such, the method of process 
tracing has had a wide area of application in different fields (Checkel 2008). 
The method of process tracing is essentially a particular methodology within the 
case study approach and as such it may offer certain advantages over large-N statistical 
methods. Despite the advances in the tools and techniques employed in cross-country 
regression analysis, the case study approach may be better suited to explore certain 
questions in social sciences. The study of foreign aid effectiveness is one such topic 
where the depth of analysis offered by case study approach may provide more 
meaningful insights into the conditions under which aid is more effective. For example, 
writing about the failure of cross-country regression analysis in measuring aid 
effectiveness, Hansen and Tarp (2000) stress the need for more theoretical work to 
inform policy and practice, thus providing support for this kind of theory-confirming case 
study.  
There are a number of other advantages as well associated with the case study 
approach, defined as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to 
develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George 
and Bennett 2005, 5). For example, unlike the cross-country regression analysis that 
averages out differences among units of study, the case study approach allows the 
flexibility to choose to focus on both the average and the outliers. Unlike the cross-
country regression analysis that treats all countries, all donors and all types of aid as 
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homogenous, the case study approach allows the flexibility to single out particular 
countries, particular donors, and particular types of aid, yet exploit some form of 
variations within the country to tease out key lessons learned. Unlike the cross-country 
regression analysis that assumes all aid is given to promote growth in the recipient 
country, the case study approach allows the flexibility to relax this assumption and 
consider other outcomes as well. This also ties closely with the definition of a case itself 
as “a phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and analyzed empirically as a 
manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, 
p. 226). The broader phenomenon in this study is the role of local human capacity in 
making aid work. To use Lijphart’s (1971) language, this is a theory-confirming case to 
show the critical role local human capacity plays in explaining the success of the health 
sector. 
Although Easterly has not advocated the use of case study approach as a better 
alternative to cross-country regression analysis in measuring aid effectiveness, he has 
objected repeatedly to the widely held assumption that aid will promote growth. Instead, 
he pushes for the acknowledgment that aid cannot buy growth and that instead aid should 
be allocated “where it can do good” (Easterly 2003, 36). This sentiment has been echoed 
by several others. For example, cross-country regression analyses may be criticized 
because “aid is used to serve a donor agenda and therefore cannot and should not be 
measured against growth in recipient countries” (Collodel and Kotze 2014, 213). 
Edwards (2015, 279) makes one of the strongest cases for case study approach, in 
a way that I am approaching the study of aid effectiveness.  
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There is little hope of making significant progress in these debates if the 
economics profession continues to rely heavily on cross section and panel 
regressions. In order to move forward and find out under what conditions aid is 
helpful and when it fails, these works need to be supplemented by in depth case 
studies that follow a country’s history for many decades, focus on specific details 
of policy, understand the way in which the authorities relate to aid officials, 
concentrate on the political economy of reforms, and scrutinize the beliefs of 
politicians, policy makers and other key players. Only then will the profession be 
able to understand the intricacies of foreign assistance and its level of 
effectiveness. 
Although some have criticized the method of process tracing for not yielding 
sufficient external validity, others argue that it can in fact yield external validity in the 
form of what Campbell once called “portable truths” (Campbell 1975 in Hall 2013, 22). 
Partly because of this debate, Hall (2003; 2006; 2013) cuts a specific niche within this 
debate and calls it “systematic process tracing” to differentiate it from one that may lack 
external validity. In particular, Hall (2013, 24) argues that he sees systematic process 
tracing “as a relatively positivist mode of enquiry, focused on hypothesis testing that uses 
systematic empirical observations to accept or reject propositions drawn from an 
overarching theory.”  
In a review article on qualitative research methodology, Mahoney (2010) 
contrasts the highly influential and equally controversial work of King, Keohane and 
Verba (1994), hereinafter referred to as KKV,  with what he calls “the new methodology” 
in the post-KKV era (in particular, five books under review, namely Brady and Collier 
2004; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; Goertz 2006; Ragin 2008). He joins 
others in critiquing KKV for overstating the strengths of quantitative research and 
undervaluing the unique characteristics of qualitative research. He further discusses the 
“tacit assumption” in KKV’s writings about how qualitative researchers could benefit 
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from the superior principles of quantitative research, such as regression analysis, while 
never considering the possibility of the reverse being true.  
Partly in response to the KKV claims about the superiority of quantitative 
research, Mahoney argues, an increased sense of “methodological self-consciousness”  
has emerged, thus giving rise to this “new methodology” as represented by the five books 
under review, which “encompasses KKV ’s helpful insights while avoiding their most 
obvious missteps” (Mahoney 2010, 122). Relating to the debate on the superiority of one 
approach over the other, Mahoney argues against such dogmatic views, arguing that the 
two approaches may be seen as complementary to one another given that each is designed 
to achieve distinctively different ends. In his view, while case studies focus on the “why” 
question about causal analyses, quantitative methods aim at estimating average effects of 
particular explanatory variables on outcomes of interest.  
The Reductionist and Anti-reductionist Debate 
The debate over reductionism (or essentialism) and anti-reductionism (or anti-
essentialism) has dominated research in social sciences for a long time. Rather than 
advocating for the adoption of one or the other, I argue that each approach on its own is 
limited in its ability to produce useful findings given their particular strengths and 
weaknesses. Although there are instances where one approach may be a better choice 
than the other, a combined application of both will yield better outcomes rather than an 
exclusive reliance on one or the other. For instance, the boiling down of economic 
wellbeing to purely income based measures by reductionists (as was demonstrated in 
Chapter IV) ignores wellbeing in many other non-income domains. Similarly, the Human 
 
 161 
Development Index, although not purely anti-reductionist, would not have been an 
improvement over income based measures had it not relied on per capita output as one of 
its three key components.  
In order to make sense of the objects in the world around us, we have to employ a 
methodology of identifying and selecting the objects and theorizing about the 
relationships among them. The different approaches that one can use in theorizing lie in a 
continuum between reductionism on the one end and anti-reductionism on the other. 
Other terms often used interchangeably with (anti)reductionism are (anti)essentialism and 
(anti)determinism. For simplicity, I will stick with reductionism and anti-reductionism in 
this paper. 
 As the name suggests, the reductionist approach refers to the presumption made 
that the cause of any event can be reduced to a few “essential” variables, often referred to 
as the key determinants. The basic approach of a reductionist methodology follows the 
following three steps (Wolff and Resnick 1987, 15). First, when we observe the 
occurrence of an event, such as changing GDP growth rates, we also know that an infinite 
number of other events are happening simultaneously just as another infinite number of 
events have happened in the past. Second, the theorist selects few variables or “essences” 
among these infinite potential variables, to be used as the causal, essential or determinant 
variables that are believed to be the driving force behind the observed effect. An example 
of such select variables in our study could be the changes in aid volumes or variations in 
local capacity. Finally, the theorist builds models where the identified causal variables 
explain the changes in the observed effect, by dividing them into dependent and 
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independent variables, and separating essential from non-essential potential causes. Much 
of the neoclassical economic theory seems to fit perfectly the profile of reductionist 
approach to social problems. The empirical works presented in Chapter IV that 
investigated the relationship between volumes of aid and GPD growth rates is another 
example or the reductionist approach.  
Anti-reductionism, on the other hand, refuses to elevate any variables to the 
privileged or essential status over other variables. The presumption is that there are 
infinite changes in other variables happening at any time, thus making it both impossible 
and obsolete to attribute a change to few causal variables. For any event, instead of being 
determined by a few causal variables, the event is said to be over-determined through the 
interplay of an infinite number of changes in variables. It does not make sense, therefore, 
to single out a few select variables as the causal factors or essences, especially since any 
variable is presumed to be both a cause and an effect at the same time. It can also be 
inferred that an anti-reductionist account of a cause-and-effect relationships cannot be 
modeled through a dependent-independent variable mode, which is most common among 
neoclassical economists in their statistical models.  
Although the prefix “anti” in the term “anti-reductionism” suggests that the latter 
is anything that reductionism is not, there are more similarities between the two 
approaches than what first meet the eyes. For practical reasons, even the most religious 
followers of anti-reductionism will inevitably be forced to drop many of the variables that 
are believed to contribute to an event, and narrow the list down to a manageable set. No 
phenomenon can be explained by referring to an infinite number of causes, each of which 
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could have been caused by an infinite number of other causes, and so on it goes. The 
difference, however, is in how these dropped and retained variables are treated. While 
reductionists may treat the former as contingent or secondary, and the latter as essences, 
anti-reductionists refuse to do so. Instead, they may drop some variables temporarily for 
practical reasons and view the selected variables as merely “entry points” into analysis, 
not the final set of essences. 
This brings us to the dynamic progress, a key distinguishing feature of the two 
approaches. Reductionist approaches have an intrinsic tendency to reinforce strongly held 
ideologies. So much faith is placed on the model that it may blind the theorist to 
alternative truths. In fact, at one extreme, the model may be idolized so much that it may 
not match the reality on the ground, except in the internal workings of the model. 
Progress over time would be aimed at proving that the initial specification of the model is 
right, rather than a willingness to thrust aside the model or even make significant changes 
to the initial specification to match the reality. While this stickiness may bring about 
clarity, precision and consistency, it also renders the approach too rigid.  
The anti-reductionist approach, on the other hand, offers a lot more flexibility and 
frees the researcher from the confines of the accepted norms and structures. Adherents of 
this approach are in fact more than willing to not only update their models but to even 
discard what they previously held to be true. To an outside observer, these tendencies 
make anti-reductionist approach seem messy, disorganized, inconsistent and at times 
chaotic. Gleaning such subtle differences can only come from a sustained examination of 
the researchers’ works over a long period of time.  
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Finally, the most subtle and perhaps the most important distinguishing feature of 
the two approaches lies in the intent and the underlying ground that supports the 
researchers’ claims about the world. A superficial examination of a claim may not tell us 
much about the deeper ideological and normative commitments of the researcher. 
Determining the right intent and the underlying ground may not be as simple as it sounds. 
One way around this issue is provided by Wolff & Resnick (1987, 20), who argue that an 
anti-reductionist may choose to focus on a select few variables as long as the researcher 
is “aware of and explicit about” the partial and incomplete nature of the analysis. Some 
researchers, however, may be aware of but do not make explicit the partiality of their 
analysis. Other researchers may exhibit all signs of reductionism by making claims that 
resemble those of reductionists, yet s/he may have arrived at those claims through an 
anti-reductionist logic or vice versa. 
It is important to note that the choice of the theory is extremely important in 
reflecting the theorist’s normative commitments, because “what we see is shaped by how 
we think just as much as how we think is shaped by what we see” (Wolff and Resnick 
1987, 18). The choice of the approach is consequential in terms of the research findings 
and policy outcomes emanating from the research. Two researchers, analyzing the same 
subject, may very well end up with quite different or even diametrically opposed policy 
conclusions depending on the approach they choose. It is for this reason that I have 
undertaken the investigation of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan through both lenses.  
In conclusion, both reductionism and anti-reductionism have a number of 
desirable features. Reductionism, for instance, allows its adherents to analyze issues with 
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remarkable parsimony, clarity, precision, call to action and universalist tendencies. Anti-
reductionism allows its adherents the flexibility to analyze complex issues with a sense of 
humility that removes the anxiety and obsession of getting it all correct in one attempt. It 
acknowledges messiness and complexity and sees policy formation as requiring a process 
of continued trial and error.  
Taken to their limits, however, both extreme reductionism and extreme anti-
reductionism are exposed to some serious challenges. Extreme reductionism, for instance, 
can lead to rigidity, blindness to alternatives, and worst of all leave you dealing with 
enormous consequences from getting it fundamentally wrong. Similarly, extreme anti-
reductionism can lead to complete inaction. If everything is caused by everything else at 
the same time, there is no way one can detangle the mess without resorting to some 
degree of reductionism.  
I argue that the world of foreign aid and development is too complex to be 
addressed through either one or the other approach, thus needing a balanced use of both 
to get a much more enriched analysis. The two approaches are more complements than 
substitutes for one another, although they may be seen the other way around by some 
unyielding believers in each camp. To the extent possible, we should exercise intellectual 
honesty, and state our convections and methodological tendencies explicitly. The right 
question, therefore, is not which approach is better but rather which approach is more 
likely to produce better results in which contexts.  
After considering this tangent, we now turn to Mahoney’s discussion of process 
tracing. The most relevant aspect of Mahoney’s article for this study relates to the way 
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process tracing may be operationalized in not just generating new theories but also testing 
them. In particular, he discusses the slightly different understanding of the method of 
process tracing by KKV vis-à-vis the other five books under review. Mahoney argues that 
KKV understand process tracing merely as the search for intervening variables that link 
an independent variable with a dependent variable. When viewed in this light, process 
tracing will clearly seem ill-suited at causal inference because there is no way of 
choosing between a large number of intervening causal steps that may be identified along 
the way from an independent variable leading to the outcome variable of interest. Given 
these limitations of the process tracing methodology, they consider it “unlikely to yield 
strong causal inference” because it can only “promote descriptive generalizations and 
prepare the way for causal inference” (KKV 1994, in Mahoney 2010, 123). 
Similar critiques of not just the method of process tracing but all qualitative 
methodologies have emerged in the past. For example, it is well documented that while 
case study approach offers some improvements over cross country regression analysis, it 
suffers from other shortcomings, in particular, the much debated problem of too many 
variables with too few cases. The typical strategies to ameliorate this limitation include 
increasing the number of cases temporally and spatially, reduce the number of variables 
by collapsing conceptual categories, building more parsimonious theories by focusing on 
smaller number of variables, and adding more comparable cases that have similar 
dependent variables (Lijphart 1971).  
Another common critique is that unlike large-N statistical analyses, the case study 
approach cannot produce probabilistic theories. This, however, may not be such a serious 
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challenge because qualitative researches, like the one that I am conducting, do not stop at 
finding a probabilistic statement, even if they were to arrive at one. They instead focus on 
the “why” and “how” questions and keep refining and reworking their theory to improve 
its ability to explain observation.  
A final critique of case study approach is its inability to yield the kind of precision 
about the magnitude and significance of identified relationships that statistical approaches 
can. The closest that case study approach gets to ascertaining the strength of hypothesized 
relationships is that they can identify those explanatory variables whose presence or 
absence could make a noticeable difference in the identified cases. In other words, while 
the overall significance of identified relationships can be determined, arriving at 
percentage of confidence is not possible. This may not be such a real challenge because 
case study approach tackles those kinds of issues that are hard to quantify and measure in 
the first place.  
Taken together, these critiques question the ability of qualitative comparative 
cases to produce both internally- as well as externally-valid claims about causal 
processes. Mahoney and others, however, argue that these critiques do not pose a serious 
threat to qualitative research, precisely because they emerge as a result of a conscious 
effort to compare qualitative approaches to regression analysis as the gold standard. 
Qualitative methods, in particular the method of process tracing, should therefore be seen 
as a distinctive approach by itself, while making efforts to take into the critiques when 
they are meaningful threats to inferential validity. Mahoney (2010, 124) argues that the 
new methodology pushes back strongly on this notion because it “links process tracing 
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not to regression norms but to a distinctive qualitative approach to causal analysis.” For 
example, George and Bennett (2005, 13) argue that “process tracing is fundamentally 
different from statistical analysis because it focuses on sequential processes within a 
particular historical case, not on correlations of data across cases.”  
To clarify how process tracing relies on a completely distinct frame of thought, 
Mahoney highlights Collier, Brady, and Seawright’s distinction between data-set 
observation (DSO) and causal-process observation (CPO). While DSO refers to a general 
observation as understood in qualitative approaches, CPO refers to a “smoking gun” type 
of evidence that only comes to light with an in-depth knowledge of the particular case 
and its context, thus, if properly identified, carrying significantly more weight than a 
DSO. The reliance of the method of process tracing on CPOs, vis-à-vis the reliance of 
regression analysis on DSOs, therefore, should make the distinction between the two 
clearer.  
Contrary to the popular belief that large-N studies are best suited for theory 
testing and case studies are best at theory generating, Mahoney argues that the new 
methodology, in particular process tracing, is in fact quite well-suited for theory testing. 
Building in particular on the works of Brady and Collier (2004) and George and Bennett 
(2005), Mahoney identifies three specific types of CPOs used in theory testing (See 
Figure 22). Even though Mahoney shows through examples that even the application of 
one type of CPO may be sufficient to establish and test causal inference, I attempt to 




Figure 22 Types of observation employed in qualitative and quantitative approaches 
 
Source: Adapted from Mahoney (2010, 126) 
 
The first type of CPO is called Independent Variable CPO because it focuses 
exclusively on identifying the existence of a causally critical independent variable in the 
cases under investigation. While this may look trivial at first sight, we have to remember 
that this independent variable of interest is identified a priori from previous theory 
development case(s) and this merely tests the external validity of that theory in one more 
context. Secondly, it is not just the mere existence of the independent variable that lends 
greater credibility to the pre-existing theory, but the manner in which this independent 
variable is present, the timing and sequence of its occurrence, and the nature of causal 
path it travels through to the outcome variable. One example that illustrates Mahoney’s 
point is Nina Tannenwald’s search for the existence of a “nuclear taboo” in explaining 


























it is not the number of historical episodes (a DSO) but the existence of a norm or value (a 
CPO) that matters for validating her claim.   
In the case of my study, the generated hypothesis posits that sufficient local 
capacity is a key determinant of effective aid utilization. While this theory is generated 
based on my observations of the health sector in particular, a good test of the theory 
would reveal that local capacity is indeed present in all sectors in varying degrees of 
success. Furthermore, the absence of local capacity in the least successful sectors would 
lend further credence to the proposed hypothesis about the conditions under which aid 
may be more effective. Both these conditions are satisfied in this study, in that some of 
the most successful sectors, such as health, education and rural development also enjoyed 
more abundant levels of local capacity in providing basic health, primary education, and 
building basic engineering structures. Some of the least successful sectors, such as 
mining and private sector development also suffer from the lowest levels of local 
capacity.  
The second type of CPO is called Mechanism CPO because it highlights the 
significance of an “intervening event” that is considered critical in the causal chain and 
that is posited a priori by the theory. This follows Bayesian logic where the original 
theory says if X is right, then we should expect to Y to happen, thus emphasizing the 
importance of theoretical priors and ex-ante expectation of events. Depending on the 
conformity of prior expectations with new observations, the new evidence might either 
support or undermine the strength of existing theory. This type of CPO is best illustrated 
by Theda Skocpol’s (1979) study of the relationship between ideologically motivated 
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vanguard movements and social revolutions. Although she finds vanguard movements 
present in all instances of social revolutions (thus satisfying the first type of CPO or 
independent variable CPO), the absence of Mechanism CPOs casts doubt on the theory. 
In particular, the theory’s prior expectations were that these vanguard movements trigger 
lower-class revolts. But this is not corroborated with evidence if vanguard movements 
show up after revolts. As a result, it reveals that the sequence of events matter for 
drawing conclusions.  
Levy (2002, 443) argues that process tracing is an especially useful methodology 
because it “follows a different logic and tries to uncover the intervening causal 
mechanisms between conditions and outcomes through an intensive analysis of the 
evolution of a sequence of events within a case.” In his view, process tracing is a strong 
methodological choice because it allows for the identification of the causal mechanism, 
which is a key advantage over large-N statistical analysis. It is also good at opening the 
black box of what goes inside the processes between inputs and outcomes. Finally, it is 
good at studying nonlinear relationships with key inflection points and path-dependence 
where timing and sequencing matter.  
In my study, I show that local capacity is present in the pre-aid era, developed 
through the decades of war delivering basic services to Afghans in Afghanistan and in 
Pakistan, and that when aid dollars are delivered to the country, these Afghan health 
experts and ex-NGO employees are able to exercise local ownership by being in the 
driver’s seat in managing aid and delivering results. Therefore, it is not just the existence 
of local capacity that matter, but the way in which these Afghan health experts get 
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organized, embrace leadership roles, and display their ability to achieve results that 
matter the most for effective utilization of foreign aid.  
The third and last type of CPO is called Auxiliary Outcome CPO because it is 
aimed at identifying other “traces” or “markers” left behind by the causal explanatory 
variable. Mahoney (2010, 129) defines this type of CPO as “particular occurrences that 
should occur alongside (or perhaps as a result of) the main outcome of interest if in fact 
that outcome were caused in the way stipulated by the theory under investigation.” This 
is different from both the first and second type of CPO in that it is neither about the 
existence of the cause, nor is it an intervening or process variable. Instead, it adds the 
requirement to show evidence of other outcome variables, in addition to the main 
outcome variable of interest. While the existence of these auxiliary outcomes, although 
closely related to the main outcome variable, is not sufficient evidence by themselves, 
their simultaneous existence with the main outcome variable adds credence to the posited 
theory. To illustrate the point, Mahoney uses Gregory Luebbert’s work on red-green 
alliance in explaining the rise of social democracy in interwar Europe. In order to 
convince the readers that red-green alliance indeed was the cause, Luebbert had to show 
evidence of other traces left behind by this alliance, which include “a reluctance of 
socialists to challenge the distribution of wealth in the countryside; high levels of worker 
and union autonomy; and an inability of socialists to rely on the middle peasantry as 
viable electoral base” (Mahoney 2010, 130).  
In this study, I show that one observable implications of the local capacity 
hypothesis is the reproduction of local knowledge and expertise through conferences and 
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peer-reviewed papers written predominantly by Afghans in international journals. In 
other words, I investigate that if local capacity was indeed the key causal factor 
contributing to the health sector’s remarkable success in effective utilization of foreign 
aid, then this local capacity should have left behind other traces and markers, such as 
conferences and papers led by Afghan health professionals. In addition, while it is true 
that the probability of finding more local capacity in relatively more successful sectors is 
not that low, the probability of finding both local capacity as well as such other visible 
traces is so low that it cannot be due to chance alone.  
I find that Afghan health experts have indeed displayed their abilities in 
reproducing knowledge by the following actions: authoring peer-reviewed journal articles 
on rebuilding health systems, facilitated numerous conferences at the local and 
international levels, advised other developing and post-conflict country governments, and 
have actively promoted the BPHS and contracting-out mechanism as a proven and 
successful model of health care service delivery in post-conflict environments. For 
example, the journal of Global Public Health includes numerous publications authored by 
Afghan experts affiliated with the MoPH. In particular, this journal’s Special Issue in 
2014 (Vol.9, Supp.1) reflected many articles by noted Afghan scholars-practitioners, 
including the current minister, Dr. Feroz, and the previous minister Dr. Dalil. 
Another visible trace of the abundance of Afghan capacity in health is manifested 
through the presence of medically-trained doctors in sectors other than medicine. Some 
interviewees pointed out to the presence of medical doctors in key leadership positions in 
other ministries and organizations, while the reverse (i.e. the presence of other experts in 
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leadership positions in MoPH or other health-focused organization) would not hold true. 
In other words, while MoPH and other health-focused organizations are almost 
exclusively run by medical professionals, this is not true in all other sectors. For example, 
the ministries of economy, finance or trade have only a handful of professionally trained 
economists, finance or trade specialists. Interviewees note that it is not uncommon, 
however, to see medical staff in these other fields. Although this is a reflection of their 
superior leadership and managerial skills more than their capacity in health, it 
nonetheless shows the overall competence and the relative abundance of Afghan health 
experts. For example, some interviewees were quick to point out that if it hadn’t been for 
Dr. Nasrin Oryakhil’s outstanding performance in her medical field, she would not have 
been nominated for the position of minster at the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, 
Martyrs & Disabled.  
As a result, the combination of all the above three types of CPOs in my study 
should convince the readers that local capacity in fact holds the secret to the health 
sector’s remarkable performance. This is not just because a) I show the existence of local 
capacity in relatively more successful sectors, or b) I show the sequence of intervening 
variables in the causal chain between local capacity and success across sectors, or c) I 
show the presence of other outcomes corroborating my local capacity hypothesis, but 
because I illustrate that all the above three conditions are satisfied in the same study.  
According to Hall (2006), the method of process tracing involves four steps, as 
illustrated in Figure 23. A complete application of these steps will be presented in the 
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upcoming chapters. This section presents a brief introduction to key elements in each 
step.  
 
Figure 23 The four steps of applying process tracing 
 
Source: Adapted from Peter Hall (2006) 
 
1. Theory formation: This main contribution of this theory confirming case study is 
that in line with the contingency school of aid effectiveness literature, aid is likely 
to be more effective conditional upon the presence of local capacity in the 
recipient countries. The key causal mechanism is that local experts are there for 
the long run, have a deeper appreciation of the local complexities, and in most 
cases, have a greater sense of motivation and incentives to play important roles in 
Drawing conclusions 
Make final judgments about theory and its fit with observations.  
Making Observations 
Collecting data to support the theory's predictions and hypotheses.  
Deriving Predictions 
Formulate predictions and hypotheses that are falsifiable 
Theory Formation 
Formulate the theory, its key variables, causal mechanism and assumptions, if any.  
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the reconstruction of their societies, thus allowing for the exercise of “local 
ownership” as emphasized by the Paris Declaration (Roberts 2010).  
2. Deriving predictions: exploiting cross-sectoral variation in aid effectiveness in 
Afghanistan, this study predicts that sectors with relatively greater levels of local 
capacity should be relatively more effective in their utilization of foreign aid 
resources. Operationalizing this model is all the more challenging given the 
paucity of data in Afghanistan. The outcome variable, i.e. aid effectiveness in 
each sector, is derived from the percentage of targets achieved as outlined in the 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy document (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 2014). A ranking of various sectors according 
to this measure was presented in Figure 21 in the previous chapter. As for the 
main explanatory variable, a measure of local capacity is developed from mainly 
three sources. First, data from university entrance examinations, number of 
graduates and dropout rates provide a basic overview of potential existing 
capacity in different sectors. Second, data on Afghan and international Externally 
Funded Staff (EFS) in each sector provide further evidence of local capacity vis-
à-vis reliance on borrowed capacity from abroad. Third, expert opinion has been 
sought through key informant interviews and discussions to complement the other 
two sources of data on local capacity.  
3. Making observations: in accordance with the proposed hypothesis in step one, the 
next step is to make relevant observations on expected events, their sequence, 
actions by key actors, and evidence on the causal chain (Hall 2006). If my 
 
 177 
proposed hypothesis about the centrality of local capacity in effective utilization 
of aid is correct, one would expect a gradual, but early transfer of authority and 
responsibility to local experts as they earn the trust and confidence of their 
international counterparts in managing resources effectively and delivering 
results. The local experts should simultaneously display their skills, abilities, 
motivations, and ambitions to exercise true local ownership and accountability.  
4. Drawing conclusions: making a definitive judgment about the extent of 
congruence between theory predictions and observations requires careful 
assessment in light of the available data and methodology. As I will show in the 
coming chapters, not all the observations match the theory’s predictions perfectly. 
However, there is significant evidence to support the argument that local capacity 
is indeed a, if not the, central variable that determines the effective utilization of 
foreign aid dollars, as exemplified in the success of the health sector in 
Afghanistan. In addition, the success of the top three most successful sectors is 
strongly correlated with their relatively higher levels of local capacity. With more 
data, future research could test the strength of this hypothesis in explaining 
variations in aid effectiveness across sectors in other countries around the world.  
The next chapter conducts in-depth process tracing of the health sector as the 
most successful sector in the effective use of foreign aid dollars in comparisons to other 
sectors. Special attention is also paid to rival hypotheses that could be argued to explain 





CHAPTER SIX: MICRO LEVEL EVIDENCE II 
 
The previous chapter set the stage by presenting the selection and ranking of the 
sectors and identifying the method of process tracing as the method of choice for this 
study. In this chapter, endeavor to explain why the health sector has been such a 
remarkable success, when all sectors were operating under the same set of conditions. 
With an aim to uncover the conditions under which aid can be more effective, this 
chapter will first conduct an in-depth process tracing of the health sector with a focus on 
the early 2000s, starting with the international community’s first key meeting in 
Islamabad in November 2001. In addition, this chapter will consider four key alternative 
hypotheses in explaining the health sector’s success, thus providing further evidence to 
support the local capacity hypothesis. 
Health as the Most Successful Sector 
The success of the health sector has attracted much attention among both 
academics and policymakers. For example, the previous minister of Public Health, Dr. 
Suraya Dalil, and her co-authors explain the success of the health sector by focusing on 
six key factors: i) country ownership through a real stewardship role for the MoPH, ii) 
strong “donor coordination and collaboration,” iii) “participatory decision-making” 
processes involving the MoPH and donors, iv) evidence-based programming with a focus 
on achieving results, v) strong donor commitment evidenced by “reliable aid flows,” and 
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vi)  “a critical mass of individuals” who worked hard to makes all these achievements 
possible (Dalil et al. 2014, S124). Their logic, however, becomes circular when they 
build their premise on the five principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
which are ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual 
accountability and argue that aid was effective in the health sectors because of these 
factors.  
Other factors identified to explain the success of the health sector include the 
careful design and rollout of the BPHS, effective engagement by the international 
community with the fragile states, community-based health care delivery and the decision 
to adopt a contracting-out modal of service delivery(Dalil et al. 2014; Newbrander, 
Waldman, and Shepherd-Banigan 2011).  
The approach that I adopt in studying the success of the health sector differs from 
the above-mentioned studies in at least two fundamental ways. First, just as I consider the 
success of the aid sector relative to other sectors in the country, I also try to identify 
potential factors that could explain the success of the health sector in comparison to the 
presence or absence of those factors in other sectors. For example, the argument made in 
favor of contracting-out model of service delivery as a key factor in explaining the 
success of the health sector can be strengthened if we find that this practice is present in 
other more successful sectors and is absent in less successful sectors. Second, my 
analysis does not end with the identification of potential factors that could explain the 
success of the health sector. Instead, I delve deeper by inquiring about the potentially 
causal mechanism through which the identified factors affect health outcomes.  
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One of the key advantages of this approach is that many potentially confounding 
factors, with the exception of sector-specific factors, are automatically controlled for by 
virtue of the units of comparison operating under the same environment. In other words, 
the principle of ceteris paribus, or holding everything else constant, is satisfied to a large 
extent because many of the potential explanatory variables are expected to have an 
essentially uniform impact on the effective utilization of foreign aid dollars in all sectors 
under comparison.  
Reviving the Health Care System after 2001 
In the pre-war years of 1960s and 1970s, the government was directly in charge of 
delivering much of the health services, albeit this resulted in much of the rural areas 
across the country being ignored. Starting in the mid-1980s, with the number of Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan exponentially increasing, and donor funding following suit, the NGO 
sector emerged to fill the gap in Pakistan and engage in some cross-border operations as 
well. This trend continued until the Taliban take-over of the country in the mid-1990s, 
during which time the MoPH capacity was at its record low, thus NGOs were left as the 
sole providers of health services. By this time, many of the NGOs had developed their 
capacities and built standard procedures for health care delivery in some of the hardest 
regions through their experiences in the previous decades both inside Afghanistan and for 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. During this time, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health 
(MoPH) played little role in coordinating health services, thus leaving the health care 
service delivery to be fragmented and unequally distributed across the country.  
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The decades of conflict and the Taliban ban on female education significantly 
impeded the development of female health care providers to keep pace with their male 
counterparts, a challenge that continues to haunt the country to this day. In fact, lack of 
female health care professionals in all health facilities is one of the key challenges in 
effective service delivery, especially in rural areas (Hill, Mansoor, and Claudio 2010). 
Ironically, the Taliban requirement for female patients to be seen by female care givers 
only provided opportunities for a few female health practitioners to continue practicing 
medicine during the Taliban reign. It is not surprising then that “since the fall of the 
Taliban regime in 2002, gender inequalities in health have improved” (Samar et al. 2014, 
S76). 
Starting in late 2002, however, the health sector experienced a massive overhaul, 
in particular, with the establishment of the BPHS, and an overall better coordinated 
health system with carefully developed national policies, strategies and priorities. One of 
the key policy choices made during these critical months included the complete transfer 
of health care service delivery role to NGOs through a system of “contracting-out” 
mechanism, while limiting the role of the MoPH to stewardship and oversight.  
After the fall of the Taliban, the health system that the new transitional 
government inherited seemed broken beyond repair, with none of the ingredients of a 
functioning health system in sight. The situation was best described as follows: 
Afghanistan's health system is in a state of near total disrepair. Standard health 
indices, including the infant mortality rate, the childhood mortality rate and the 
maternal mortality ratio, are among the worst in the world. As the new interim 
government re-establishes and slowly strengthens social services, it finds itself 
facing a multitude of technical, managerial and operational problems that need to 
be clarified before they can be solved (Waldman and Hanif 2002, i). 
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In the year 2014, an evaluation of all sectors under the Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) finds that the health sector is “the most successful sector” 
in the country (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 2014, 18). How 
did the health sector make it from being in a state of “near total disrepair” in 2002 to “the 
most successful sector” a decade later (Waldman and Hanif 2002, i; Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 2014, 18)? What is the secret behind the health 
sectors unmatched performance in creating a well-functioning public health delivery 
system with a stellar record “out of almost nothing in post-2001 Afghanistan” (Michael, 
Pavignani, and Hill 2013, 322)? However, a focus on the health sectors is warranted not 
just because of its stellar record, but also because service delivery in the health sector 
restores government legitimacy and is a “bridge for peace” in post-conflict environments 
(Vaux and Visman 2005, 3).  
Alternative Hypotheses 
In developing new hypothesis, considering alternative hypotheses adds further 
credibility to theory (Kuhn 1970). Furthermore, the idea of a “three-cornered fight” 
between observation, existing theory and alternative hypotheses was popularized by 
Lakatos (1970). In this section, I present four key alternative hypotheses that may be 
presented to explain the health sector’s success. As Khan (2008, 15) argues, “much 
dogmatism in social sciences can be avoided if rival theorists were to make explicit the 
causal mechanisms and the grounds for what would comprise a fair causal comparison 
among rival theories.”  
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At least four reasons may be presented as the potential explanation for the success 
of the health sector. In the following section, I consider each of these arguments and 
refute them as key rival hypotheses in favor of the fifth hypothesis, i.e. the local capacity 
hypothesis (LCH), that I argue best explains the success of the health sector compared to 
the other sectors in Afghanistan.  
The first rival hypothesis may be called the Financial Support Hypothesis (FSH), 
referring to the massive financial contribution of the donor community to the health 
sector in Afghanistan. On the surface, this is the most powerful rival hypothesis to refute. 
In fact, no one can deny the fact that the centrality of the donor moneys in rebuilding the 
broken health system of the country cannot be overstated. If it were not for the 
international community’s financial support, even the very first Conference on 
Preparation for Reconstruction in Islamabad in November 2001 would not have been 
held. As Dr. Hussein Gezairy, the then WHO Regional Director for the Eastern 
Mediterranean said, “significant financial and technical resources are required more than 
ever before” (WHO 2001, 1). 
While the significance of donor support in reconstructing the health system in 
Afghanistan cannot be denied, it should be noted that the question raised is about the 
relative success of aid in the health sector. When viewed from this perspective, the 
amount of aid spent on the health sector should be compared to that of the other sectors. 
If the amount of aid was the only determinant of success, we could reasonably expect that 
the sector with the highest budget be the most successful sector. Such a comparison 
reveals that the reason for the extraordinary performance of the health sector does not lie 
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in the amount of foreign aid spent on the sector (see Figure 24 and Appendix B for more 
details). In fact, sectors with higher budgets are outperformed by the health sector, just as 
some less successful sectors enjoy higher budgets than that of the health sector. From this 
analysis, it is clear that the financial support hypothesis does not stand up to this simple 
logical test.  
Figure 24 The distribution of government core budget across ANDS sectors 
 
Source: National Budget Document, 2013-2016 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 
2016; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2014; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Finance 2013; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2012) 
 
I call the second rival hypothesis the Easy Indicator Hypothesis (EIH). Under this 
hypothesis, the critics argue that the reason more was achieved in the health sector with 
relatively less financial support is because the chosen indicators of success for the health 
sector were easier to achieve than those for the other sectors. An assessment of the 
process of selecting indicators and targets for ANDS allowed the line ministries 
significant control, and leaves the possibility to such a bias. In fact, the unchecked 
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influence of the line ministries throughout the process gave them an incentive to select 
softer and easier to achieve targets and indicators.  
While a thorough evaluation of the process of ANDS development and an 
objective comparative analysis of the targets and indicators across sectors are beyond the 
scope of this research, two arguments may be presented to refute the easy indicator 
hypothesis. First, since the process presented all the line ministries with the same 
opportunity to develop their targets and indicators, we have no reasons to believe that the 
health sector was either in a more privileged status or that they behaved differently from 
the rest of the group by setting their targets at proportionately easier levels than their 
counterparts. Second, even a cursory look at the set of indicators in the ANDS reveals 
that the indicators selected for the health sector are far from easy. One of the key 
critiques that may be charged against the ANDS Monitoring Matrix is the apparent 
confusion and inconsistency in the framing of outcomes, indicators and targets. More 
specifically, the document does not seem to clearly differentiate between output and 
outcome, with the former being a direct product of activities, while the latter is achieved 
as a result of achieved output(s). By this definition, a sector that sets its targets at the 
output-level may be deemed to have selected easier indicators for assessing its success.  
In the case of the health sector, while it is true that some output-level indicators - 
such as “number of functional public and private hospitals set up” or “90% of population 
within two hours walking distance” of heath care services by 2010 – have crept into the 
health sector, this sector also includes some critical and hard-to-achieve outcome – and 
even impact-level indicators too (impact refers to highest level objectives). Examples of 
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the latter category include 50% reduction in maternal and child mortality rates, and 30% 
reduction in infant mortality rates, all by 2013 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008c, 
255–256). Almost all the other sectors, however, suffer from an abundance of relatively 
easier-to-achieve output-level indicators where they should have had outcome-level 
indicators. For example, in the energy sector, some targets include 25% of rural 
households and 65% of urban households electrified by 2011 (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2008c). Almost all targets and indicators for the Information 
Communication Technology sector are about increased coverage of various technologies. 
In the mines and natural resources sector, almost all objectives, such as the approval of 
various regulations, “survey of 5% area of country's natural resources,” are specified at 
the output level (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008c, 252). Lastly, many of the 
indicators for the agriculture and rural development sectors are focused on the number of 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) established and the province-wide coverage 
of the National Solidarity Program (NSP), both of which are clearly output-level 
indicators.  
The easy indicator hypothesis, however, does have some explanatory power in 
explaining the differences in the relative performance of education, and social protection 
sectors. In the case of the education sector, many of the indicators, such as those focused 
on enrollment rates and the number of new school buildings with amenities for both boys 
and girls are set at the output level. The closest it gets to outcome indicators, such as 
learning outcomes, is designing “competency tests” for students, teachers and principals, 
yet still not even discussing improved test scores on these competency tests (Islamic 
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Republic of Afghanistan 2008c). The social protection sector is ranked as the second least 
successful sector, mainly because of the difficulty in achieving its poverty and 
vulnerability reduction targets. Examples include a 3% reduction per year of people 
living on less than $1 a day, or a 20% reduction in the chronically poor female headed 
households (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008c).  
The third rival hypothesis to explain the health sector’s unmatched performance 
may be called Low Baseline Hypothesis (LBH). Under this hypothesis, one may argue 
that the main reason that the health sector is displaying a spectacular performance is that 
all the indicators were at such low levels in 2002 that any minor push could result in 
significant gains. From this hypothesis, two sub-hypotheses can emerge. First, the 
baseline indicators were deceptively low because of unreliable data. With the passage of 
time and more reliable data, subsequent surveys reveal the actual levels of health status 
across the country. These figures were mistakenly interpreted as improvement in health 
outcomes due to the interventions introduced after 2002. The second sub-hypothesis may 
posit that even if the baseline data was reliable, the indicators were artificially and 
temporarily kept low because of the impact of war. By extension, it could be argued that 
the improvements noticed in the post-2002 surveys simply reflect the settling of the dust 
in the post-conflict Afghan society. In line with the theory of diminishing marginal 
returns, it could be argued that, each additional dollar of foreign aid invested in the health 
sector will result in successively smaller gains in health outcomes.  
Theoretically, the first sub-hypothesis (unreliable data) is hard to rule out because 
measurement and sampling errors are not only common but even expected in such 
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difficult and insecure environments. In addition to errors, even willful manipulation of 
data may be understandable given the incentive structures and the pressure to produce 
results. Similarly, the second sub-hypothesis (the temporary war impact) cannot be 
rejected given the war’s direct impact on the quality and utilization of health care services 
and other complementary factors, such as good nutrition.  
As Waldman and Newbrander (2014, S3) have noted, some exaggeration of 
achievements and underestimation of failures by donor agencies may be understandable 
“given the quest to legitimise the fledgling Afghan Government, the magnitude of their 
investments, and the risks that accompanied those investments because of the highly 
politicized atmosphere in which the reconstruction of Afghanistan is taking place.” 
Controversy about reported success was at its highest when the 2010 Afghan Mortality 
Survey (AMS) results were out, which indicated the following examples: average life 
expectancy at birth had jumped from 42 years in 2002 to 62 years in 2010; maternal 
mortality rates had dropped from 1,600 women per 100,000 live births in 2002 to 327 in 
2010 (APHI/MoPH et al. 2011). In a seminar at the Center for Global Development, 
featuring Dr. Kenneth Hill of Harvard School of Public Health, the seminar title asked if 
the gains in Afghan health were “too good to be true” (Center for Global Development 
2012). The magnitude of the change was so inexplicably high that it casts doubt not only 
on the 2010 survey but also the baseline survey that has been used as the benchmark for 
comparison of all health statistics since 2002. For example, it was argued that “believing 
the new numbers are accurate probably means accepting that the old numbers were way 
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off, which makes it impossible to say exactly how much health has really improved” 
(National Public Radio 2012).  
Two tests may be applied to assess the strength of low baseline hypothesis. First, 
if the low baseline hypothesis were correct, we would expect to observe a dip in mortality 
rates in late 1990s and early 2000s. Fortunately, the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database has historical data on average life expectancy, infant and child 
mortality rates continuously from 1960 to 2014 (World Bank 2014). This data is 
presented in Figure 25 below. The vertical axis on the right hand side corresponds to the 
solid line for average life expectancy, while the vertical axis on the left hand side 
corresponds to the dotted lines for infant and under five mortality rates.  
 
Figure 25 Historical trend of health outcomes, 1960-2014 
 
Source: World Development Indicators  
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In order to detect any anomalies in the data, I have added simple linear trend lines 
for each of the indicators in Figure 26. This simple test reveals that for the most part, the 
super-imposed linear trend line follows the actual data almost in tandem. Contrary to the 
predictions of the low baseline hypothesis, we detect no anomalies in the data round late 
1990s and early 2000s. The largest deviations between the actual and predicted data for 
mortality rates appear in mid 1990s and 2014.  
 
Figure 26 Historical trend of health outcomes with linear trend lines, 1960-2014 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
The evidence presented through this simple test may be used to dispel, or at least 
weaken, the doubts raised by low baseline hypothesis. Two caveats, however, must be 
noted about the evidence presented. First, the data from the World Development 
Indicators do not match perfectly the data from the Afghan Mortality Survey (AMS) for 
the years that the AMS were conducted. In fact, the results of various surveys in the last 
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decade – such as Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), Afghanistan Health Survey 
(AHS), National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), Afghanistan Mortality 
Survey (AMS), and Reproductive Age Mortality Survey (RAMOS) – fail data 
triangulation tests by source of data. This, however, is not surprising not simply because 
of expected sampling variability but also because of the challenges in conducting valid 
and reliable surveys in post-conflict societies. Second, this data is presented for life 
expectancy, infant and under five mortality rates, and leaves out the measure of maternal 
mortality rates that are equally, if not a more critical measure. The reason for this 
omission is that continuous annual data on maternal mortality rates are not available. The 
World Development Indicators database reports sporadic figures for MMR for only six 
years out of the 54 year period from 1960 to 2014. Specifically, it reports an MMR of 
1200 for 1990 and 1995, 1100 for the year 2000, 730 for the year 2005, and 500 for the 
year 2010 (World Bank 2014). The Afghan Mortality Survey (AMS), however, shows a 
sudden drop from 1600 in 2002 to 327 in 2010 (APHI/MoPH et al. 2011). This anomaly 
is harder to explain than the improvements in other health indicators such as infant and 
under five morality rates.  
A second test to assess the strength of the low baseline hypothesis, and in 
particular, the doubts surrounding the validity of survey data involves the assessment of 
other indicators complementary of health. In other words, if the gains of the health sector 
in reducing mortality rates were in fact too good to be true, one would expect zero or 
insignificant gains in other factors thought to be key determinants of mortality rates. In 
fact, much has been written and debated in response to the doubts raised about the 2010 
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AMS results. One article is written in particular to carry out a test that I have posed here. 
In particular, one article sets out to ask if the gains in the health sectors, as measured 
through the various mortality rates, are in fact consistent with the trend in other health 
indicators. They find support for the reported gains by showing that “decreases in these 
mortality rates are consistent with changes in key determinants of mortality, including an 
increasing age at marriage, higher contraceptive use, lower fertility, better immunization 
coverage, improvements in the percentage of women delivering in health facilities and 
receiving antenatal and postnatal care, involvement of community health workers and 
increasing access to the Basic Package of Health Services” (Rasooly et al. 2014, S29). In 
addition, these gains should not surprise us given the complementary nature of gains in 
all other measures, including improved nutrition, better access to clean drinking water, 
improved hygiene, higher per capita incomes, gains in education, better access to and 
utilization of health services due to improved roads and wider coverage of 
communication technologies, etc.  
In conclusion, while the low baseline hypothesis does raise interesting questions, 
it is not supported by sufficient evidence. Furthermore, even if we accept some of the 
doubts raised by this hypothesis – such as the war impact – it cannot be reasonably 
argued that they do not apply to the other sectors that the health sector is being compared 
to. Therefore, we can refute the low baseline rival hypothesis in explaining the health 
sectors relatively more successful performance in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the validity 
of the theory of diminishing marginal returns does not necessitate acceptance of the low 
baseline hypothesis. In other words, we could continue to expect successively smaller 
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gains in health outcomes with additional investments in the health sector, whether or not 
the health sector had started with low baseline data.  
Finally, the fourth rival hypothesis may be called the Foreign Capacity 
Hypothesis (FCH). Local capacity deficit in all post-conflict societies, including 
Afghanistan, has been well documented. In fact, almost no report or article on 
Afghanistan fails to bemoan the dearth of local capacity, and by extension praise the 
critical role that foreign experts have played in the Afghanistan reconstruction process. 
The drumbeats on capacity building programs by all local and international agencies have 
been in response to this blatant truth. The channeling of more than 15% of all official aid 
to “technical cooperation grants” is further testament to this hypothesis (World Bank 
2014). In addition, in order to fill the capacity gaps in the country, foreign experts 
(including foreign-trained Afghans) have been planted in key technical support positions 
in Afghan ministries as Externally Funded Staff (EFS) through programs such as Civilian 
Technical Assistance Program (CTAP). A World Bank survey of eight ministries and one 
agency in 2011 found that there were nearly 5,000 EFS in these entities, brought in at an 
estimated cost of nearly US$125 million a year (World Bank 2012a, 13). Although the 
majority of EFS are Afghans (only 200 of the mentioned 5,000 EFS were non-Afghans) 
they are often better trained than the civil servants and therefore paid much higher than 
those under the government payroll.  
Although the local capacity deficit and the significance of foreign technical 
support cannot be denied, they fail to explain the variation in aid effectiveness across 
sectors in Afghanistan. If the foreign capacity hypothesis were to succeed in explaining 
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the cross-sector variations in aid effectiveness, the sectors with greatest foreign technical 
support would be expected to outperform other sectors. What I find, however, points in 
the opposite direction. Some of the sectors with the greatest concentration of foreign 
experts rank among the least successful sectors, and vice versa. For example, Table 10 
shows that the top most successful sectors have the lowest ratios of international to 
national EFS.  
 
Table 10 Distribution of Externally Funded Staff (EFS) across sectors in 2011 
National International
Rural Development 2,110                1,879       21                 1%
Education 41,464              1,353       16                 1%
Governance 19,971              253          4                   2%
Health 17,750              374          13                 3%
Agriculture 9,156                339          36                 11%
Mining 2,709                66            9                   14%
Public works 2,278                67            11                 16%
Energy 2,806                129          24                 19%
Finance 7,036                237          60                 25%
Total 105,280            4,697       194               4%
International/National EFS
EFSNumber of Civil 
Servants
Sector
Source: World Bank Report (2012a) and author’s calculations 
Table 11 further reinforces the point about the significance of local capacity in the 
health sector in particular by showing that the MoPH has not needed to rely on more than 
3% international EFS as a percentage of national EFS. This evidence points to the 
direction of refuting the alternative foreign capacity hypothesis and supporting the local 
capacity hypothesis, which I argue is the best predictor of cross-sector variation in aid 




Table 11 Externally Funded Staff (EFS) in the health sector 
National International
2010 17,000                   458             12                 3%
2011 17,750                   443             12                 3%
2012 17,750                   411             9                   2%
2013 18,000                   415             10                 2%
2014 18,000                   410             9                   2%
2015 18,000                   290             10                 3%
Year





Source: Discussion with MoPH staff and author’s calculations 
The Role of Local Capacity in Explaining Gains in the Health Sector 
The role of local capacity in the reconstruction of the broken health system in 
Afghanistan after the Taliban era cannot be overestimated. Using the method of process 
tracing, I will use this section to show that the driving force behind the success of the 
present-day health sector in Afghanistan lies in the decades of the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. During  that time, today’s policy makers and health practitioners received their 
medical training and invaluable professional experiences inside Afghanistan and abroad, 
especially in Pakistan while delivering basic health care services to Afghan refugees.  
In fact, the traces of Afghan capacities in medicine built during these decades of 
war can be found in present-day Afghanistan when medical professionals have not only 
dominated the field of medicine, but are also visibly present in all other prominent 
positions ranging from the country’s chief executive, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, to the 
cabinet, members of parliament, the private sector and the thriving non-profit sector.  As 
it will be illustrated in more details below, tracing the process of rebuilding the health 
system in general and BPHS in particular in the post-2001 Afghanistan is especially 
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instructive at demonstrating the significance of local capacity leading to the exemplary 
success of the health sector as compared to other aid-financed sectors.  
After the fall of the Taliban and the return of Afghan refugees from abroad, the 
Afghans with the financial and technical support of the international community got 
together in late 2001 to devise a plan and put together a strategy to revamp the health 
sector. Even before the formation of a national interim administration and the signing of 
the Bonn Agreement, the donors and NGO community held an important three-day 
conference in Islamabad to prepare for the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s health system. 
One of the first decisions made during this and other deliberations was to conduct a 
national needs assessment, which formed the basis of the country’s national health policy, 
first drafted in March 2002. Two of the key policy choices outlined in this document 
include a) a deliberate focus on primary health care and b) a decentralized MoPH 
structure, centered around providing stewardship, management and regulation, rather than 
on providing health care service directly.  
For improved coordination and collaboration, it was decided that the major donor 
agencies interested in rebuilding the health system would hold joint meetings. In order to 
appreciate the policy development and decision making processes in these critical 
months, special attention has to be paid to the three Joint Donor Missions, because “it 
was during these times that policy options were placed on the agenda, debated, and 
concrete steps were taken to ensure that discussion was transformed into action” (Strong, 
Wali, and Sondorp 2005, 16). During these early discussions, the indispensible role of the 
pre-existing NGO sector could not be ignored.  
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Contracting-out of Service Delivery to NGOs 
The already demonstrated strength of the NGO sector in delivering basic health 
care services was a key impetus for one of the boldest decisions made at the national 
policy level, the decision to “contract out” health care service delivery to NGOs. It was 
during the first Joint Donor Meeting, held in April 2002 and co-chaired by WHO and the 
World Bank, that the contracting-out policy was reiterated using the World Bank’s 
favored mechanism of Performance-based Partnership Agreements (PPA) (Strong, Wali, 
and Sondorp 2005). In PPA, service providing NGOs would go through a competitive 
bidding process and be paid on an estimated per capita cost basis, given their 
predetermined particular catchment areas, and their performance would be evaluated 
based on the findings of third party evaluations.
27
  
PPA and contracting-out in Afghanistan was chosen on the basis of two 
experiments in Haiti and Cambodia, which according to Ridde (2005) were not strong 
enough evidence to prove its superiority. In particular, the Haitian example was not very 
helpful because there was no comparison between the NGO and public-sector service 
delivery, nor was there a comparison between NGOs with and without PPA contracts. 
For these reasons, Ridde (2005, 12) concludes that the World Bank proposal on the use of 
PPA “lacks a strong scientific basis.”  
In the Cambodian case, districts were randomly assigned to one of the following 
three funding modalities, in order to assess the relative effectiveness and impact of each 
(Bhushan, Keller, and Schwartz 2002). First, under a “contracting-out” mechanism, such 
                                                 
27
 For  more thorough discussion of the interconnections between the public, private and nonprofit sectors, 
particularly in the delivery of health services, see (J. M. Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002) 
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as that employed for the majority of provinces in Afghanistan, the contractors were paid 
directly for their work operating the health facilities and the contractors were in charge of 
the entire operations, including service delivery, human resource management, 
procurement of supplies, equipment and drugs, and every day management of health 
facilities.  
By contract, in a “contracting-in” modality, the Ministry continued to remain in 
charge of human resource management, procurement decisions, and every day 
management. The contractors, however, helped strengthen the ministry’s existing 
structure by providing management support to civil servants in return for budget 
supplement for staff incentives and operating expenses.  
The third modality of funding applied was the complete provision of services by 
the government. Functioning as a control group in these districts, the Government District 
Health Management Team (DHMT) was in charge of everything from day-to-day 
management to procurement, human resource management and service delivery.  
The results of a before-and-after survey indicate that “contracted districts 
consistently outperformed the control districts with respect to the predefined coverage 
indicators. The contract-out model performed better than the contract-in model” 
(Bhushan, Keller, and Schwartz 2002, p.2). The same study also shows that contracted 
districts had the added advantage of efficiency gains and achieved more equitable access, 
including households of lower socioeconomic status. 
On an experimental basis in Afghanistan, it was decided to employ the 
“contracting-in” modality in three of the country’s 34 provinces, namely Parwan, Kapisa 
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and Panjshir provinces.  This modality of funding, supported by the World Bank is called 
the MoPH Strengthening Mechanism (SM). Both mechanisms, however, are based on the 
proven model of PPA, a transparent and competitive model of funding that had been 
borrowed from Cambodia and piloted by the Asian Development Bank (Bhushan, Keller, 
and Schwartz 2002). According to Afghanistan’s Strategic Plan for 2011-2015, 
“contracting has proven to be enormously successful in expanding service coverage and 
improving quality of care”  (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2011, 
9). It is important to note, however, that although Afghanistan’s SM model is based on 
the contracting-in model of funding, it has been slightly modified for the context of 
Afghanistan. In particular, the Afghanistan SM model involves “the use of national 
consultants to assist with planning and implementation of SM activities, and salaries are 
generally linked to the National Salary Policy that is applied by NGOs” (Blaakman, 
Salehi, and Boitard 2014, S111). 
In 2003, the MoPH adopted a strategy of contracting-out the delivery of basic 
health care services to NGOs, who had a pre-existing strong presence in some of the 
country’s most remote regions during the preceding decades of conflict, so that the 
MoPH could concentrate fully on its stewardship role. Currently, 31 of the country’s 34 
provinces are under the coverage of this contracting out mechanism, but there are some 
differences across provinces depending on whether the province is covered by the WB, 
USAID, or the EC. In the remaining three provinces (Parwan, Kapisa and Panjshir), the 
MoPH is engaging in direct delivery of health services through a process called the 
“Strengthening Mechanism.”  The management of the 31 provinces’ contractual 
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obligations was awarded to a newly established Grants and Contracts Management Unit 
(GCMU) within the MoPH in 2003.  
After an appraisal mission was conducted by the World Bank in February 2003, 
two important policy decisions were made. First, it was decided that the country’s 34 
provinces would be divided among the three major donors, the World Bank, USAID and 
the European Commission (EC). This allowed for improved accountability and clearer 
division of responsibilities among the donors, thus avoiding a diffusion of responsibility 
and duplication of effort, which are common in many other contexts. The second major 
decision was to establish an independent unit within the MoPH called the Grants and 
Contracts Management Unit (GCMU). This unit would be responsible for liaising 
between the donor agencies, the contracted NGOs and the MoPH.  
The establishment of GCMU was a smart way to bypass the bureaucratic delays 
typical of civil administration, which is why it has been called a “ministry within a 
ministry” (Michael, Pavignani, and Hill 2013, 328) given its function as an independent 
unit, with significant access and control over donor financial assistance and contracts.  
National Health Strategy 
At first, the MoPH developed an interim National Health Policy (NHP) and 
National Health Strategy (NHS) from 2002 to 2004 and in the post-2005 years, a 
National Health Policy was developed. Following this, the next step for the MoPH was to 
transform the policy into a national strategy because “effective aid is dependent on 
building a structure of good policies and institutions” (Michael, Pavignani, and Hill 2013, 
338). The MoPH initiated the process of developing the interim health strategy in August 
 
 201 
2002 and completed it in February 2003, through a number of seminars funded by the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Some of the key components of 
this strategy document included capacity building within MoPH, revised organogram of 
MoPH, and a firm commitment to implementing the BPHS for the next five years.  
The MoPH developed its latest Strategic Plan for 2011-2015, which laid the 
foundation for moving towards a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in the health sector. 
This document identified ten strategic directions which focused on nutrition, human 
resource development, equity in access to health, health financing, evidence-based 
decision making, regulation of the private sector, community empowerment, promotion 
of healthy environments and creating an enabling environment for quality 
pharmaceuticals (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2011). Prior to this, 
the health sectors strategic direction was outlined in the Health and Nutrition Sector 
Strategy (HNSS) developed in 2008. This document promoted the adoption of eighteen 
specific strategies, ten aimed at reducing morbidity and mortality rates and eight aimed at 
institutional development (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008b). 
Since the development of the first national health policy in 2003, successful 
implementation of the BPHS has always received a deliberate focus. For this reason, 
every year close to 50% of total government’s core health budget goes to BPHS, which 
explains the centrality of the BPHS in the success of the health sector (World Bank 
2012b). For these reasons, I now turn to a discussion of the process involved in 
developing the concept of BPHS from idea to fruition. The process of developing the 
BPHS is also instructive at identifying factors that led to its success.  
 
 202 
The Process of Developing BPHS and EPHS 
Once the World Bank managed to garner enough donor and MoPH support for the 
idea of delivering health services through a PPA approach, the next obvious question was 
what those services would constitute. As a result, an advisory committee was appointed 
by the Health Coordination Taskforce (HCTF) to devise the package of services. This 
advisory committee was headed by a WHO consultant, Dr. Xavier Modol, and the 
committee comprised of representatives from MoPH, WHO, UNICEF, USAID, UNFPA 
and MSH (Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health 2003).  
From there onwards, the process seems to have picked considerable pace. In fact, 
within just a month of work, a final draft of BPHS was presented for feedback and 
discussion, and by April 2003, MoPH was in the driver’s seat and the BPHS wheels came 
in motion (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Health 2005b). The 
BPHS soon became the official policy of the government on health and the move was 
made from discussion and planning to actual implementation and service delivery. As the 
first BPHS document notes: 
The cornerstone of the emergence of a new Afghan health system is the Basic 
Package of Health Services, because it addresses the most common health 
problem at all levels and focuses on priority interventions for reducing mortality 
and morbidity. (Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of 
Health 2003, 44)  
These developments were quite impressive given that the “first point that 
delivering a basic package was articulated as a strategy to improve health” was just in 




The idea of a “package” of health services is not new. In fact, Essential Health 
Packages (EHPs) “took centre-stage in the debate when the 1993 World Development 
Report posed a practical question – how should governments in low-income countries 
spend their very limited health budgets?” The response was that they should spend their 
limited health budgets “on a minimum package of essential public health and clinical 
services,” which have been known by different names in different countries (WHO 2008, 
3). For example, while this package is known as BPHS and EPHS in the case of 
Afghanistan, Uganda piloted a Minimum Health Care Package or MHCP in the 1990s. 
the common thread in all these EHPs is that they are the “guaranteed minimum” health 
services and that they provide the “best value for money” for resource-poor countries 
(WHO 2008, 1). Other countries that have adopted such packages include Liberia (Petit 
et al. 2013),  Cambodia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Somalia and more. These examples 
reveal that, more recently, such EHPs have become a natural part of health system 
reconstruction, especially in post-conflict or fragile state environments.  
The early draft of the BPHS was criticized for not representing the views of key 
stakeholders on the ground, including the MoPH, and thus not reflective of the realities of 
Afghanistan (Newbrander et al. 2014). As a result, a Health Coordination Taskforce 
(HCTF) was formed to ensure broader participation in the development of the BPHS and 
to customize it to the realities of the country. In order to get a better sense of these 
realities, the Afghanistan National Health Resources Assessment (ANHRA) was 
conducted, which helped inform the contents of the BPHS, including a stronger focus on 
mother and child initiatives (The Communication Initiative 2003).  
 
 204 
On a practical level, clarity and focus were two of the most important 
achievements in the development of the BPHS. The BPHS brought about considerable 
clarity to the field through its adoption of a standard set of nomenclature that replaced all 
previously confusing naming arrangements. Beyond the taxonomy, the BPHS provided 
clear answers to all logistical questions, such as what services will be provided, where to 
go for specific types of care, who will deliver the services and how the services will be 
delivered. Each health facility type, such as Basic Health Center (BHC) and 
Comprehensive Health Center (CHC), is defined by the following: its catchment area, 
type of services offered, staffing patterns, and the recommended list of equipment and 
essential drugs. Furthermore, a costing exercise was carried out, which found that the 
services listed under BPHS could be provided at an annual per capita cost of US$4.55 
(Newbrander, Yoder, and Debevoise 2007). The second most important contribution of 
the BPHS to the health sector is the kind of focus it brought on specific health related 
interventions and target outcomes. The division of provinces among a small set of three 
major donors simplified coordination mechanisms and prevented fragmentation of health 
care services.  
To complement the services offered by the BPHS, the MoPH and its international 
development partners turned their attention to the development of a similar package at 
higher levels of health facilities than the District Hospital. As a result, the Essential 
Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) was born in 2005, in order: 
(1) to identify a standardized package of hospital services at each level of 
hospital, (2) to provide a guide for the MoPH, private sector, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and donors on how the hospital sector should be staffed, 
equipped, and provide materials and drugs, and (3) to promote a health referral 
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system that integrates the BPHS with hospitals. (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Public Health 2005a, 2). 
 
Despite the seemingly natural unfolding of these processes in hindsight, they were 
far from seamless. In fact, the process was fraught with challenges as a result of intense 
debates, disagreements, and differences of opinion on how best to move forward. I will 
illustrate this through the following three examples.  
Firstly, there was some opposition to the entire BPHS initiative for its prioritizing 
of rural areas and for its disproportional focus on preventive measures. For example, the 
Afghan cabinet wanted to see greater emphasis on curative health by supporting and 
expanding the national hospitals, as had been historically the case in the pre-war decades 
(Newbrander et al. 2014). Whereas some international NGOs were keen to support a 
more vertical programming, which was also a practice that they used during the last two 
decades of conflict in Afghanistan (Newbrander et al. 2014).  
Secondly, there was some opposition to the concept of contracting-out because 
the government considered service delivery as a part of its mandate, and that the public 
perception of health services being delivered by anyone other than the state would 
threaten the government’s authority and legitimacy. In early 2000s, the NGOs also had 
their reservations about the contracting-out of services because they saw their 
independence under threat.  
Thirdly, some interviewees working for the MoPH conceded that although the 
donors recognized the government’s lack of capacity for direct service delivery, they also 
sympathized with the government’s reservations to adopt a contracting our mechanism. 
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At the same time, the donors were unable to unanimously decide what the right solution 
would look like. The first major hurdle was coming to common terms about the World 
Bank’s proposed PPA approach. Then, the three major donors insisted on making their 
mark on the system by modifying elements of the PPA approach, which actually led to 
three divergent paths to the contracting mechanism. These paths only converged to a 
common platform in 2014, over ten years since its conception (Strong, Wali, and Sondorp 
2005). In particular, some Afghan employees at the Bank admitted that the World Bank 
wanted to see contracts between the MoF and NGOs, with the latter holding full control 
and flexibility over the contract amounts. On the other hand, USAID and EC both wanted 
to see a direct relationship between the donors and the NGOs.  
All of these examples indicate the challenges of various actors working together 
towards a common goal. Although less important, the three donors could not even adopt a 
common terminology in their operations. For instance, the World Bank would issue 
“request for proposals,” while the USAID would put out “request for application,” and 
EC would issue “call for proposals.” At first, these variations caused some confusion for 
the NGOs and the Afghan government. Similarly, it appears that GCMU could have had 
one less letter in its acronym if it were not for the Word Bank’s insistence on “contracts” 
and USAID and EC’s insistence on “grants” to be included in the name. This is just one 
example pointed out by some interviewees that show the extent of disconnect among the 
three donors.  
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Revisiting the Role of Local Human Capacity in Health Sector 
The foregoing analysis reveals a number of critical points about the role of local 
human capacity as a key determinant of success in the health sector and the causal 
mechanism associated with it. The turn of the century was a critical juncture for both 
Afghanistan and the international community. While the Bonn Conference was in session 
in December of 2001, demand for change in how aid is delivered was gaining 
momentum. It was being increasingly acknowledged that while aid was a necessary 
condition for development, it is not sufficient. Following the Monterrey Consensus in 
2002, the subsequent high level fora paved the way for the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2005, which pushed for much greater attention to how the donors and the 
recipient country governments would behave.  
In fact, it was argued that the Paris Declaration was “all about changing behavior” 
of donors and recipient countries, and that more aid alone was “unlikely to make a 
serious dent into global poverty if donors do not change the way they go about providing 
aid and developing countries do not enhance the way they currently manage it” (OECD 
2006, 54). But optimism was on the rise earlier when “the year 2005 was billed in 
advance the ‘year of development’” (OECD 2006, 14).  
It was against this backdrop that the international community came together to lay 
the groundwork for rebuilding Afghanistan. With the exception of a few sectors, 
Afghanistan failed to utilize aid in its most effective manner in line with the five 
principles of the Paris Declaration, namely ownership, alignment, harmonization, 
managing for results and mutual accountability (Roberts 2010). One interviewee 
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attributes Afghanistan’s failure to achieve more effective use of development assistance 
to the lack of a specific kind of capacity, namely managerial capacity, defined as the 
ability to set strategic vision and harness the available resources in an efficient manner 
towards the achievement of that vision.  
The health sector, however, managed to take maximum advantage of the 
readiness of the international community to allow for MoPH to claim greater ownership 
on the process and achieve greater alignment and harmonization of efforts. A critical 
factor that contributed to the success of building a strong health system included the early 
assumption of leadership roles by Afghan health experts in the MoPH and the NGO 
community. For example, the “Program Secretariat” was abolished in 2002 “for having 
too many expatriates involved and not enough Afghan leadership” and instead, a 
Consultative Group for Health and Nutrition (CGHN) was adopted with MoPH 
leadership (Strong, Wali, and Sondorp 2005, 29). The CGHN was composed of members 
from the MoPH, donor agencies, UN agencies, the International Security Force (ISAF) 
and other line ministries, and held weekly meetings to discuss technical issues and 
deliberate on key decisions. As Afghans proved their capabilities, donor agencies receded 
more control over time. For example, Newbrander et al., (2011, 653) states that: 
An indicator that the management, monitoring and financial systems had become 
sufficiently developed manifested itself in 2008 when the US Administration 
signed an agreement with the Government of Afghanistan that committed US$218 
million for the funding of basic health services for 13 provinces for five years 
through direct budgetary support to the MOPH through the Ministry of Finance. 
This arrangement represents the first time that USAID has directly provided 
funding of this amount to a host nation. 
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According to the former minister of public health, Dr. Suraya Dalil, the success of 
the health sector is attributed to “a critical mass of individuals with the right experience 
and expertise being deployed at the right time and able to look beyond agency mandates 
and priorities to support sector reform and results” (Dalil et al. 2014, S124). This critical 
factor is identified by others as well. For example, the majority of interviewees noted the 
key role of ex-NGO employees in the post-Taliban reconstruction of Afghanistan’s health 
system. Following the fall of the Taliban, the MoPH “emerged with a relatively new team 
of leaders, many of whom came from UN agencies and NGOs with valuable exposure to 
the realities of the field” (Strong, Wali, and Sondorp 2005, 9).  Beyond the case of 
Afghanistan, the World Health Organization also identifies “well-performing health 
workforce” as one of the six building blocks of a health system (WHO 2007, 3). 
Although some observers (Bower 2002; Waldman and Hanif 2002) have noted a 
lackluster presence of the NGO opinion in these early debates, the observers attribute the 
absence of NGOs to their lack of experience in policy formulation, as opposed to their 
field experience in programmatic areas.  
In programmatic and service delivery areas, however, some 80% of health 
facilities across the country were operated by NGOs and it was argued that “if the public 
health system in Afghanistan runs at all, it runs because of what NGOs have managed to 
do” (UNICEF Officer, in Bower 2002, 18). This point was also identified in a World 
Bank report which found that more than 70% of these NGOs were in fact local Afghan 
NGOs. The World Bank called it “external capacity built during the 1990s” (World Bank 
2012b, 90). This capacity built during the war period filled important positions both in 
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the service delivery sector (operated by the NGOs) as well as in the stewardship role (by 
the MoPH). For example, Newbrander et al. (2014, S10) identify the important role they 
played in the formation and operation of the GCMU within MoPH to manage the 
planning and implementation of BPHS “which included recruitment of knowledgeable 
former NGO staff.” Afghan health experts were in the driver’s seat even in the early 
stages of developing the BPHS as part of the Health Coordination Task Force (HCTF).  
In fact, one of the main reasons that the MoPH (and Ministry of Rural 
Rahabilitation and Development, MRRD) adopted a contracting-out strategy is precisely 
because of the capacities built by the NGOs during the decades of war.  The critical role 
that people, in particular trained and experience professionals, play in the working of the 
state cannot be overstated. For example, “the state must attract, train, and retain a 
sufficient number of talented and honest people to run its programs effectively” (Joshi, 
2011, p. 349). For the case of the health sector in early 2000s, this critical factor was 
already there with training and experiences that had prepared them in the pre-aid era of 
1970s through 1990s. In short, the preponderance of evidence points in the direction of 
local human capacity having played the key deciding role in the success of the health 
secor and other successful sectors, like education and rural development.  
This finding is not surprising in the context of Afghanistan where certain 
occupations, such as medical doctors, engineers and educators are highly sought after due 
to the social prestige they carry. This cultural preference acts as a self-screening tool, 
through which parents prepare their best and brightest children to pursue a career in these 
fields. In fact, as several of the interviewees pointed out, it is common knoweldge in 
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Afghanistan that social pride comes with the occupation you hold in society. Among the 
various occupations, becoming a doctor or an engineer is the top two aspirations anyone 
carries for themselves or for their loved ones. For instance, parents expend a great deal of 
energy in ensuring that their chidren, especially if they exhibit signs of greater 
competence, pursue their education in either medicine or engineering. Interviewees 
pointed out that one would rarely encounter a parent who would dream of their child 
growing up to become an artist, a farmer, an economist or even a successful entrepeneur, 
but doctors and engineers are on the tip of every tongue.  
Although Afghanistan offers free (publicly funded) education, including at the 
posti-secondary level, Afghans have exhibited their willingness to pay for an education 
even in the worst economic circumstances. For example, as some interviewees noted, 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s when the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
was soaring, one of their top aspirations was to provide opportunities for higher edcuation 
for the youth. Afghans, numbering in several million, were not allowed to attend public 
Pakistani colleges and universities, and they could not afford the private institutions. As a 
result, they started establishing their own private institutions of higher education, which 
were merged into the Afghan University in Peshawar in 1999 (UNHCR 2000). Some of 
the interviewees, who are graduates of that university and are currently in leadership 
positions at the MoPH, emphasize that the top two departments within the Afghan 
University were the departments of medicine and engineering.  
The higher education system in Afghanistan further reinforces these cultural 
preferences for certain fields of study. It has to be noted that before 2002, the only 
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suppliers of higher education in Afghanistan were the public universities and specialized 
institutes of higher education. Admission to public universities was granted based on a 
competitive entrance examination, called Kankor (from the French Concours). The 
minimum score threshold set for admission into medical and engineering programs are 
set higher than those for any other program of study, thus further picking the best minds 
into these programs. The students in these sought-after fields undergo relatively more 
rigorous training as evidenced by much higher dropout rates than in any other field.  
The government’s disproportionate attention to these fields of study is also 
illustrated by the number and type of programs offered in each field. For example, out of 
a total of 29 programs offered, only two are related to less successful sectors like finance 
and private sector development, namely the faculty of economics, and faculty of 
management and trade. Conversely, the field of medicine offers a wide variety of 
specialized programs including faculty of pharmacy, faculty of general medicine, faculty 
of medical treatment, faculty of stomatology, and faculty of nursing. Similarly, the field 
of engineering (which explains the success of the rural development sector) offers a 
variety of programs including faculty of general engineering, faculty of construction, and 
faculty of electromechanical engineering (CountrySTAT 2015). With the increasing 
popularity of private institutions of higher education (especially in Kabul) this scenario 
might change over the coming decades. As Figure 27 illustrates, private institutions of 




Figure 27 Private universities and institutes of higher education in Afghanistan 
 
Source: CountrySTAT, Afghanistan (2015) 
 
The popularity of the medical doctor’s profession, however, has not yet resulted 
in an oversupply of medical professionals. In fact, with an average ratio of 0.4 doctors per 
1,000 people in the early 2000s, the overall number of doctors was still lower than the 
average of 1.1 doctors per 1,000 in all developing countries (Strong, Wali, and Sondorp 
2005). The total number of health care personnel, including doctors, nurses and 
midwives, in Afghanistan is just a little over 6 per 10,000 population, which is still lower 
than the 23 per 10,000, which is recommended by the WHO (World Bank 2012a).
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However, these figures still put the health sector ahead of other less successful sectors, 
such as finance, mining and private sector development because comparatively health 
experts are still better trained, more experienced and higher in numbers, which supports 
the local capacity hypothesis for the health sector (CountrySTAT 2015, also supported by 
some interviewees from the Ministry of Higher Education).  
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In addition, it is not just the number of physicians per population that matter for 
Afghanistan. In the context of Afghanistan over two-thirds of the population lives in rural 
areas. Therefore, there needs to be a focus on simple and preventative care, community 
midwives and community health workers (CHWs). These are practitioners that can make 
a real dent in national statistics on mortality and disease prevalence, because “even non-
literate CHWs, male and female, in remote communities can treat childhood health 
problems and communicable diseases such as malaria” (Newbrander et al. 2014, S10). 
The official endorsement and expansion of community midwifery program in 
Afghanistan in 2005 will exponentially increase the number of community midwives in 
the coming years and decades and thus continue to make significant positive impact on 
health outcomes.  
In short, the causal chain from local capacity to the success of the health sector in 
achieving 88% of its stated objectives as defined by Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy, is best described by the narrative below. Some interviewees who were present 
during the early discussions on rebuilding the Afghan health system in early 2002 said 
they knew what mattered the most for the international community was the trend of key 
indicators, especially infant and maternal mortality rates. As a result, the MoPH, with 
support from their international counterparts, carried out a number of exercises, baseline 
surveys, and studies to determine key determinants of mortality and bottlenecks in the 
Afghan health system to achieve significant reductions in mortality rates. The results of 
these studies informed all policy level decisions and strategies.  
 
 215 
For example, it was identified that at the heart of the disproportionately high 
infant mortality rates lay high rates of malnutrition, spread of infectious disease, acute 
respiratory illnesses, diarrheal related illnesses, and other vaccine-preventable disease. 
Taken together, these findings informed the MoPH’s concerted efforts on developing 
solid programs in the areas of nutrition, control of infectious diseases and the rapid 
growth of expanded program on immunization (EPI) across the country.  
Similarly, it was identified that maternal mortality rates were driven primarily by 
pregnancy related complications that were easy to treat but could prove fatal if left 
undetected. The key strategies to address these root causes included an expansion of 
training with community nursing, community midwives and community health workers 
(CHW), which significantly increased the rates of Skilled Birth Attendance (SBA) and 
consequently dropped maternal mortality rates. The official endorsement of the National 
Midwife Education and Accreditation in 2005 boosted the expansion of midwifery across 
the country. This is an especially welcomed move given that the lack of female health 
workers in health facilities was identified as a critical challenge in health service delivery 
in rural Afghanistan.  
The depth with which health posts (HPs) staffed with CHWs covered even remote 
regions and built a strong early detection and referral system prevented pregnancy related 
complications from escalation. The increasing rates of ante-natal care (ANC) and post-
natal care (PNC) over time support this claim. The expansion of BPHS in supporting 
these initiatives, coupled with systematic training of midwives, nurses and CHWs, was 
highly consequential for the gains achieved since 2002.  
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Although local human capacity played a significant role in the health sector’s 
success, other factors that also contributed to their success should not be ignored. For 
example, rather than choosing the path of least resistance to invest in tertiary curative 
care and large hospitals in urban centers (which had enormous political support by 
Afghan politicians), the international community and the experienced Afghan health 
experts based their entire policy and strategy on the realities on the ground that came to 
light through national surveys, such as the Afghanistan National Health Resource 
Assessment (ANHRA) in September 2002. This was an important policy choice which 
prevented the sacrificing of the long-term development for short term political gains. 
It was the ANHRA that paved the way for developing the BPHS, which by itself 
is a key factor contributing to the health sector’s overall success. In fact, Newbrander et 
al. (2014, S7) call the development and implementation of BPHS “one major factor” that 
contributed to the relative success of the health sector in Afghanistan. One of the key 
criteria of the BPHS was to enable the Afghan government and the international 
community to get the biggest bang for the buck, by addressing the most critical needs on 
a priority basis. The BPHS development was slow at the beginning and did not produce 
any visible results druing the first few years, but it helped build strong foundations, and 
thus struck a good balance between the short run need to show results and the long run 
strategic objectives of the sector. The lesson learned from this is that effective aid will 
balance the elements of relief, rehabilitation and development all at once. More 
specifically, “Stakeholders should aim not only to save lives and protect health but also to 
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bolster nations’ ability to deliver good-quality services in the long run” (Newbrander, 
Waldman, and Shepherd-Banigan 2011, 639).  
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the fact that many other factors have 
important implications for the success (or lack of it) of effective aid utilization. In the 
context of Afghanistan, key variables include the degree of corruption, the role of 
informal economy, informal institutions, and political dynamics. The reason these factors 
have not been dealt with in this study is that they are not believed to have had 
differentiated impact across sectors. In other words, I find little evidence to believe that 
corruption or lack of it is more or less pertinent to the health sector vis-à-vis the 
education sector. Differences in local human capacity, however, was identified as the key 
factor determining the variations in aid effectiveness across sectors.  
Ensuring the financial sustainability of the health sector, however, is the last 
remaining key challenge facing the MoPH. In 2014, about 74% of national health budget, 
and 69% of overall national budget comes from foreign aid (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance 2014). Raising domestic sources of revenue would 
therefore lead the path towards financial self sufficiency.  
In conclusion, this chapter presented strong evidence in support of local capacity 
hypothesis in explaining the variations in effective utilization of aid across sectors, and in 
particular in explaining the remarkable success of the health sector. The next and final 
chapter of this study will discusss the policy implications of the local capacity hypothesis 
for Afghanistan before presenting concluding remarks in further testing this hypothesis 
and setting the stage for further research in this area.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This study investigated the question of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, with a 
particular attention to the post-Taliban era from 2002 to 2014. During this time, 
Afghanistan was the second largest recipient of official development assistance second 
only to Iraq, thus making it a critical case study. The literature defines aid effectiveness 
in one of two ways: first, aid effectiveness is assessed against rise in recipient country’s 
GDP growth rates; second aid effectiveness may be defined as the achievement of other 
development outcomes in areas such as health and education. In line with the first 
definition, I investigated the relationship between ODA levels and GDP growth rates 
using data from OECD-DAC Aid Statistics database, the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the United Nations’ National Accounts Main Aggregates 
database. Despite applying three statistical models – namely ordinary least squares 
(OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) – the 
regression results were inconclusive mainly for their failure to arrive at statistically 
significant relationship between levels of ODA and GDP growth rates.  
I want to show that Afghanistan’s lackluster performance in macroeconomic 
indicators (such as the aid-growth link) is not necessarily indicative of the failure of aid 
in Afghanistan. In fact, while the macro-level indicators are important, they obscure the 
achievements of development outcomes at the micro levels. I also show that these 
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variations of success at the micro-level can be illuminating of the factors that lead to 
success under certain conditions, thus locating my research with the contingency school 
in the aid effectiveness literature.  
As a result, I turned my attention to applying an alternative definition of aid 
effectiveness based on its achievement of development outcomes across sectors. 
Fortunately, most of the background work in this area has already been carried out by the 
Afghan government and the international community. In particular, the country’s first 
and only poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) called the Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) clearly lays out the various priority sectors, along with 
their structures, goals, and targets (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008). As presented 
in Table 8, ANDS identifies 17 sectors, grouped under three main pillars of Security, 
Governance, and Economic and Social Development, and six cross-cutting focus areas, 
such as environment, counter narcotics and anti-corruption efforts. Furthermore, an 
extensive evaluation of all sectors was carried out in 2014, which identified a ranking of 
the sectors based on the percentage of targets each sector had achieved (Figure 20). 
Based on this evaluation, the health sector topped the list with a cumulative achievement 
of 88% of its targets, while the lowest performer, i.e. private sector development, 
achieved only 44% of its targets (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy 
2014).  
This questions why there were such extreme variations in the effectiveness of aid 
across sectors even though all sectors were operating under essentially the same set of 
conditions, including the same donors and the same environment. Methodologically, 
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although a one-country case study, I exploit the within country variations to make some 
meaningful comparison of the performance of aid in different sectors. The end goal of 
this study was to identify conditions under which aid is more likely to be effective by 
employing Mill’s method of concomitant variation coupled with the method of process 
tracing, informed by significant desk review and key informant interviews.  
In particular, I choose to focus on the health sector and defend the argument that 
pre-aid levels of local human capacity, built during the decades of conflict from 1970s 
through 1990s, best explains the health sector’s success at not only rebuilding the health 
system after it was almost devastated by the end of the Taliban era. It was also achieving 
remarkable reductions in infant, under five, and material mortality rates among other 
health indicators. 
There are a number of reasons why the health sector in particular enjoys greater 
levels of local human capacity compared to other less successful sectors. First, in the 
cultural context of Afghanistan, certain professions carry greater social prestige than 
others. For example, as most of the interviewees reiterated, the greatest aspiration that 
Afghan parents can have for their children is for them to grow up to become either 
doctors or engineers or educators. This attitude shapes the children’s desires and 
aspirations as they grow up. A good example of this preference for certain professions 
was illustrated in the 1990s, when the Afghan refugees in Pakistan were not allowed to 
attend Pakistani institutions of higher education, but they established their own private 
university, called Afghan University, whose two primary departments were medicine and 
engineering (UNHCR 2000).  
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Second, partly in response to the society’s preferences, Afghanistan’s higher 
education system is built around tightening the grip on who gets into and out of these 
highly sought-after departments by raising the admission requirements through the annual 
national university entrance examinations, called Kankor. In addition to attracting the 
best and the brightest minds to these departments, the higher education system pays 
special attention to the quality of these departments given their privileged status. Higher 
dropout rates ensure yet another layer of screening process to retain the most capable 
individuals in the program.  
Third and most importantly, during the decades of conflict from the 1970s 
through 1990s, in response to the rising numbers of conflict affected IDPs in Afghanistan 
and Afghan refugees in Pakistan, there was an outpouring of humanitarian and 
development assistance from the international community. Given the gap in service 
delivery created by the near collapse of the state (and the absence of it for Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan), NGOs rushed to fill the vacuum and deliver the needed services. 
Here as well, interviewees who used to work for these NGOs emphasize the greater 
attention paid to delivering basic health, and primary education, including literacy 
training. This process ended up building and developing the capacity of Afghans in the 
practical aspects of service delivery as an unintended consequence of delivering aid and 
humanitarian assistance to conflicted Afghans in Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan.  
Taken together, the above-mentioned three factors explain the differentiated 
extent of local human capacity, particularly in medicine, engineering, and education. 
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While the local capacities in medicine and education manifest themselves in the success 
of health and education sectors, engineering skills are best put to use in MRRD’s flagship 
program called the National Solidarity Project (NSP), which delivers basic infrastructure 
projects to rural Afghanistan through bloc grants administered by elected Community 
Development Councils (CDCs). The traces of Afghan expertise in health can be found in 
at least two ways. First, Afghan health experts have taken an active role in producing and 
disseminating knowledge and best practices locally and internationally, e.g. by writing 
papers in the journal of Global Public Health, and promoting the concept of BPHS 
internationally. Second, the presence of Afghan health experts has expanded beyond just 
the MoPH to other sector, including in key leadership positions.  
I consider four alternative hypotheses to explain the health sector’s performance 
relative to other sectors, but refute them in defense of the local capacity hypothesis. The 
Financial Support Hypothesis (FSH) that attributes the gains in the health sector to the 
international community’s financial support. This hypothesis is refuted because the health 
has one of the lowest budgets when compared to the other sectors. The Easy Indicator 
Hypothesis (EIH) attributes the gains in the health sector to the ease of achieving the 
stated targets. This hypothesis is refuted on the grounds that the target setting exercise 
was conducted under the same conditions for all sectors. In fact, the targets in the health 
sector (such as a drop in the mortality rate) are far from easy. The Low Baseline 
Hypothesis (LBH) attributes the gains in the health sector to the condition of health 
outcomes in the post-Taliban era. This hypothesis too is refuted on the grounds that 
significant gains are also achieved in other health indicators, including those considered 
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to be key determinants of mortality (such as immunization coverage and rates of skilled 
birth attendance). Finally, Foreign Capacity Hypothesis (FCH) attributes the gains in the 
health sector to borrowed capacity. This hypothesis is also refuted on the grounds that the 
health sector has one of the lowest proportions of international externally-funded staff 
(EFS) compared to other sectors.  
The causal path linking local capacity to significant gains in the health sector, 
especially in achieving significant reductions in mortality rates, is best illustrated through 
a number of deliberate policy decisions at the MoPH in the early periods of post-2001 
reconstruction. One key decision was to go systematically about identifying and 
addressing key determinants of mortality rates among infants, children, and mothers. In 
fact, it was found in 2014 that the drops in mortality rates went hand in hand with 
corresponding changes to: 
key determinants of mortality, including an increasing age at marriage, higher 
contraceptive use, lower fertility, better immunization coverage, improvements in 
the percentage of women delivering in health facilities and receiving antenatal 
and postnatal care, involvement of community health workers and increasing 
access to the Basic Package of Health Services. (Rasooly et al. 2014, S29) 
 
Having discussed the evidence in support of local capacity hypothesis to explain 
the health sector’s relatively more successful performance, I now turn to the implications 
of this study for the field of development. The findings of this study have important 
implications that will inform both policy and practice for an intelligent allocation of 
foreign aid both for the case of Afghanistan and beyond. For the particular case of 
Afghanistan, this study revealed that Afghanistan is a complex case study with deep 
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historical, social, and political roots that are salient in the study of development process. 
For example, it asserts that without an appropriate strategy to handle Afghanistan’s 
relationships with Pakistan, achieving peace and security will always elude us.  
At the theoretical level, a focus on local capacity in determining aid effectiveness 
takes the debate away from supply-side factors such as volume of development assistance 
(Sachs 2006), or demand-side factors such as good policy environment (Burnside and 
Dollar 2000). Furthermore, it showed that a narrow conception of aid effectiveness, 
defined exclusively in terms of GDP growth rates, may be misleading primarily because 
growth is a function of a myriad of factors and foreign aid is but one such factor. As 
illustrated in the case of Afghanistan, valuable development gains may be overlooked on 
the basis of not finding statistically significant relationship between levels of ODA and 
growth. More importantly, variations in aid effectiveness within a country (as defined by 
development gains across sectors) may be helpful in arriving at contingent 
generalizations, thus informing policy and practice. Such a broad view of aid 
effectiveness, coupled with the case-based methodology of process tracing, can be more 
illuminating than aid-growth regression analysis. This study is also a partial response to 
the micro-macro paradox, in that it shows that gains at the micro level can coexist with 
lack of evidence to show that aid works at the macro level precisely because aid may be 
able to achieve one and not the other (Mosley 1986). 
Methodologically, this study revealed the superiority of combining elements of 
reductionism and anti-reductionism to relying on any one approach. While the former 
brings parsimony, clarity and precision, the latter allows for greater flexibility in dealing 
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with complexity. This may be why widespread agreement on the advantages that the case 
study approach (in particular the method of process tracing) offers has not gone hand in 
hand with a consensus on what the method of process tracing precisely is as different 
aspects of process tracing have been emphasized by different experts (e.g. King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994; Mahoney 2010; Hall 2013; George and Bennett 2005; 
Checkel 2008).   
The most important contribution of this study, however, is the emphasis on local 
capacity as an explanatory variable to variations in aid effectiveness across sectors. 
Therefore, at a practical level, a few policy implications are pertinent. First, aid allocation 
across sectors should be based on and informed by a thorough assessment of existing 
local capacities, which will determine both the absorption capacity as well as the 
probability of success in achieving key development outcomes. Second, channeling aid to 
capacity-rich sectors could yield predictably higher results. Furthermore, policy makers 
could pursue a capacity enhancing strategy by channeling more aid to those sectors with 
relatively higher levels of local capacity. Third, policy makers could pursue a capacity 
equalizing strategy by focusing aid efforts on those sectors with relatively lower levels of 
local capacity by engaging in capacity improvement before disbursing more aid. This 
strategy will provide a more level playing field and increase the potential of all sectors to 
benefit from future investments and support. Such an approach will also increase the 
overall absorption capacity of the recipient country. This is in line with previous calls for 
focusing on the human aspect of development (e.g. Sen 1999; M. ul Haq 1995; K. Haq 
and Kirdar 1986; Schultz 1981). 
 
 226 
It is worth noting, however, that one of the most important policy messages of the 
human development agenda is that “the link between economic growth and human 
progress is not automatic” (UNDP 1990, 3). Although this quote referred to aspiring 
towards a more balanced growth, I argue that more than just balanced growth, we need a 
more focused and deliberate strategy on promoting human development as was the case, 
for example, in producing a cadre of trained community midwives in mid-2000s in 
Afghanistan.  
Developing human capacity, however, should not be assessed on the basis of its 
instrumental value alone, i.e. in so far as they are shown to contribute to growth. In 
particular: 
We should avoid restricting the definition of human resource development to 
sectors contributing to the short-term satisfaction of basic needs. If health, 
nutrition and basic education are important in the perspective of a minimum level 
of self-sustained development, other sectors, such as agriculture, energy and 
transportation - even telecommunications - could constitute the turning point in 
adapting to change. (Jean-Guy St-Martin in K. Haq and Kirdar 1986, 33) 
 
Although Bennett and Elman (2006, pp. 94–95) argue that “causation is not 
established through small-n comparison alone but through uncovering traces of a 
hypothesized causal mechanism within the context of a historical case or cases,” I found 
that a solid application of this methodology is an iterative process that cannot be 
established at once.  In particular, I believe this study can be further strengthened to 
include additional tests, both over time and across different cases to lend further credence 
to its claims. For example, future research could include a longitudinal design that 
investigates whether aid effectiveness changes over time as local capacity increases. This 
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could be done within the same sector or across sectors over time. For example, as 
Afghanistan’s private institutions that flourished since early 2000s produce their future 
leaders in various fields, it would be interesting to observe if a corresponding increase in 
achieving outcomes in those particular fields come to the fore. Similarly, one could ask if 
aid effectiveness changes in other sectors with varying levels of domestic capacity. 
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 Number of functional public and 
private hospitals set up 
Under Assessment Functional regulatory framework 
for quality health services in place 
by 2013 
 
 Number of provinces where organized 
structure is in place 
Under Assessment Functional regulatory framework 
for quality health services in place 
by 2013 
 
 Index on the progress of putting in 
place quality health care services 
Under Assessment Increased quality of health care 
services will be available 
throughout Afghanistan by 2013 
 
 Overall score on Balanced Scorecard TBD TBD 
 
Increased 
access to health 
care service 
 % of population within two hours 
walking distance from PHC services 
66% of population 
with nearby  
access to PHCs 
(2006) 
 
90% of population with access to 
PHC services (2010) 
 Number of health facilities, district, 
provincial and regional hospitals 
equipped with standard package of 
defined clinical and diagnostic 
services 
 
Under Assessment Comprehensive referral system 
integrated with BPHS  
& EPHS in place by 2013 
 % of TB cases detected and treated 68% (2006) Increase of 12% from the baseline 
 
 % of Malaria cases detected and using 
preventive treatment 
 
To be assessed Reduction by 60% from baseline 
Effective 
Reproductive 
and Child  
health system 
 % of children under 1 year having 
received measles antigen, DPT & 
hepatitis dosage and polio drops 
 
77% (2006) Achieve and sustain above 90% 
national coverage (2013). 
 
 % of children under 1 year received 
measles antigen. 
35% (2000) Achieve above 90% coverage by 
2010. 
 
 Maternal mortality ratio 1600 deaths 
/100,000 live births 
(2000) 




 Under 5 mortality rate in the country 
(%) 
257 deaths/1000 
live births (2000) 
 
Reduce by 50% between 2003 
and 2013 
 Infant mortality rate (IMR) in the 
country (%) 
165 deaths per 
1000 live 
births(2000) 
Reduce infant mortality rate by 
30% by 2013 from the baseline of 
2000 
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33 Rahmani Ahmad Idrees Afghanistan Political Analyst Independent
34 Rasool Mohammad Local community member Local community elder, Kabul, Afghanistan 
35 Roberson David VP for University Relations American University of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan 
36 Saay M. Salim IT Director Ministry of Higher Education, Kabul, Afghanistan 
37 Sabawoon Dr. Ajmal Senior Researcher Governance Institute of Afghanistan (GIA), Kabul, Afghanistan
38 Saber Dr. Mohammad Chancellor Nanagarhar University, Nangarhar, Afghanistan 
39 Sadaat Dr. S. Former Director of Foreign Relations, Professor at KU MoHE, Kabul University, Kabul, Afghanistan 
40 Safi Najibullah Director General, Preventive Medicines MoPH Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan 
41 Sahil Ahmad Independent Consultant Independent, Kabul, Afghanistan
42 Sufizada Mohammad Hanif Graduate Student Cornell University, USA
43 Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed
44 Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed
45 Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed
46 Zaman Wendy Staff US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan 
47 Zamir Assad Minister Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), Afghanistan
48 Zia Ehsan Former Minister Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Afghanistan
49 Eight-member focus group discussion held in Kabul among outpatients near Malalai Maternity hospital. 
50 Nine-member focus group discussion held among ordinary citizens in Bagh-e-Babur, a national park in Kabul.









APPENDIX D: NATIONAL BUDGET ALLOCATION BY ANDS SECTORS  
 
US$ Mill % of Total US$ Mill % of Total US$ Mill % of Total US$ Mill % of Total
Private sector development 179           3% 197                    3% 174           2% 66                       1%
Health 317           5% 325                    4% 328           4% 289                     4%
Social security 345           5% 370                    5% 418           5% 175                     3%
Contingency Codes 233           4% 162                    2% 374           5% 560                     8%
Governance 258           4% 286                    4% 320           4% 963                     14%
Agriculture & rural development 436           7% 729                    10% 590           8% 252                     4%
Education 874           13% 987                    13% 987           13% 543                     8%
Infrastructure & natural resources 1,350       20% 1,226                16% 1,083       14% 1,028                 15%
Security 2,644       40% 3,371                44% 3,376       44% 2,929                 43%
Total 6,636       7,652                7,650       6,805                 
Sectors
2016 2015 2014 2013
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